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CHAPTER I
The first link in the chain of events leading up to
the Crimean War was a dispute between Catholic and Ortho-
dox monks over the custody of the Holy Places of the Chris-
tian religion in Jerusalem. The origin of this dispute
can be traced back to 1535 when King Francis I of France
allied himself with Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of Tur-
key, against Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of
Spain. This alliance, widely denounced in Europe as an act
of apostacy on the part of a king whose ancestors had been
pre-eminent in the Crusades, was based on the fact that the
House of Hapsburg was the principal enemy of both poten-
tates at this time. Suleiman granted the French important
commercial, judicial, and religious concessions in an agree-
ment signed in 1536. These concessions v/ere matters of pol-
icy, not weakness, for the Turks were considerably stronger
than France in this period. All Catholics in the Turkish
Empire were placed under the Judicial protection of France,
and Catholic monks were given control over the Holy Places
in Jerusalem. These agreements between France and Turkey
were renewed on several occasions between 1536 and 17^0.
Except for a brief interruption early in the reign of
Louis XIV, the alliance was maintained until the French Rev-
olution. In the course of the eighteenth century Russia
had
succeeded Austria as the chief enemy of the Turks. Seeking
to maintain their influence, the French had supplied the
2Turks with arms and advisors during the Russo-Turkish wars
of 1768-7^ and 1787-92. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in
1798 (which was the first step in a projected attack on
British India) brought about a Turkish alliance with Rus-
sia against France. Although peace was restored between
Prance and Turkey in 1801, one of the long-term results of
their break was a decline of Catholic influence in Jeru-
salem. Orthodox monks, with support from Russia, now ob-
tained custody of a number of Holy Places that had previ-
2
ously been under Catholic control.
The restored Bourbon monarchy in France, being occu-
pied with troubles at home after 1815» failed to take ac-
tion that would restore the Catholic position in Jerusalem.
Nor did the anti-clerical regime of Louis Philippe desire
to do anything about this situation. However, when Louis
Napoleon became President of the French Republic, one of his
main goals was to gain the support of the Catholic Church.
He promptly demanded the restoration of Catholic control
over the Holy Places as had been provided for in a treaty
that France and Turkey had signed in 17^0. The Turks at-
tempted to delay negotiations as long as possible, but the
visit of one of France's newest warships to Constantinople
persuaded them to agree to the French demands. Such was
the situation at the end of 1852.
5In the dominantly Protestant United States there was
little sympathy for either the Catholic or Orthodox side in
the Holy Places dispute. Yet many Americans were concerned
with certain wider implications of the controversy. Ameri-
can diplomatic relations with Turkey had been quite friend-
ly since their formal establishment in 182?. Captain Wil-
liam Bainbridge and the U.S.S. Georg;e Washinp;ton had vis-
ited Constantinople as early as 1800, at which time Turk-
ish naval officials had been very much impressed by the
quality of the ship's construction. After the destruction
of a large part of the Turkish fleet at the Battle of Nav-
arino (1827) » "the Sultan's government arranged to have sev-
eral warships built for Turkey in the United States. The
Turks thereby hoped to avoid total dependence upon conti-
nental powers for their armaments, and obtain ships from a
nation that had no political involvement in the Eastern
Question or the European balance of power. For several
years American instructors were employed in Turkish navy
yards, although their role declined after 1840 when Brit-
ish personnel (after considerable pressure from Lord Palm-
erston, the Foreign Secretary) were appointed to important
positions in the Ottoman navy.
The diplomatic cordiality prevailing between the
United States and Turkey was accompanied by a rapid in-
crease in American commerce with the Ottoman Empire. As
many as thirty American vessels called at Smyrna in 1830,
4including thirteen from Boston and seven from other Massa-
chusetts ports. In addition to purchasing large amounts of
figs and raisins, the Americans by 1828 were taking almost
the entire Turkish opium crop (mainly for the China trade).
In return the Americans sold such goods as cotton, worked
metal and rum. The last item, mainly produced in New Eng-
land, brought distress to American missionaries in the Otto-
man Empire, most of whom, ironically, also came from New
England. A contemporary observer appropriately described
the Smyrna trade as "a leading Boston interest." ^
Operating under the supervision of the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, American missionaries
(mainly Congregational and Presbyterian) first entered Turk-
ish territory during the early 1820' s. They established
schools in Constantinople and several other cities with the
initial object of converting to Protestantism, the Chris-
tian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. The missionaries
were able to win the allegiance of a large number of Arme-
nian, Syrian and Nestorian Christians, but the adherents of
the Orthodox Church (who were by far the most numerous
Christian group in Turkey) were largely unresponsive. But
such resistance failed to dampen the zeal of the American
clergymen, many of whom were young grarduates of Yale, An-
dover, Amherst, and Williams colleges. They entertained
high hopes that their new converts would provide the nu-
cleus for the eventual conversion of the entire Turkish Em-
5pire. They were strongly supported by George Perkins
Marsh, American minister, and John Porter Brown, the chargA
d* affaires who had been at the Constantinople legation
since the early 1830's. Both men believed that the Near
East could be regenerated through the influence of Ameri-
can Protestantism and democracy.
These American evangelists were assisted by Sir Strat-
ford Canning, who had been an attach^ in the British em-
bassy at Constantinople as far back as 1808 and who was
Britain's ambassador to Turkey for much of the time between
1824 and the Crimean War, During the early 184-0 's he pres-
sured the Sultan's ministers into granting more toleration
to the Protestant converts than had previously been al-
lowed to new sects. Other British officials in the Turk-
ish provinces frequently extended their protection to the
missionaries. John P. Brown on one occasion formally
thanked Lieutenant Colonel W. P. Williams of the British
army for the assistance he had given in 1852 to the mission
in Kurdistan. Colonel Williams replied: "The personal
knowledge of any and every one of the American Missionaries
in the East is quite sufficient to make a British officer
smile at fatigue, when by a little extra toil, he could res
cue them from danger, or further their righteous cause
o"
In a despatch to Secretary of State Daniel Webster (June
21, 1852), George P. Marsh paid tribute to Lord Stratford:
6Lord Stratford has been throughout his dip-
lomatic career, a firm and influential advocate
of reforms in Turkey, and many of the most liber-
al measures of the present government may fairly
be ascribed to his zealous and persevering ef-
forts. ... It is but just to add that Lord
Stratford has treated all American interests in
Turkey with liberality and that American mis-
sionaries in remote districts of the Turkish em-
pire have often been deeply indebted to the Brit-
ish embassy and consulates for prompt and effi-
cient protection, when their persons and effectSr.
might otherwise have been seriously endangered.
Turkish policy during the 1848 European revolution en-
hanced its reputation in the United States. Following the
Austro-Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolt, Nicho-
las I and Francis Joseph demanded the extradition of sever-
al thousand Hungarian and Polish refugees who had fled to
Turkey. The Sultan refused their demand, and Britain and
France supported him by sending their fleets to the Darda-
nelles. While not acting Jointly with the British and
French, Marsh and Brown also encouraged the Turks to re-
sist. Eventually, the Austrian and Russian governments
withdrew their ultimatum. The Sultan's action converted
him into a hero for those Americans who sympathized with
the Hungarian cause. The widely publicized Turkish toler-
ation of Protestantism combined with Turkish protection of
European "republican" revolutionaries to inspire a growing
American view that the Sultan's government was more pro-
9
gressive than the Christian monarchies of biurope.
These events altered, if not entirely dispelled, an
older American image of Turkey as a semi-barbarous Moslem
despotism, a view enhanced by events during the Greek War
of Independence in the 1820' s. Many Americans became dis-
illusioned when Greek policy made it more difficult for
American missionaries to operate in Orthodox Athens than
in Moslem Constantinople, By the early 1850' s, then, the
Turkish government was usually presented in a more favor-
able light by the American press than were the major Euro^
10pean powers.
During the early nineteenth century, a curious pattern
of friendship had developed between the Republic of the
West and the Autocrat of all the Russias. The United
States and Russia had no major political or economic con-
flicts with each other at that time, and both nations were
often 'drawn together by their respective disputes with Great
Britain. Although the Russian government did not estab-
lish diplomatic relations with the United States until
1809, the Empress Catherine had indirectly assisted the
American Revolution by refusing to furnish troops to Great
Britain, and by forming the League of Armed Neutrality.
Russian attempts to mediate between Britain on the one
side, and Prance and the United States on the other, came
to an abrupt end when Catherine's new alliance with Emperor
Joseph of Austria (for the partition of Turkey) made a
con-
8tinuation of the Revolutionary War favorable to Russian
interests. "^^
During the War of 1812 Czar Alexander I, Britain's
ally in the conflict against Napoleon, offered to mediate
between the United States and Britain. England rejected
this offer because she did not want Russia expanding into
Western hemispheric affairs. Alexander's motive was equal-
ly nationalistic; he was interested in the continued exist-
ence of a United States navy as a partial counterweight to
B ritish naval power. Russo-American tension developed
after 1815 when the Czar supported plans to restore Spanish
rule in South America and attempted to extend his influence
from Alaska to California. British opposition blocked in-
tervention in South America, and the Russians soon aban-
12doned their California ambitions.
The Polish revolt against Russia in 1850 aroused con-
siderable American sympathy. At one point the Russian min-
ister in Washington protested to the State Department about
extreme anti-Russian articles in Washington's newspapers.
But American-Russian relations improved, due to several fac-
tors. First of all there was the acrimonious dispute be-
tween America and France over claims for damages to United
States property resulting from French maritime seizures dur-
ing the Napoleonic Wars; and Nicholas I detested King Louis
Philippe as a usiirper, and regarded France as a perpetual
revolutionary menace. Secondly, there was the Anglo-French
effort to check American expansion by maintaining Texas as
an independent republic. Third, both powers were giving
diplomatic support to Turkey against Russian influence at
this time. After 1837 "the Czar was represented in Wash-
ington by Baron Alexandre de Bodisco, who became highly
popular in Washington society and acquired a reputation for
good parties. A widower in his early sixties, he did not
remain unattached for long after arriving in Washington and
his wedding was one of the most celebrated social events of
the age.
Still one more development bringing Russians and Amer-
icans together was railroad construction. During the 1840 's
engineers and mechanics from the United States were build-
ing Russia's railroads. Major George Washington Whistler
(father of the famous artist) supervised construction of
the Moscow-Saint Petersburg Railroad until he died of chol-
era in 1849. The firm of Harrison, Eastwick and Winans
built the Alexandrovsk Locomotive Works near Saint Peters-
burg between 1844 and 184?, and this plant was managed by
Americans for eighteen years. Moreover, several Russian
naval vessels were built in American shipyards during the
1840' s, and much of the hemp used by the United States navy
14
for rigging on its own ships was imported from Russia.
Russia's support of Austria against the Hungarian rev-
olution in 1849 represented a major setback in these gener-
ally favorable relations. Napoleon had said at
Saint Hel-
10
ena that in fifty years Europe would be all Republican or
all Cossack (a prophecy frequently quoted in the United
States), and increasingly after 1849 Russia loomed as a dom-
inant and reactionary European power. In December of 1850
the American Whig; Review expressed alarm at the relentless
advance of Russian power:
• • • this Russian policy, this terrific conspir-
acy, more fearful and a thousand times more vast
than that of the assassins, appalls and subju-
gates the world. Who its directors are is known
to few, all of them perhaps to none, some only to
any, but one or two to us, and that by mere re-
port. For some centuries it has existed, receiv-
ing at regular intervals reports of deeds done
and deeds doable from its hydra-headed agents,
stowing them away in archives, and putting them -.
into action at the very nick and crack of time.
William Dowe, a noted American author who was strongly pro-
Turkish, described Russian expansion: "It still grows, as
it has continued to grow from year to year, till it stretch-
es its bulk, like a horizon of storm clouds, nearly along
16
the entire northern edge of the habitable globe."
Despite deep concern with Russian power — further
stimulated by the much-acclaimed 1851 visit of Louis Kos-
suth, the Hungarian revolutionary leader — American hos-
tility for Russia was never so intense as that felt toward
Austria. There remained indeed a considerable body of pro-
Russian sentiment in the United States, especially in the
South and among expansionists in every section. According
11
to them, Russia and the United States were young and grow-
ing, while Western Europe was effete and declining. ^'^
In January 1855 the Southern Literary Messenger, em-
phasizing this theme, informed its readers that all efforts
to halt Russian expansion would be futile. Her power, in
contrast to Western Europe, was steadily increasing and
would extend as far west as Gibralter, "possibly before the
sod covers the remains of men now living." While most Amer-
icans could admire the "American" style of Russian vitality,
fewer would agree with the conservative Messenger
, wherein
distaste for the French Revolution and its long-terra effects
provided an additional reason for pro-Russian sentiment:
Almost every other power sunk mildewed and
crushed before this chilling curse - this bitter
est vial Almighty wrath had ever poured out upon
a guilty and crirae-ridden world. ... The Rus-
sians, as was incontestably proved in the ter-
rific contest with France, are the best soldiers
on earth. ... No republican ideas ever have or
ever can penetrate within those wide extended
borders, from the very nature, both of the gov-
ernment and the inhabitants - all are equal save
one ; and with an eastern devotion they bow be-
fore that one as a superior being. 18
In addition to becoming master of Europe Russia, ac-
cording to the Messenger , would also be the instrument of
Providence to spread Christianity in Asia and Africa. Hu-
man progress had gone about as far as God would permit it
to go. Any steps beyond nineteenth century civilization
would mean that man was trying to rival God, After the
12
collapse of Western Europe the United States would join
Russia as one of the two great powers of earth:
Yet, though the United States cannot check
the march of Russia, it will in all probability
as inevitably extend its domain over a hemi-
sphere. The republican institutions may possibly
change but, whether under a republican or mon-
archical government, the sceptre of the American
Continent from ocean to ocean, and from pole to
pole, at no distant period, will be swayed by the
Anglo-Saxon race, and the world will be divided
into two immense empires. What then? Here we
must pe use - speculation itself can go no fur-
ther - the problem becomes too great for other
than Deity to solve. 19
Most significant perhaps was the relish with which a
Russian conquest of decadent, revolutionary Europe was an-
ticipated, and the calm acceptance of the possibility that
the United States government might cease to be republican
as it extended its power over the Western Hemisphere. Fear
that nineteenth century "progress" might go too far was
also apparent, resembling in tone the pro-slavery denunci-
ations of capitalism by George Fitzhugh, William J. Grayson,
and others.
In the very month that the Messenger predicted
contin-
ued Russian expansion, the Eastern Question was complicated
by a revolt in Montenegro. Its Orthodox leaders
had long
maintained close ties with Nicholas I and he believed
that
13
the uprising signaled the impending break-up of the Turk-
ish Empire. Priding himself on being the champion of Orth-
odox, as well as European conservatism, he was outraged by
the Turkish concessions to France, and regarded Louis Na-
poleon (now Emperor Napoleon III) as a usurper who would
someday start a revolutionary war in Europe to regain the
power once possessed by his uncle. Nicholas felt that the
time had come to forestall the possibility of French gains
when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. But for the moment he
was content to have Austria play the leading role in the
20Montenegrin affair.
The Austrian government was determined to end the
fighting in Montenegro. It feared that the insurrection
might spread to include the Orthodox Slavs under its own
rule. There was also the possibility of Russia becoming
the leading beneficiary of a general Balkan uprising, some-
thing- that had long concerned the statesmen in Vienna. Al-
though Nicholas I was a valuable ally against Central Euro-
pean revolutions, his presence in the Balkans would be high-
ly unwelcome. Indeed, had he fully appreciated the signif-
icance of Austria's dual attitude there might never have
21
been a Crimean War.
Nicholas I assured Emperor Francis Joseph of his full
support when, in February, 1853, Austria despatched a spe-
cial ambassador. Count Leiningen, to Constantinople with an
ultimatum demanding an immediate cease-fire in Montenegro.
14
Commenting upon it, John P. Brown, in charge of the Ameri-
can Legation in Constantinople during the absence of Min-
ister Marsh, noted the "peremptory and menacing demands"
in a despatch to Secretary of State Edward Everett. Brown
was certain that "the Austrian government is strongly sup-
ported by Russia, and it is believed they act in concert
against Turkey." In his Judgement, Turkey would have to
look to England and France for support.
The Turkish government did consult Britain and Prance,
but these powers advised against resistance on the Monte-
negrin question. The Sultan, as a result, agreed to a
cease-fire in Montenegro. Brown consoled himself with the
fact that "the Porte has refused all intervention on the
part of Austria in the condition of the Sultanas Christian
subjects of Bosnia." He also informed the State Department
that "the Porte has been much aided in sustaining this po-
sition by the French Ambassador and the British Chargi d'
Affaires, - particularly by the former." ^
The American press extensively reported the events in
Montenegro. Turkey, according to the New Bedford Mercury ,
was "effete," and the Montenegrins had "something of the
old republicanism of the early New England colony." Ameri-
cans "may find a parallel in them; for they are in fact a
republic of small communities; each village having the
24
right to be governed by its own assembly." The Mercury
concluded that "the perpetual puzzle of cabinets," the
15
Eastern Question, was about to be revived. The Springfield
(Mass.) Republican a week later published an article from
its Vienna correspondent to the effect that the Montenegrin
conflict would have consequences across Europe:
The peace of Europe hangs by a thread, and
the little war in Montenegro may serve as the
dust in the balance, insignificant, but suffi-
cient to turn the scale, and set thrones and em-
pires tottering. It is evident to the merest
tyro in politics, that a trifle is sufficient to
disturb the delicately adjusted relations exist-
ing between the four principal continental pow-
ers, and the course events are now taking, seems
to indicate that clashing interests in the East
will commence the drama, 25
Many Americans sought to discover a struggle between
"republicanism" and "despotism" in every European conflict.
They could not be disturbed by the apparent irrelevance of
the republican issue in any Russo-Turkish dispute. William
Dowe, -for example, uncovered strong elements of democracy
in Turkey;
Patriarchal governments are suitable to the
genius of the East; and the Turkish is one of
these, like the Chinese, Japanese, Persian, Bur-
mese, etc. In that patriarchal system there is
a certain spirit of democracy. In Turkey there
is no hereditary nobility; nothing stands be-
tween the Padishah and the poorest Turk, who may
rise by merit and bravery to the presence of his
sovereign - become Grand Vizier, and actually
marry his sister or daughter! If there is no
democracy in this, we do not know what to call
democracy or where to find it. . . . '^^rely there
is much more of the fine old equality of the
16
primitive ages in Turkey than in the feudalized,
crystalized society of aristocratic England. 26
If war broke out between Turkey and Austria, it was
widely believed in the United States, the Turks would call
on Kossuth and other European revolutionaries for assist-
ance. The. New York Tribune expressed confidence in the
Turkish army and its possible allies: "The Turkish army
is well disciplined and equal in valor either to the Aus-
trian or the Russian, . . • The hopes of Hungary, and indeed
of all Western Europe, are all directed to Constantinople,
Deliverance and liberty are for the present expected from
the East." ^'^
The New York Times had few doubts as to who was behind
rebellion in Montenegro: "It is suspected that the Czar is
the operator, and that what is wrought out in Montenegro is
telegraphed all the way from Saint Petersburg." The paper
editorially surveyed the background of this conflict:
Hopes have been adroitly instilled into
every people whose faith regards the Emperor as
Supreme Head in spiritual things, that at some
day not far off in the future, there shall be a
reassembling of the tribes, and a setting up of
a Sclavonic Empire, whose power and religious
unity shall in due time cover the earth. These
flattering tales mask the intention of Russia to
absorb the whole of Eastern Europe from the Pel-
oponnesus to the North Cape. They are so under-
stood in the political scheme of Europe. 28
17
A general European war, the Times editorialized on March 7,
was likely and it could produce a new round of revolutions.
There was little possibility, however, that the United
States would intervene directly in such a war: "It matters
nothing to us whether Paynim, Cossack, or John Bull own the
Dardanelles. And we shall have too much on our hands at
home to permit us, even if so disposed, actively to inter-
fere in favor of republicanism in the other hemisphere
While the American press pondered the implications of
the Montenegrin revolt, Czar Nicholas, encouraged by the
success of Count Leiningen at Constantinople, moved to con-
solidate Russia's position in the Balkan peninsula. The
Czar was confident that England would support him in his
plan to eliminate French influence in Turkey because, early
in 1855 » Great Britain was in the grip of a French "inva-
sion panic." Had he confined himself to demanding a re-
versal of the Turkish decision on the Holy Places question,
it would not have concerned the British greatly. But Nicho-
las went further.
After staging military and naval maneuvers at Sevasto-
pol, General Alexander S. Menshikov, the Czar's special am-
bassador, arrived in Constantinople with a most impressive
military staff. He demanded that the Turks revoke their
recent concessions to France and agree to a Russian pro-
18
tectorate over the Sultan»s Orthodox subjects. Turkish
assent would have amounted to an acknowledgment of Russia's
right to occupy any part of European Turkey on the pre-
text of protecting Orthodox Christians. Napoleon promptly
despatched a fleet to the Aegean to encourage the Turks to
resist. The British at first hesitated. They had been
willing to support Nicholas so long as he seemed to be up-
holding the integrity of the Turkish Empire against France.'
Now the Czar himself had challenged this integrity. Grad-
ually England moved to the side of France. The veteran
British ambassador in Constantinople, Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, advised the Turks to concede most of the Russian
demands on the Holy Places question, but to reject the pro-
posed protectorate; and they followed his suggestions.
John P. Brown, the American charge d* affaires, also
counseled the Turkish authorities to take a firm stand
against Prince Menshikov. The Russian envoy had insisted
on the resignation of Fuad Effendi, Turkey's Foreign Min-
ister, and when Fuad assented, the British and French
charges (neither ambassador was in Constantinople when Men-
shikov first arrived) urged the Sultan to retain Fuad.
Brown, conferring with the Grand Vizir, also urged a simi-
lar stand. He reported that it was proper for the United
States to join its influence to that of "other liberal and
52
constitutional Governments" in this crisis. ^ He even
sent a confidential letter to Fuad in which he tried to
19
persuade him to withdraw the resignation. Since the United
States government had encouraged Turkey to protect Hungari-
an refugees in the past, he was convinced of America's ob-
ligation to give diplomatic support to Turkey. Ali Pasha,
a former Turkish Foreign Minister, brought this matter up
in a conversation with Brown: "He stated to me that the
Ottoman Government was placed in its present unpleasant con-
dition towards Austria and Russia greatly in consequence of
having acted on the friendly recommendation of the Govern-
ment of the U.S. in behalf of Mr. Kossuth." Brown failed
in his immediate objective; Fuad Effendi did not return to
office. He was succeeded by Rifaat Pasha, an official less
objectionable to Russia.
On May 12 Brown informed the new Secretary of State,
William L. Marcy, that the Holy Places dispute had been set-
tled, but Prince Menshikov had presented a forty-eight hour
ultimatum to the Turks on the protectorate question. The
French ambassador was giving strong support to the Turkish
government, and Lord Stratford, after some hesitation, also
advised the Porte to reject the ultimatum. The recommen-
dation was followed. Menshikov left Constantinople with
the announcement that diplomatic relations between Russia
54
and Turkey were now severed.
After Menshikov 's departure. Brown sent the State De-
partment a series of documents on the Eastern Question. He
was encouraged by a new development in the Turkish Foreign
20
Ministry; Reshid Pasha, "a man of liberal views" who was
"very hostile to Russia," had succeeded Rifaat Pasha.
Brown requested the State Department to authorize him to
assure the Turkish government of "the friendly sympathies
of the Govt, of the U.S., and its interest in the mainte-
nance of the integrity of the Sultan's Dominions." ^"^
Brown soon had a chance to demonstrate American sympa-
thy for the Turkish cause. George P. Marsh was on official
business in Athens when he heard the news that Menshikov
had broken off diplomatic relations with Turkey. Since
there might be popular disturbances in Constantinople
»
Marsh thought it would be good to have a warship there to
protect American citizens. He requested Commodore Silas
Stringham to proceed to the Bosphorus on the frigate Cumber -
56
land
,
flagship of the U.S. Mediterranean Squadron.
The almost continuous existence of this squadron since
1801 was testimony to the importance of American commercial
and missionary activity in the Mediterranean^ President
Jefferson had originally sent a fleet to the Mediterranean
to halt the attacks of the Barbary pirates on American mer-
chant ships. These pirates were a memory by the middle of
the nineteenth century, yet the squadron was maintained to
protect American merchants and missionaries in the fre-
quently turbulent ports of the Levant. ^' Brown, upon
Stringham 's arrival, arranged for him to be received in
Court where, on Brown's advice, the Commodore assured the
21
Sultan of "the sympathies of the Government and People of
the United States in the present unjust endeavors to in-
fringe upon his Sovereign Rights, and the independence of
his Government,"
Shortly after the breakdown of the Russo-Turkish nego-
tiations, the British and French fleets were ordered to
Besika Bay, adjacent to the Dardanelles. The Russian army
crossed the Pruth River and occupied the principalities of
Moldavia and Wallachia which were under nominal Turkish
suzereinty. Brown informed the State Department on June 25
that the British and French planned to attack Sevastopol
and destroy Russia's Black Sea fleet if war broke out. The
American charge was convinced that "the future liberties,
and advancement of all mankind will be involved in this
struggle." He was pleased to note that "even Austria" was
beginning to turn against Russia. The United States, Brown
thought, should not "remain a silent spectator of the strug-
gle."
Upon returning to Constantinople, Marsh informed the
State Department that a majority of the Sultan's advisors,
including the British ambassador, were opposed to treating
Russian occupation of the Principalities as an act of war.
The mass of the Moslem population in the Turkish capital
was for war, Marsh admitted, and he feared "great tumults"
if the Sultan conceded too much to Russia. He thought that
American citizens in all the major Turkish ports might need
22
naval protection. Therefore, Marsh decided to keep the
sloop Levant at Constantinople and requested Commodore
Stringham to detach another vessel from his squadron "to
cruise between the different ports of the Levant while the
present state of affairs continues."
Marsh fully approved of the vigorous policy that Brown
had pursued in his absence and was displeased with English
hesitation. He wrote to Secretary Marcy on July 15 that
the British and French should have taken the Russian occu-
pation of Moldavia and Wallachia as a casus belli . The
season for fleet operations in the Black Sea would soon be
over: "The fleets might now strike a powerful blow at Rus-
sia by annihilating her marine in the Euxine and destroying
the towns upon its coasts, and the Turkish forces are in
better condition, morally and physically, than they have
usually been in recent wars." ^"^ The State Department had
up to -now approved of the policies of Brown and Marsh. But
Secretary Marcy thought that Marsh was going too far when
he advocated an immediate Anglo-French attack on Russia.
Writing "omit" next to the strongest paragraph in Marsh's
despatch, he thereby made certain that the State Depart-
ment clerks would not include this passage when they made
copies of the documents. Yet Marcy sent no rebuke to ei-
ther Marsh or Brown.
The general tone of the American press was pro-Turkish
during the months of the Menshikov mission. Typical was
25
the Springfield Republican
^ foreseeing- great gains for
European revolutionists if war broke out between the Great
Powers over the Eastern Question. Consequently, the paper
editorialized, every effort would be made to avoid war:
"The powers of Europe are all afraid of a war* Let but the
match be lighted, and the continent will blaze. The great
powers are determined there shall not be a war. We shall
see." On July 15 the Republican printed a letter from
the Reverend Edwin Bliss of West Springfield, a missionary
at Constantinople. Exemplifying the attitude of most Amer-
ican missionaries, Bliss believed that Russia hoped to con-
solidate the power of the Orthodox priests and prevent the
spread of Protestantism:
Nobody would think it strange to see the
Russian fleet coming down the Bosphorus at any
hour of the day. ... Of course all these
things give us some anxious thoughts in regard
to the future. But the Lord reigns, and we may
rejoice. The coming in of the Russians would
seem to be a great calamity. But the Lord can
take care of his own work, and of us also. We
will seek to do just what He would have us do,
and be found where He would have us be, and then
we need not be anxious. ^
The National Intelligencer , a more conservative paper
than the Republican , also thought that war would lead to
revolution in Europe. Unlike the latter, it had little sym-
pathy for European revolutionaries and, while occasionally
printing some praise for Russia as a growing young nation,
2^
its main interest was in the preservation of peace. On
June 20 the Intellig;encer contained a letter from an Ameri-
can in Genoa, whose opinions reflected its own: "Inter-
national policy has become a policy of reciprocal interests.
Xt is the age of civilization and commerce, and diplomacy
arbitrates in place of the sword."
The Intelligencer even printed a letter from Roger A.
Pryor, the editor of its Democratic rival, the Washington
Union , which expressed a conservative opinion on the East-
em Question, His letter centered upon the recently pub-
lished The War of Ormuzd and Ahriman by Henry Winter I^avis,
later famous as a Radical Republican congressman during the
Civil War. Davis claimed that an American-Russian war was
inevitable. Concerned with this prophecy, then being
spread by European radicals and their American disciples,
Pryor rejected the view that the United States represented
the spirit of light and Russia was the incarnation of dark-
ness. He cited the long history of friendly Russian-Ameri-
can diplomatic relations. He also praised Russia for not
having made "the abolition crusade an engine of warfare a-
gainst republican institutions": "It is a favorite dream
of our American disciples of Louis Blanc and Ledru Rollin,
the men of the Mountain, that the United States and Russia
are fore-ordained foes - that it is their mission ulti-
mately to rush in dread collision, and by wager of battle
to determine the grand problem of human freedom.
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The New York Tribune on April 12, 1853 published an
editorial entitled "The Real Issue in Turkey," written by
Karl Marx, one of its European correspondents. Marx crit-
icized the British for not taking stronger action against
Russian expansion and, like most European liberals and so-
cialists, he regarded Russia as the "international gen-
darme" of reaction. Any defeat of Russia would increase
the strength of bourgeois liberalism and ultimately of so-
cialism. Marx wrote that in a conflict between England and
Russia "the interests of the revolutionary Democracy and
47England go hand m hand." '
The Washington Union , the semi-official organ of the
Pierce administration, had denounced Davis' The War of Or-
muzd and Ahriman when it was published. Speaking of the
"immense genius" of Nicholas I and describing the great
progress of Russia under an absolute monarchy, it took note
of similarities between Russian and United States expan-
sion. But as Russian pressure on Turkey continued, the
Union switched to a strongly pro-Turkish stand. On July
17 it described Russia as "the arch enemy of the cause of
free government in Europe." Commodore Stringham's inter-
view with the Sultan prompted the following comment: "It
will be seen that Commodore Stringham understands the
pulse of the American heart, and in a very handsome manner
has given the Sultan assurances of the sympathies of our
countrymen in his resistance of unjust aggression."
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1?he New York Times was incensed by the Union 's early
pro-Russian position and commented on it at length. In a
satiric vein it described the Union 's editor dining late
with Baron Bodisco and then imagining that Nicholas, rather
than Pierce, was his master while he was "tottering home-
SO
ward." The Times published further editorials on this
subject and linked the Union' s attitude towards Nicholas
with the expansionist policy of the Pierce administration:
"No more sympathy for nations struggling for freedom, un-
less annexation be intermixed with the plan. The American
Government has decreed that its sovereignty is to move a-
breast with its principles. This may come to be called the
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•Pierce Doctrine'." ^
On June 9 the Times asserted that a great conflict be-
tween Russia and the Western powers over the "lifeless
corpse of Turkish rule" was inevitable: "Possibly a war, a
new crusade may result from the defeat of the Russian de-
mands. The religion of Jesus may, as in the days of Peter
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the Hermit, bring upon the earth not peace but a sword."
Hiring the spring of 1855 American reaction to the
Russo-Turkish dispute, both official and unofficial, was
predominantly pro-Turkish. Several decades of increased
American diplomatic, commercial and missionary contacts with
the Ottoman Empire had contributed to this sentiment. It
was influenced primarily by a circumstance already important
in American foreign policy decisions. Turkey had provided
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aid and comfort in recent years to republican revolution-
aries highly popular in the United States. Russia, on the
other hand, had given its full diplomatic and military sup-
port to Austrian attempts to repress liberal and national-
ist revolutions.
CHAPTER II
The apparently close cooperation between Russia and
Austria during the spring of 1853 was a major factor which
intensified pro-Turkish sentiment in the United States,
For several years American diplomatic relations with Aus-
tria had been hostile, and there were numerous popular dem-
onstrations against the Hapsburg monarchy and support for
its revolutionary opponents.
Before 184-8 the Austrian policy of maintaining the ter-
ritorial and political status quo
, established in Europe by
the Congress of Vienna (1815), had been highly unpopular in
the United States. Then in 1848 Prince Metternich, the
chief architect of this policy, was overthrown, and for a
few months the Austrian Empire seemed to dissolve into its
national components. But the army remained loyal to the
monarchy, and Austria's position in Italy was re-estab-
lished by Count Joseph Radetzky. Hungary's rebels, how-
ever, briefly succeeded in expelling most of the Austrian
troops from their territory. Although there was consider-
able dissension between Louis Kossuth and General Gorgei,
the Hungarian political and military leaders, the con-
cerned Hapsburg government was forced to call on Nicholas
I for military assistance to crush the rebellion, Gorgei
then surrendered to the Russians while Kossuth fled to Tur-
key. The Austrian commander. General Haynau, already known
in England and America as the "beast of Brescia" for his
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ruthless suppression of a revolt in that Italian town, pro-
ceeded to execute all the Hungarian leaders he could cap-
ture, including several who had been more moderate than
Kossuth.
American enthusiasm for the Italian and Hungarian rev-
olutions was very great. It was intensified by two factors
the brief overthrow of the Pope, and Kossuth's Protestant
faith. The combined spectacle of European peoples imitat-
ing the American Revolution, and a "Protestant hero" strug-
gling against the leading Catholic power in Europe, appeal-
ed to the mood of mid-nineteenth century America. Domestic
anti-Catholicism had recently been strengthened by the
great influx of Irish immigrants; and consequently, support
for European freedom easily fused with fear of Catholic po-
litical control of American cities. Such tendencies did
not always coincide (some revolutionary sympathizers were
against nativism, while some nativists were almost as anti-
revolutionary as they were anti-Catholic), but whether op-
erating together or separately they were always anti-Aus-
2trian and anti-papal.
When Pope Pius IX, in 1850, announced the restoration
of a Catholic hierarchy in England, American Protestants
shared the indignation of their English brethren against
this "Papal Aggression." Since Louis Napoleon had restored
the Pope to Rome with the French army, and the Italian and
Hungarian revolutions had been suppressed by Austrian and
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Russian military forces, a united front of the Catholic
and Orthodox monarchies seemed to exist. This development
provoked a strong American (and English) popular reaction.
The Methodist Quarterly Review consoled itself with the
thought that the papacy's days were numbered:
The papacy, though not dead, is dying; and
,
like an expiring giant, it puts forth gigantic
energies, even in the death struggle. Its latest
usurpation, the daring attempt to re-establish
its ecclesiastical rule and cast the fetters of
its worn-out superstition over gospel enlight-
ened England, is not the effect of conscious
health and power, but rather a spasm of waning
vitality. 5
The Hungarian question produced a major diplomatic
dispute between the United States and Austria, which had
not ended when a European war threatened to erupt over the
Eastern Question in 1853. Four years earlier. President
Zachary Taylor's administration had sent A, Dudley Mann, a
special emissary, to the Hungarian rebel government with
discretionary power to recognize it. The United States had
already recognized several provisional governments in 1848,
most of which had soon collapsed. Although Mann accom-
plished nothing, the indignant Austrians were convinced
that he had refrained from recognizing Kossuth's govern-
ment only because it was on the verge of collapse when he
arrived. ^
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Chevalier Johann Hulsemann, the Austrian minister in
Washington, protested the aid and comfort given to his Em-
peror's disloyal subjects. In reply, Secretary of State
Daniel Webster reminded Hulsemann that United States ter-
ritory was now so vast that the possessions of the House
of Hapsburg were but a small part of the earth's surface
by comparison. This defiant response, strongly implying
that the United States was now powerful enough to secure her
interests in all parts of the world, increased Austrian con-
cern about future American meddling in Europe. Although
Webster was genuinely pro-Hungarian, he privately admitted
that the bombastic tone of his note was partly designed to
divert American attention from the slavery controversy by
focusing attention on the Union's proud position in the
world,
,
While Webster was engaged in controversy with Hulse-
mann over the Mann mission, Louis Kossuth left Turkey on
board the American steam frigate Mississippi
.
Upon his ar-
rival in the United States Kossuth received a tumultuous
popular reception. Parades and banquets were held for him
in most of the leading cities. In New York, his denunci-
ation of the Jesuits as associates of Austrian tyranny was
hailed by Protestant clergymen, protested by the Catholic
Archbishop John Hughes, and created heated controversy in
the press. George Templeton Strong, a New York Whig lawyer
with little taste for revolutions, confided to his diary
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that American enthusiasm for Kossuth was based more on the
old No-Popery cry than on any genuine interest in Hungarian
nationalism. New York's large Irish population, not sur-
prisingly, displayed little enthusiasm for the Magyar lead-
er. 6er.
Kossuth, impressed by the rapid increase of United
States wealth and power, sought to persuade Americans to a-
bandon their traditional policy of avoiding European po-
litical alliances, and to support the next round of Euro-
pean revolutions, hopefully in alliance with Britaino ^
Kossuth repeatedly reminded his audiences of the need to
establish American political ideals on the Continent. Em-
erson's welcoming speech, when Kossuth visited Concord in
May, 1852, seemed to meet the Hungarian's highest expec-
tations:
Sir, whatever obstruction from selfishness,
indifference, or from property (which always
sympathizes with possessions) you may encounter,
we congratulate you that you have known how to
convert calamities into power, exile into a cam-
paign, present defeat into lasting victory. For
this new crusade which you preach to willing and
unwilling ears in America is a seed of armed men.
. . . And as the shores of Europe and America ap-
proach every month, and their politics will one
day mingle, when the crisis arrives it will find
us all instructed beforehand in the rights and
wrongs of Hungary, and parties already to her
freedom. 8
The high point of Kossuth's trip was his visit to Wash-
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ington. President Millard Fillmore received him, and Con-
gress voted funds to pay his hotel expenses. At a banquet
in his honor, Secretary Webster seized the opportunity for
another public rebuke to Austria. He proposed a toast to
"Hiingarian Independence," and would rejoice, he declared,
"to see our American model upon the lower Danube and on the
mountains of Hungary." Although this was mainly political
rhetoric as far as Webster was concerned, it was taken seri-
ously by Hulsemann as another indication of impending Amer-
qlean intervention abroad. ^
Kossuth, continuing his journey, began to be caught in
the dangerous cross-currents of American politics. Although
it was Senator Henry Foote of Mississippi who had first sug-
gested that a warship be sent to convey Kossuth out of Tur-
key, the South generally responded less favorably to revo-
lutionary speeches than did other sections. Many Southern-
ers were aware that Kossuth's arguments could be used to
justify a slave insurrection. At the same time the abo-
litionists were irritated with Kossuth's refusal to commit
himself on the slavery question, claiming it was none of
his business to make pronouncements on purely American is-
10
sues.
Despite a fad for Kossuth beards and hats, it soon be-
came evident that neither the American political leaders
nor a sizeable element of the people had any desire to in-
tervene abroad in support of a Hungarian or any other revo-
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lution. Above all, few American politicians would dare to
appear pro-British in the eyes of their constituents, and
Kossuth's hopes were based on the idea of Anglo-American
cooperation in support of European revolutions. Democratic
Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, who often spoke in
favor of a more active American foreign policy, repudiated
any idea of Anglo-American cooperation until England made
major concessions to Ireland. Less hostile to Britain, the
Whigs were, more than the Democrats, opposed to any thought
of adventures in Europe. Kossuth left for England a dis-
illusioned man. President Fillmore and Secretary Webster
had made it clear to him in private conversation that any
American action abroad was out of the question. The Hungar-
ian leader now began to write articles for The New York
Times , which were highly critical of American emphasis on
business success to the exclusion of a spirited foreign pol-
icy. 11
Kossuth's hopes were not entirely misplaced. A group
of highly vocal politicians and journalists calling them-
selves "Young America" were more genuine interventionists
than Webster. Most of them were Democrats and ardent ad-
vocates of American territorial expansion. They combined
their expansionism with strong support for the 1848 Euro-
pean revolutionary movements. Unlike the Whig Webster, who
was generally pro-British (more so in private than in pub-
lic statements), the "Young Americans" regarded England as
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the chief obstacle in the way of further extension of Amer-
ican power in the Caribbean and Central America. Their en-
thusiasm for revolts included Irish attempts to overthrow
British rule; but, being Southerners or Northerners indif-
ferent to the moral aspects of the slavery question, they
were against any anti-slavery agitation. The two leading
figures in "Young America" were George N. Sanders, tt^e ed-
itor of the Democratic Review , and Senator Stephen A. Doug-
las of Illinois. The former became notorious after offer-
ing the Hungarian republicans 144,000 old muskets for use
in a new revolution. The latter derided an "Old Fogy" for-
eign policy which opposed American intervention in Eu-
rope. "^^
In early 1853 "Young America" appeared to be growing
in strength, for the new Democratic president, Franklin
Pierce, selected several' of its manbers for important dip-
lomatic posts. Pierre Soul6, a former French republican,
was appointed Minister to Spain. (As Louisiana senator,
Soul^ was a leading advocate of American expansion in the
Caribbean and Central America.) The rising New York banker
August Belmont became American minister to the Hague.
George N. Sanders of the Democratic Review became the Amer-
ican consul in London. Pierce, in his inaugural, struck
an expansionist note by deploring the timidity of those who
opposed any further extension of America's boundaries.
Everything seemed to foreshadow an administration whose for
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eign policy would be similar to that of President Polk.
In late June of 1853 an incident occurred at Smyrna
which suggested that "Young America's" foreign policy might
be implemented and Austria's worst suspicions confirmed.
Austrian officials seized a Hungarian refugee, Martin Kosz-
ta, and imprisoned him on the brig Hussar
.
Koszta, an as-
sociate of Kossuth, had gone to the United States after the
collapse of the 1849 Hungarian revolt. He had taken out
naturalization papers, but had not yet been naturalized at
the time of his arrest in Smyrna.
David Offley, the United States consul in Smyrna, im-
mediately protested the Austrian action to the Turkish au-
thorities, informed John P. Brown, the American charge in
Constantinople, of the incident, and consulted with Com-
mander. Ingraham of the U.S. corvette Saint Louis , which was
anchored in the Smyrna harbor at the time. They agreed to
take no action until Brown forwarded instructions. Ini-
tially, Brown sent a note to the Austrian envoy in Constan-
tinople demanding the release of Koszta, but it was rejected
and Brown was informed that Koszta was still an Austrian
subject. While these negotiations were going on, Offley a-
gain consulted with Ingraham aboard the Saint Louis . As
the two men were talking in the Commander's cabin, an offi-
cer broke in to warn that the Austrian warships in the har-
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bor were loading their guns. Ingraham then gave orders to
load the guns of the Saint Louis
.
The situation remained tense for several days. On
June 28, Brown instructed Ingraham to attempt the forceful
release of Koszta if necessary. In a note to Offley, Con-
gressman Caleb Lyon of New York, in Constantinople at the
time, added his hearty concurrence: "Don't let this chance
slip to acquit yourself nobly and do honor to our country,
. • • The eyes of Nations are upon the little St. Louis and
her Commander. For Godsake and the sake of humanity, stand
for the right." "^^
After receiving Brown's despatch on July 2, Ingraham
informed the captain of the Austrian ship Hussar that he
would open fire unless Koszta was released in a few hours.
At first the Austrians prepared to resist, but then recon-
sidered and an agreement was soon reached under the terms
of which Koszta was placed in the custody of the French con-
sul. Most of Smyrna's European inhabitants as well as the
Turks supported the American action, and Brown as well as
Offley thought that Koszta 's rescue had greatly enhanced
16
the prestige of the United States in Europe.
The Continental press reacted vigorously. CJonserva-
tive and liberal papers agreed that the event was the be-
ginning of a more active United States policy. Austria,
the London Morning Herald stated, would be likely to lose
her Italian provinces if a new insurrection were to take
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place there, and might find an American fleet in the Adriat-
ic helping the Italian rebels. An Italian paper, II Parla-
^ento of Turin, thought that the vast extent of American
commerce made it inevitable that the United States would be
interested in the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. America,
it predicted, would be an important force contributing to
the downfall of the Vienna treaty system of 1815. ''"'^
While the European press was debating the possible con-
sequences of the Koszta affair, Austria sent the United
States a strong protest note which was supported by Russia.
Austria's charg*, Hulsemann, accused the United States of
having violated the rights of a neutral nation (Turkey) by
its action in Smyrna. This resort to the favorite American
doctrine of neutral rights against the United States was re-
jected by Secretary William Marcy. In his reply to Hulse-
mann,- Marcy claimed that Turkish authorities had approved
Commander Ingraham's action. It was the Austrian seizure
of Koszta which violated Turkish sovereignty, stated Marcy,
who justified his rescue on the grounds that Koszta 's dec-
laration of intent to become a citizen entitled him to Amer-
ican protection. '^^
a
Vienna also complained to other European courts about
the conduct of the American commander, and re-asserted its
I'ight to seize refugees in neutral ports. France expressed
partial sympathy for the Austrian position, but was not in-
clined to seek a quarrel with the United States. Anti-Aus-
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trian sentiment was very strong in England. Kossuth had
been received here almost as enthusiastically as in the
United States. Moreover, English opinion had recently been
outraged by the arrest of several Italian Protestants in
Tuscany (which was ruled by a branch of the Hapsburg fami-
ly), for possessing Bibles. Such public feeling made it
impossible for the British government to support the Aus-
trian protest, despite its deep concern about the long-
range effects of American involvement in European affairs.
The London Advertiser , which thought English policy on the
Eastern Question too weak, expressed the hope that the ap-
pearance of the Stars and Stripes in the Mediterranean
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would shame the "muddy old Union Jack" into activity. ^
Commander Ingraham*s rescue of Koszta was generally
Hailed by the American press (except for conservative Whig
0:<jurnals)^ The New York Tribune's editorial of August 6,
1853 was typical:
We state an obvious fact in saying that Cap'
tain Ingraham, had he sunk the Austrian corvette
in Smyrna harbour, as it was but a chance he did
not, would almost inevitably have been the next
President of the United States. Had the two
ships been cruising off the harbour, instead of
at anchor within it, where action must have been
a gross outrage on neutral rights and resulted
in a woeful destruction of life and property on
shore, the collision could not have been avert-
ed. 20
On September 2^ the Tribune carried a letter from
^0
Marx which described the reaction of the conservative Euro-
pean press to its editorial. Some of these oournals were
predicting American intervention on behalf of Switzerland
if that country were to be attacked by Austria. (The Swiss
were presently engaged in a dispute with Austria over their
protection of refugees from Austria's Italian provinces.)
According to Marx, widespread rumors of American plans to
intervene in Europe show how seriously the events at Smyrna
were regarded. The Paris Constitutionnel was particularly
severe in its criticism of American policy. The United
States defended Koszta as a revolutionist, not as an Amer-
ican citizen, it declared, and claimed that no European
government could ever admit an American right to protect
European revolutionaries with armed force. The paper then
dismissed, as a "ridiculous pretence," the American claim
that Koszta had announced his intention of becoming a cit-
izen.- Finally, it warned that the American navy might not
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win such easy triumphs in future situations.
An editorial in the Washington Union (which rarely a-
greed with the Tribune ) also praised the rescue of Koszta
and brought the case within the general scope of American
Manifest Destiny:
There is clearly no resisting a manifest
destiny. V/e are fated to intervene in European
affairs - morally, by the potent example of lib-
eral institutions; economically, by the powerful
traction of national equality and prosperity
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upon the population; politically, by such inci-
dents, quite unexpected and casual, as that which
occurred the other day at Smyrna. While our con-
servative presses were uttering their sagest ad-
monitions against any participation in the Ori-
ental question, we were up to our ears in it.
• . « The act has made us a party to the fate of
Turkey. 22
Baron Bodisco, the Russian minister, was so incensed that
he cancelled his subscription to the paper. The Union re-
ported the cancellation with great pleasure, as a convinc-
ing rebuttal to The New York Times' recent charge that it
25
was pro-Russian. ^
The National Intelligencer took a very different stand.
A conservative Whig paper, it disliked the thought of Amer-
ican aid to European revolutionaries, warned against the
doctrine of intervention, and denounced Kossuth, Mazzini,
and Ledru Rollin (the last two were the leaders of Italian
and French republicanism), whose belief in universal free-
dom really meant "universal license." Another editorial
denied that Koszta was entitled to full American protec-
tion merely because he had declared his intention of be-
. • 24
coming a citizen.
In the abolitionist camp, a sharp division of opinion
about the Koszta affair appeared. The pacifist William
Lloyd Garrison, editor of The Liberator , condemned the res-
cue as an example of American official hypocrisy. At the
very time when attempts were being made to enforce a strin-
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gent fugitive slave law in the North, an American naval of-
ricer went to the brink of war with a major European power,
to secure the release of a Hungarian. But Gerritt Smith,
the New York abolitionist and congressman, saw the issue
quite differently. Until 1853 Smith had been a strict Gar-
risonian pacifist. Now he approved Commander Ingraham's
action. Indeed, he thought that Ingraham should have im-
mediately opened fire on the Austrian brig. Garrison was
dismayed by Smith's about-face, and rebuked him in a Lib-
erator editorial for eulogizing a "professional fighter."
The response to Ingraham's action, in both Northern
and Southern journals, indicated a powerful national senti-
ment in favor of a more progressive American policy in Euro-
pean affairs. Praise for him was a logical sequel to the
enthusiasm with which Kossuth had been received. Yet the
encounter at Smyrna marks the culmination of the series of
American official actions in favor of European revolution-
aries, although no one in either America or Europe could
suspect that this would be the case in 1855. Also, despite
the strength of "Young America" in the Pierce administration,
a combination of domestic controversy, diplomatic inepti-
tude, and Anglo-French opposition would frustrate most of
Pierce's projects. There was no spectacular increase in
the size of the United States during his presidency as there
had been during Polk's. Indeed, the course of events would
also reveal some astonishing turn-abouts in American opin-
ion. But in the summer of 1853 most Americans were con-
vinced that Turkey was being bullied by Austria and Rus-
sia, and they identified its cause with that of Europe's
liberal patriots.
ICHAPTER III
For a short time, in August 185$, while the United
States and Austria were exchanging notes about Koszta, the
Russo-Turkish dispute seemed on the verge of settlement.
Representatives from Great Britain, France, Austria and
Prussia drew up a proposal at Vienna which was accepted
without conditions by the Czar. But the Sultan, under in-
creasing pressure from the pro-war party at Constantinople,
insisted on adding several interpretative reservations to
the Vienna note. On August 15 George P. Marsh, the Amer-
ican minister in Constantinople, sent a despatch to Secre-
tary William Marcy which endorsed the Turkish position on
the Four Power peace proposal. The proposal. Marsh in-
sisted, conceded the substance of all Prince Alexander Men-
shikov's demands. He criticized the course of Anglo-
French policy, charging that the two Western powers were
ineffectual in the face of Russian power and arrogance.
Failing to take action, they might soon find it too late
to prevent the extension of Russia's empire into the Med-
iterranean. The American minister, however, did not offer
his advice to the Turkish government, probably because he
knew that an appointee of President Pierce would soon re-
place him. Marsh's fears about the consequences of the
Vienna note were unnecessary: Nicholas I rejected the Turk-
ish modifications, and once again Russia and Turkey were on
the verge of war.
.^5
By this time the Sultan's militant advisors, aided by
the religious excitement in Constantinople, had gained the
upper hand. Turkey issued a declaration of war against
Russia early in October 1855. It would be put into effect
in 8 month if the Russians refused to evacuate Moldavia
and Wallachia. The Russians remained in their positions
and fighting began in early November, Up to this point
Nicholas had thought that Austria and Prussia would sup-
port him in any conflict with the Western powers. He now
learned to his dismay that Austria, fearful of Russian ex-
pansion in the Balkans, was leaning towards the West. The
British and French fleets were ordered to sail through the
Dardanelles to Constantinople to help the Sultan maintain
order in the city (particularly if anti-Christian riots
broke out in Constantinople). This was a significant step
towards Anglo-French involvement on Turkey's side - an in-
volvement which would have strong impact on American opin-
ion, ^
In 1853 the United States and France were engaged in
a minor diplomatic dispute, typical of the many controver-
sies that had arisen between the two former allies. A
French adventurer, Count Raousset de Boulbon, had made an
unsuccessful incursion into Sonora with the intention of
detaching that province from Mexico. Although the French
government disavowed the action, it was known that de Boul-
bon had influential friends in Paris. American concern
over French designs on Mexico increased. ^
The formal alliance between France and the United
States had not survived the storms of the French Revolu-
tion. When it became apparent that France was following
a course quite different from that preferred by Americans,
enthusiasm for her revolution had waned. After the unde-
clared naval war (1798-1800) between France and the United
States, Napoleon Bonaparte agreed to a convention which ab-
rogated the alliance of 1778* His sale of Louisiana in
1803 greatly strengthened American power, but Franco-Amer-
ican relations remained cool because of Napoleon's decrees
against neutral trade with Great Britain, and attacks on
American shipping by French privateers. The United States
declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812 pleased
France, but neither power attempted to renew the old alli-
4
ance.
After the 1815 European peace settlement the restored
Bourbon monarchy began to reconsider French policy toward
the United States. The regimes of Louis XVI and Napoleon
generally had operated under the assumption that a strong
and independent United States was valuable to France as a
permanent source of trouble for Great Britain. Yet by the
1820* s, French statesmen began to fear that the young co-
lossus across the Atlantic might become a rival more dan-
gerous than Great Britain herself. President James Mon-
roe's message to Congress of December 1823, in which he
warned against any further European colonization in the
Western Hemisphere, was regarded by the French as the be-
ginning of a campaign to establish American supremacy in
Central and South America. The conservative Catholic sen-
timent that pervaded the court of King Charles X (1825-
1830) was greatly disturbed by the thought of a Protestant
republic dominating the entire Western Hemisphere. Short-
ly before the 1830 Revolution French diplomats and consuls
in South America were instructed to use their influence a-
gainst American economic penetration. ^
Many Americans were enthusiastic about the July Revo-
lution (the aged Marquis de Lafayette played a leading
role in it), but there was no improvement in diplomatic re-
lations between the two countries. Indeed, disputes seemed
even more open and acrimonious than before. There was con-
siderable talk of war during the negotiations concerning
the United States maritime claims against Prance. (Iron-
ically, England's mediation contributed to the settlement
of this dispute between two nations once allied against
her.) Although the Church's influence, so strong during
the Restoration period, disappeared under Louis Philippe,
both he and his Prime Minister, Francois Guizot, also were
eager to check United States expansion. Guizot likened
the threat of an American "universal republic" in the West-
em Hemisphere to the old fear of any one power establish-
ing a "universal monarchy" in Europe. The French hoped to
establish a balance of power in the New World by joining
Great Britain in maintaining Texas as an independent repub-
lic. These plans for Anglo-French cooperation were thwart-
ed in 1840, when France supported Mohammed Ali, the Pasha
of Egypt (who had almost succeeded in overthrowing his
overlord, the Sultan of Turkey), and Great Britain re-a-
ligned herself with Russia, Austria and Prussia,
During the early 1840 's an attempt was made to revive
the Anglo-French entente vis a vis Texas, but the negotia-
tions failed because England refused to commit herself to
anything beyond diplomatic action. The French had in-
sisted that if any joint steps were to be taken, England
must, as a last resort, agree to military action against
the United States. Anglo-French relations suffered fur-
ther deterioration when it appeared likely that a son of
Louis Philippe might inherit the Spanish throne by mar-
riage. England had once fought a long war against France
to block a similar event and was no more inclined to ac-
cept such a union in 1846 than in 1700. '
When Louis Philippe was overthrown by the 1848 Febru-
ary Revolutionaries, an over-eager American minister in
Paris was the first foreign diplomat to recognize the new
provisional government. Once again it seemed likely that
the "twin republics" might work closely together. But the
^9
new revolution took a socialist turn and the bloody "June
Bays" dismayed conservative Americans, North and South.
Ralph Waldo Emerson commented on the difference between the
English and French ideas of liberty. In England, he ob-
served, "Life is safe, and personal rights, for what is
freedom without security? whilst, in France, 'fraternity,'
•equality,' and 'indivisible unity' are names for assas-
sination." ^
The powerful conservative reaction that followed the
"June Days" was no more favorable to Franco-American
friendship. After Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected
President of the French Republic in December 1848, rela-
tions between the two republics deteriorated rapidly. For
one thing American Protestants detested Napoleon's pro-
Catholic educational policy and his 1849 intervention at
Rome to restore the Pope to his throne. In addition. Napo-
leon renewed Louis Philippe's effort to arrive at an under-
standing with Great Britain which might check American ex-
9pansion.
As early as 1839, while Louis Napoleon was living in
exile in England, he concluded (in a manner similar to that
of Alexis de Tocqueville several years earlier) that the
United States and Russia were the two most progressive pow-
ers in the world. Worried by the possibility that Western
Europe in general and France in particular might someday be
supplanted, he declared:
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I note with regret that at the present time
only two governments fulfill their providential
mission; these are the two Colossuses, one ex-
isting at the extremity of the new, the other at
the extremity of the old, world. Whilst our old
European center resembles a volcano, v/hich con-
sumes itself in its crater, the two nations of
the East and the West march without hesitation
on the road of improvement - one of them through
the will of one man, the other through liberty, 10
The 1840 's saw the extension of American boundaries to
the Pacific and the Rio Grande, through military force and
strong diplomatic pressure. The Caribbean seemed to be the
next great area of American expansion. In Southern states
there was agitation in favor of seizing Cuba from Spain
(if Spain refused to sell the island to the United States),
and General Lopez, with informal American help, led an at-
tempt to conquer the island in 1851. After Lopez's fail-
ure, France and Great Britain presented a joint protest
note to Washington, which implied that they would give mil-
itary support to Spain against any American attempt to
seize Cuba. At the outset of the Crimean War, then, any
lingering sentimental regard for France had suffered from
recent abrasions.
There was no such sentimental background for American
relations with Great Britain. In 1855 the memory of two
wars with Britain was very much alive in the United States.
The War of 1812 was well within the recollection of many
Americans. Furthermore, although the British abandoned
their efforts to create an Indian buffer state in the Old
Northwest after the Treaty of Ghent, they still sought to
check American expansion wherever possible. There were
more disputes between England and the United States during
the years from 1815 to 1853 than between the United States
and any other European power. The Maine boundary clash of
1859 » the Caroline and Creole affairs, the Oregon contro-
versy of 18^4-46, troubles over Texas, and the Central
American dispute that began in 1848, were but touchstones
in a condition of permanent animosity. In addition to ter-
ritorial questions, America's refusal to permit the Royal
Navy to search United States ships suspected of engaging in
12
the slave trade contributed to the tension.
British statesmen differed considerably as to how they
should proceed in attempting to check American expansion.
Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, who alternated as For-
eign Secretary for most of the time between 1828 and 1851,
exemplify these differences. Aberdeen generally followed
a conciliatory policy towards the United States, while
Palmerston thought that Yankee aggressiveness should be
handled in a firm manner. Any major British effort to es-
tablish a balance of power in North America required the
cooperation of France. This was attempted in the case of
Texas and failed for reasons already mentioned. British
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statesmen all agreed that the re-establishment of French
military power in the Western Hemisphere was too high a
price to pay for the containment of the United States. '^^
Anglo-American relations were further embittered by
commercial rivalry. America's merchant marine expanded
greatly after the War of 1812 and by the 1850 's was almost
as large as the British. In the early 1850 's the new Amer-
lean clippers were the world's best sailing ships, and the
Collins Line steamers established speed records for trans-
Atlantic passages that surpassed those of the British Cu-
narders. These developments annoyed the British, who had
long regarded the sea as their province. Impressive, too,
was American machinery sent to the London Exhibition of
1851» making it apparent, that the United States possessed
industrial as well as commercial capabilities. Commodore
Vanderbilt • s arrival in England in 1853, aboard his luxuri-
ous steamer North Star , was another portent of the poten-
14-
tialities of Yankee enterprise.
There were still other factors that contributed to
Anglo-American animosity. For example, much of the travel
literature of English visitors expressed great distaste for
the democratic habits of Americans or for their hypocrisy
on the slavery issue (i.e. Mrs. Frances Trollope and
Charles Dickens). The condescending tone of English news-
papers and literary journals also was a source of anger in
the United States, where all insults were reprinted along
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with appropriate editorial comment. Hostility between the
two countries was further stimulated by the arrival of
large numbers of impoverished Irish immigrants following
the 1846 Potato Famine, These Irish remained in the large
Eastern cities and, because their votes were important,
Democratic and Whig politicians were highly competitive in
their "twists to the lion's tail." Irish nationalists such
as John Mitchel continued their anti-British agitation af-
ter coming to the United States.
Despite an almost unbroken history of ill feeling be-
tween the United States and Britain, there were certain
factors that worked for better relations. Their commerce
drew them together at least as much as it divided them.
In a war, the British navy could sweep American merchant
ships off the seas, as both powers knew, while American
privateers would ruin British trade. Strong cultural ties
remained. Most of the literature that Americans read v/as
English; New World periodicals extracted many articles from
their English counterparts; American writers tended to fol-
low British models in their own works. Much of the knowl-
edge that Americans obtained about European events came
from English newspapers. In addition, British and American
reformers worked closely in promoting such causes as the
abolition of slavery and the temperance movement. Wealthy
Americans tried to imitate the style of the English gentry,
as they had since colonial days. Finally, there was the
incipient idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity against the rest
of the world. Although this doctrine was frequently ex-
pressed in American periodicals and newspapers in the
1850 's (mainly in Whig organs and certain religious publi-
cations), it was still far from acquiring the influence
that it would exert a half
-century later. Too many areas
of conflict remained for such a theory to achieve wide pop-
ularity in the 1850' s.
George P. Marsh was not easily convinced that the
British and French would give military and naval assistance
to Turkey. In a despatch to Secretary Marcy shortly after
the Turkish declaration of war on Russia, he denounced the
"treacherous policy" of the two Western powers. Marsh
thought the Turks would be forced by their allies to make
concessions to Russia. The Anglo-French fleet was still
outside the Dardanelles at this time, and Marsh did not be-
lieve rumors concerning its forthcoming passage of the
straits. As late as October 15 he was still not convinced
that hostilities would take place. The Turks, to be sure,
were sending men and munitions to the frontier, but he be-
lieved that the British and French would not permit any
17
clash between the Turks and Russians. '
Notwithstanding Marsh's distrust of British policy in
the Eastern Question, he was essentially sympathetic to the
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idea that closer Anglo-American ties would be valuable be-
cause they would offset the influence of the Continent's
"despotic" powers. "^^ After all, most Americans had earli-
er assumed that Austria and Prussia would support Russia a-
gainst Turkey. Many still expected Austria to fight along-
side Russia if the Czar became involved in a war with Eng-
land and France. The idea of an Anglo-American alliance
was in part a response to the overthrow of the Second Re-
public in France by Louis Napoleon. From 1851 to 1855 it
was widely believed that Napoleon would ally himself with
the three traditionalist monarchies. During the "invasion
panic" in England in late 1852 the United States minister
in London, Joseph Ingersoll, wrote the following to Secre-
tary of State Edward Everett:
Among the topics of frequent conversation
here is that of the probability of an assault of
some kind from the other side of the channel.
Military officers of great distinction consider
it a probability. The trainings of militia and
other movements of caution are induced by it. I
mention the circumstances because it is often
connected with remarks of a friendly character
towards ourselves. The idea is familiar that if
the powers of the Continent, relapsing, as they
are supposed to be into high toned principles of
government, should manifest hostility to consti-
tutional freedom by assailing it in its strong-
hold in England, the people of the United States
would join in the defence of a common cause.
There is certainly a tendency to cultivate good
feelings with our country which is worth culti-
vating in return. 19
56
-
The American Whig; Review , in its article on "Russian
Ambition," had advocated such an alliance several years
earlier. Anglo-American solidarity was also favored by sev-
eral Episcopal and Evangelical Protestant magazines. The
National Intellip;encer regarded England and the United
States as twin examples of ordered liberty, opposed to both
the absolute monarchs and the revolutionists of Continental
Europe. However, despite its strong feeling of kinship
with England, the Intelligencer stopped short of endorsing
a political alliance with that country. The Democratic
press, which frequently placed the British government in
the same category as the Continental monarchies, was total-
ly opposed to such an idea.
When England and France drew together in 1855, Ameri-
can and British interest in a united front against the Con-
tinental powers (which was now irrelevant in any case)
waned rapidly. Many Americans still clung to their pro-
Turkish attitudes, however, until Britain and France pre-
pared to take the offensive, and it became clear that Aus-
trian policy was not pro-Russian. American action in the
Koszta case was an affirmation of a policy which Britain
and Prance had supported since 18^9, when they sent their
fleets to Besika Bay to strengthen Turkish resistance to
the Austro-Russian demand for the extradition of Hungarian
refugees. Believing Austria too pro-Russian to be a good
mediator, Ingersoll was in favor of American mediation of
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the Eastern Question before war broke out. In his opinion
America's prestige would greatly increase if she made the
offer and, were the mediation to succeed, she would receive
full credit for preventing war.
Ingersoll was succeeded by James Buchanan in London in
August 1855. Shortly after his arrival Buchanan conferred
with Musurus, the Turkish minister, who told him that Turk-
ish modifications of the Vienna note were more than "merely
formal." However, the Turkish envoy thought there would be
no war. Buchanan concurred with this sentiment. His eval-
uation of the situation was similar to that of Marsh, al-
though he was less angry about the hesitancy of the Western
powers to take action against Russia:
France and England are so much indisposed
to go to war with Russia, that they will find
means to avert it, even if the Emperor should re-
fuse to accede to the modification made by the
Sublime Porte. . . . But there will be no war un-
less the fanaticism of the Turks should unex-
pectedly compel the Sultan to commence hostil-
ities. 22
Buchanan was also pleased to note that Musurus expressed
great satisfaction with the conduct of Commander Ingraham
23in the Koszta affair.
During the early 1850 's Buchanan had been the American
minister at Saint Petersburg and had been on friendly terms
with Nicholas I. He had served as Secretary of State under
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President James K. Polk during the negotiations with Great
Britain over the Oregon question. Although opposed to
British expansion in the Western Hemisphere, he believed
that the commercial interests of the two nations were simi-
lar in some parts of the world. In Buchanan's opinion the
opening of China to Western commerce would promote a "noble
and generous rivalry" between Britain and the, United States,
which would "contribute most effectually to promote the
cause of Christianity, civilization and freedom among this
Oh.
ancient and strange people."
On September 16 Buchanan informed Secretary Marcy of
the Czar's refusal to accept the Turkish modifications of
the Vienna note. The American minister still thought that
Britain and France would make every possible effort to pre-
vent the outbreak of war. He was concerned because many
Poles and Hungarians, presently in London, who had declared
their intention of becoming American citizens, wanted to
obtain United States passports in order to cross Europe and
Join the Turkish array. Buchanan's refusal to grant a pass-
port to anyone who was not already an American citizen led
one angry Polish refugee to threaten to appeal over his
25head to Secretary Marcy in Washington.
Buchanan at this time was involved in a controversy
with the British Court over Marcy 's Dress Circular to Amer-
ican diplomats, forbidding them to wear the heavily-orna-
mented type of formal attire that was the rule at European
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royal receptions. In a conversation with a British offi-
cial, Buchanan compared British and Russian procedure in
this matter, to the advantage of the latter:
I
. . . observed that the rules of etiquette
at the British Court were more strict even than
in Russia. Senator Douglas of the U.S. Senate had
just returned from Saint Petersburg. When in-
ivited to visit the Czar in costume, he informed
.Count Nesselrode that he could not thus appear.
The Count asked him in what dress he appeared be-
fore the President of the U.S. Mr. Douglas an-
swered: In the very dress he then wore. The
Count after consulting with the Emperor said that
this was sufficient; and in this plain dress he
visited the Emperor at the palace and on parade
and had most agreeable conversations with him, on
:both occasions. 26
Eventually a compromise was reached between Buchanan and
the Court. The American minister appeared before Queen
Victoria in his usual sober black suit, but with a dress
sword added. '
<
At their first meeting Buchanan discussed the Eastern
Question with Lord Clarendon. The British Foreign Secre-
tary spoke of the determination of France and Great Brit-
ain to sustain the Sultan, at least by naval means. He
believed there was still a chance of avoiding war since
Austria and Prussia were now not likely to support Russia,
and since the Czar's prestige in Europe had greatly ebbed
during the past year. Clarendon was concerned about the
possibility of a crop failure in Britain, and about domes-
tic consequences if the supply of Russian grain was cut
off by war. Buchanan concluded that "under these circum-
stances, the prospect of war is anything but agreeable to
British Statesmen." In the course of this interview the
two diplomats discussed the British establishment of a pro-
tectorate over the Mosquito Indians in Central America and
the Cuban question. Clarendon denied that England had any
intention of acquiring Cuba. Buchanan replied that the
United States would never seek the island "except by pur-
chase or by other fair and honorable means." ^®
A few days later Buchanan and Clarendon met again.
Clarendon seemed less certain that there would be no war,
but he was doing everything possible to settle the Russo-
Turkish dispute. The discussion then proceeded to the ques
tion of American expansion. Buchanan reported their con-
versation as follows:
I told him that whilst our good mother had
been all the time engaged, for one hundred and
fifty years, in annexing one possession after
the other to her dominions, until the sun never
set upon her empire, she raised her hands in
holy horror if the daughter annexed territories
adjacent to herself, which came to her in the
natural course of events. His Lordship replied;
Well, you must admit that in this respect you
are a chip of the old block. Very true, I ob-
served; but we could not imagine why iingland
should object to our annexation; we extended the
English language, Christianity, liberty and law
wherever we went upon our own continent and con-
verted uninhabited regions into civilized com-
munities, from the trade with which they gained
great advantages. With much similar conversa-
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tion, especially in regard to the annexation of
' Texas, this long interview terminated. 29
The Pierce administration's interest in Pacific as
well as Caribbean expansion aroused considerable concern
in Britain and France. Preliminary negotiations for an
annexation treaty with the King of the Sandwich Islands
were going on at this time. On December 4 Secretary Marcy
informed Buchanan that John F. Crampton and Eugene de Sar-
tiges, the British and French ministers in Washington, were
uneasy about the rumors of an impending American acqui-
sition of the islands. Sartiges was particularly worried
about his nation's Catholic missionaries who had recently
gone to the Sandwich Islands. For some years there had
been much rivalry between these missionaries and their
50American Protestant counterparts who had preceded them.
While Buchanan and Clarendon discussed the Eastern
Question and American expansion, a Turkish army under the
command of Omar Pasha, crossed the Danube into the Princi-
palities early in November 1855- Russia's army stood on
the defensive here, but its Black Sea fleet took the offen-
sive. Although peace negotiations continued after the
fighting began, and it is possible a settlement might have
been concluded, a spectacular Russian naval victory de-
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stroyed these hopes. A Turkish squadron carrying rein-
forcements and supplies for Turkish troops on the Caucasus
frontier, was caught by the Russian Black Sea fleet out-
side the harbor of Sinope and virtually annihilated. The
Russian ships were equipped with long-range shell-firing
guns, while the shorter-range Turkish cannons fired only
solid shot. Because of the disproportionate losses of the
Turks, the battle was reported in England as a "treacher-
ous massacre." That Russia and Turkey had been at war for
almost a month was forgotten. English public opinion, and
much of her press, clamored for war with Russia, Lord
Palmerston, now Home Secretary, had been known to oppose
Russian expansion, and his abrupt resignation from Lord
Aberdeen's coalition government was rumored to have been
forced by "pro-Russian" ministers. Prince Albert, the
Royal Consort, was hissed in the streets of London, because
he and his German relatives, suspected of being Russian
sympathizers, were thought to have pressed for Palmerston 's
51dismissalo
As a result of this great excitement, Palmerston was
back in office in a few weeks, British and French fleets
were ordered into the Black Sea in early January 185^,
The Czar instructed his ambassadors to leave Paris and Lon-
don. Even now, war between the two western powers and Rus-
sia had not begun. But Britain and France, encouraged by
the possibility of enlisting Austria on their side, for-
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warded an ultimatum to the Czar demanding that his forces
evacuate the occupied Principalities by April 50. At the
same time Napoleon sent him a personal letter, a last ap-
peal for peace. Now less eager for war than the British
government and people, Napoleon had hoped to avoid actual
conflict and sought merely a diplomatic victory over Rus-
sia. But alliance with England, he thought, which was some-
thing his uncle never had, might be worth a war to keep.
Nicholas ended Napoleon's vacillation by informing him
that the Russians would prove to be the same in 185^ as
they had been in 1812. Napoleon could not refuse this chal-
lenge. Britain and Erance declared war on March 28,
185^.
Late in 1853, as diplomatic negotiations collapsed and
fighting erupted between Russian and Turkish armies on the
Danube, pro-Turkish sentiment in the United States reached
its height. The Turks had the better of several encounters
in the first month of the war, and these successes (some-
times considerably magnified in the newspaper accounts)
were applauded in America as being unmistakable evidence of
Turkish vitality. In some quarters pro-Turkish sentiment
was also synonomous v/ith pro-British sentiment, even though
it was not certain that Britain would enter the war. Anglo-
philism was most notable in the Protestant religious maga-
zines, which tended to neglect the close cooperation of
Catholic France with Britain. The Methodist Quarterly Re-
view sang a hymn of praise to England:
What is England now? Preeminent among the
nations of Europe, in 'all that the wise most
seek to know, or the good most desire to do.'
• • • Her empire encircles the globe; her keels
vex every ocean; her influence reaches to the
ends of the earth; and; 'she sits like a star on
the lap of the ocean, ' emitting a mild and
healthful radiance on the surrounding dark-
ness. 35
Russia, on the other hand, was "the impersonation of
despotism." The Review noted that Russia had become a
great European power at about the same time that the
United States had achieved its independence. Both coun-
tries possessed the "bounding vigor and elasticity of a
youthful existence," clear evidence of providential design.
But there the similarity ended. Since Russia dominated the
Continent, "by the defeat of a single power, when the ful-
ness of the time for Russia's fall has come, tyranny might
be extinguished forever, blotted by a single blow from the
face of the whole earth."
The Church Review and Ecclesiastical Register , an
Episcopal magazine, was pro-Turkish and pro-British. It
was hostile to autocratic Russia but also to European revo-
lutionaries such as Kossuth. Representing "constitutional
liberty" rather than "anarchy and lawless licentiousness,"
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England was hated by the revolutionists as well as by the
Czar and the Austrian Emperor. The Church Review
, despite
its distaste for radicalism, approved of Commander Ing-
rah^m's conduct in the Koszta case. The American flag,
like that of Britain, it commented, would "rebuke Austrian
impudence and Russian despotism wherever it encounters
tkem." America would remain neutral in the forthcoming
war and the prosperity that would come to her through the
carrying trade would hasten the day when she would "take
her place as a great ruling power among the nations of the
35earth." -^-^ There was one exception to the American policy
of neutrality. If all the Continental powers were allied
against England, then the United States would enter the
war:
We note this exception because we see a two-
fold effort now making in the newspapers of the
day to sow the seeds of alienation and distrust
between these two great Protestant powers. The
myrmidons of popery and the political scape-
graces of the old world, who have fled their
country for their country's good, and who had
yet to learn the very alphabet of true liberty,
these are both at work among us, leveling their
envenomed shafts at old England, the Church, and
the British Constitution. They will exhaust
their inane twaddle and their Jesuitical cunning,
and still they cannot sunder the bonds which
bind these two great nations together in endur-
ing concord. One, to a great extent in the lin-
eage of the glorious old Anglo-Saxon race, one
in language and literature, one, more and more,
in religion, one, in the apparent destiny of un-
paralleled influence, they may yet be found one
also in doing battle for the common cause of the
Truth of God and the rights of humanity. 56
Both Democratic and Whig newspapers leaned to the
Turkish side but with differences in degree. The Koszta
case had led the Democrats to identify the Turkish cause
with that of the European revolutionaries, and they were •
therefore extremely hostile to Russia. At the same time,
Democratic hostility to Britain continued unabated. The
Whigs, who were unenthusiastic about revolutionists, pre-
ferred Turkey but made some effort to present the Russian
viewpoint.
The resounding Russian naval victory at Sinope a-
roused much excitement in the United States, but it did
not lead to any major change in public sentiment. Pro-
Turkish feeling remained dominant but, in marked contrast
to the English reaction there was no tendency to describe
the Russian attack on the Turkish fleet as "treacherous."
On December 27 the New York Tribune reported that "the
country was startled" by the news, but it explicitly crit-
icized the British press for its talk of Russian treach-
ery. The Tribune thought that the chances for peace might
have improved, since the Czar's forces had won a victory
which would enable him to save face if he evacuated the
Principalities.
The New Orleans Picayune called the Russian success
"important but not decisive." It emphasized its belief
that if England, France, Austria and Prussia took a reso-
lute diplomatic stand they could force Russia to back down
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without an extension of the war. However, it doubted
whether the four powers were sufficiently united to do
this. Although not agreeing with the English press, the
Picayune called it "more truthful to its vocation" than
the controlled French press, which played down the battle,
since it was a setback to Napoleon's hopes of avoiding
59war.
The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported Sinope with a
flourish, along with several other exciting events:
News! News!! News!!! Read the paper all
over today. The contents are worth a year's sub-
scription. The unparalleled naval battle be-
tween the Turks and Russians and the annihila-
tion of the former; riot and death at Erie; the
Pope's Nuncio mobbed in Cincinnati; great ship
Republic burned in New lork, &c. 8cc. • '4-0
The Albany Evening Journal described the news of Sino-
pe as "painfully exciting" and agreed that Britain and
France would now be forced to enter the war. Another Al-
bany paper, the Argus , expressed similar thoughts and
printed a key London Times editorial in which that Journal
abandoned its earlier conciliatory stand on the Russo-Turk-
41
ish dispute and called for a "sterner alternative."
Although the Washington Union,the semi-official voice
of the Pierce administration, had no direct editorial com-
ment about Sinope, its general stand on the war was clear.
On November 25 the Union brought out an extra edition
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which announced the outbreak of hostilities between Russia
and Turkey, and which included the Czar's war manifesto.
Every American heart would be enlisted on Turkey's side,
it editorialized on the following day, and Russia could
have no friends in such a struggle. The day after the news
of Sinope arrived, the Union placed on its front page a
London Times editorial entitled "Gloomy Prospects of Rus-
sia." Since the Union frequently engaged in polemics a-
gainst the English "Thunderer," it is significant that it
printed this call for strong action against Russia, with-
out any criticism. The Union's strong pro-Turkish stand
was nonetheless mitigated by continuing suspicions of Brit-
ish and French motives in the Western Hemisphere as well as
in Europe. Cuba was the main foreign preoccupation of the
Pierce administration in 1853 and the Union regularly de-
nounced British attempts to "Africanize" the island by per-
suading Spain to abolish slavery. According to an editor-
ial of early November England would stop at nothing to
keep Cuba out of American hands. Great Britain might even
permit African pirates to become active in the Gulf of Mex-
ico, as she had once tolerated the depredations of Alger-
4-2lan pirates.
The Springfield Republican favored vigorous action by
Britain and France to check Russia's "Godless, grasping,
grinding ambition." On September 5 it printed a letter
from a London correspondent which expressed the hope that
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if the United States and England ever fought again it
would be on the same side. After the rejection of the Vi-
enna note the Republican found war inevitable. It dis-
missed Russia's demands on Turkey as "mere trumpery" and
described the Turks as deserving of the sympathy of the
Christian world.
During the last months of 1853 the National Intelli-
gencer
,
the voice of Whiggery, was a notable exception to
the anti-Russian tone prevailing in the American press.
Yet, since it opposed all plans for American acquisition of
Cuba, it seldom expressed hostility to Great Britain. The
Intelligencer agreed that an Anglo-French war with Russia
over the Ottoman Empire was inevitable but thought it
could still be delayed for some time. It predicted a de-
fensive strategy by the Russians on the Danube, which would
make it more difficult for Britain and France to intervene.
Although the Intelligencer was correct about Russian land
strategy, it did not foresee the naval offensive in the
Black Sea which led to the Battle of Sinope.
On October 25 the Intelligencer published three pro-
Russian items. One described Nicholas I as the wisest
sovereign in Europe and praised his consistent friendship
for the United States. An article on Russian educational
improvements (from the New York Evening Post ) was also
printed. Then, curiously enough, there was a letter from
a "Major W.H.C." which praised Russian expansion as bene-
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ficial to civilization and portrayed Siberia as being full
Qf "smiling villages and comfortable homesteads." "May
the flight of the Russian and American eagles," he con-
cluded, "be continued until Christianity, civilization,
and conservatism encircle the earth!"
The Intelligencer foresaw "a danger of universal an-
archy in Continental Europe." It advised Americans not to
give too much credence to reports of early Turkish victor-
ies, American policy in the Koszta case was criticized as
well as the general idea of support for European revolu-
tionaries. On December 27 the paper contained a report of
a meeting held at Eckhart's Hotel in New York on December
22 which had as its purpose the organization of volunteer
• companies to assist the Turks. Most of those present were
Germans, French, Poles or Hungarians:
The scene was picturesque in the extreme
, , . men of every nation, men with large beards,
from whose mouths curiously shaped pipes pro-
jected; desperate looking fellows, destined prob-
ably to be the saviours of the Ottoman Porte and
the terror of the Autocrat of all the Russias.
. , o A letter was also read from a Baltimore
lady, drawing the attention of the society to a
gun which can be fired ten times in a minute,
carrying eleven balls at a time, to the distance
of three hundred yards. 46
As Britain and France moved closer to war with Rus-
sia, newspaper readers discovered some exceptions to the
general pro-Turkish tone of the American press, notably in
71
the case of the WashinR;ton Union
. In early March 1854 the
Union ran a series of articles on the Eastern Question by
"A Retired Statesman." The first established the tone of
what would follow by criticizing the deference of American
Journals to opinions in the British press. A second letter
pointed out that British attempts to halt Russian expan-
sion were identical with her efforts to limit American
growth. The protection of Turkey was similar to the "pro-
tectorate" established by Britain on the Mosquito Coast of
Central America. The third and fourth contributions pic-
tured the Ottoman Empire as no longer having any territor-
ial integrity to preserve. The "Retired Statesman" also
warned against an Anglo-French attempt to set up a balance
of power in America. Britain had always been hostile to
the United States, and France had been so since the early
1830 ''s.
The fifth article in this series elaborated upon the
menace posed by Anglo-French cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere. It was in the interest of the United States
to maintain good relations with Russia because no territor-
ial or economic rivalry existed between the two nations
anywhere in the world. Both powers were progressive, even
though their forms of government differed. The menace of
the new Western alliance should also persuade Americans to
stop arguing about the slavery question and abandon"uni-
versal philanthropy" for blacks and European revolution-
aries alike
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In some distant age, and amid those revo-lutions of time which produce miracles, tnesegiants of the two worlds may possibly meet some-
where and shake hands, or buffet each other: but
whoever anticipates this must dive so deep intofuturity that in all probability he will never
come up again. I cannot, therefore, but hopethat the Congress of the United States, which a-lone can speak for the people of the United
States, will take an early occasion to show the
world that they are neither asleep nor blind-
that they see clearly into the policy of this
new alliance, and mean to prepare for its con-
sequences. It is high time for us to get out of
the lirabo of niggerdom, and pay some little at-
tention to the interests of our white fellow cit-izens. 48
While the New York Tribune supported Turkey against
Russia, its only hope for the regeneration of Turkey was
the substitution of Christianity for Islam, There would
be some gain for Europe if Russian expansion were checked,
but on the whole the Tribune deplored the outbreak of hos-
tilities as a disaster for civilization. It pointed out
that weapons of destruction were considerably more formi-
dable now than during the Napoleonic Wars. There was
little chance that the masses of Europe would benefit from
such a conflict, unless the revolutionists were able to
take advantage of it. Almost as hostile to Britain and
Prance as it was to Russia, the Tribune emphasized the
duplicity of British diplomacy (i.e. British support of
Russia against Prance in the Egyptian crisis of 1840).
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Napoleon III was a "perjured assassin" (i.e. the coup
d'etat of December 2, 1851) in the opinion of the Tribune
.
Nevertheless, the paper regarded Nicholas I as being main-
ly responsible for the war. It compared his demands on
Turkey with Senator Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska
Bill, which had just been introduced in the United States
Congress.
William Lloyd Garrison, still adhering to his total
nonresistance stand, had already clashed with his fellow
abolitionist Gerritt Smith over the Koszta affair. The
editorials in The Liberator continued to advocate pacifism
in dealing with the -Eastern Question. One article praised
the "crushing speech" which John Bright (a staunch oppo-
nent of British entry into the Russo-Turkish war) deliv-
ered in reply to Admiral Sir Charles Napier's defense of
war at the World Peace Convention at Edinburgh in the fall
of 1853* The Liberator refrained from taking any direct
stand on the conflict between Russia and Turkey, but crit-
icized the Washington Union for the anti-British tone of
its editorials. Garrison attributed this attitude to the
50determination of the "Slave Power" to seize Cuba.
Some of Garrison's colleagues in the anti-slavery
cause were openly hostile to Russia. Thomas Wentworth
Higginson preached a sermon on the Nebraska Bill in which
he charged that Senator Douglas was working in collabora-
tion with the Czar to disrupt the American Republic so
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there would be no possibility of American intervention in
Europe. Referring to Douglas* recent visit to Saint Peters-
burg, Higginson reminded his audience that there was a motto
of European statesmen which warned, "Beware of the man who
came last from Saint Petersburg," According to Higginson
the history of Europe for the past century was only the
history of Russia, Since Russian power was so far-reaching,
Americans would be foolish to think that the Czar would
not consider a scheme to divide the United States in order
to further his projects in Europe, The explanation of the
introduction of the Nebraska Bill is beyond "the politics
of one continent only,"
The Springfield Republican was sympathetic to both
Turkey and the Western allies. It desired the liberation
of all those Europeans whose hopes had been frustrated in
1848-49. It was better "that liberty should be purchased
at the price of so much life and treasure, than not to be
obtained at all." On a more practical note, the Republi-
can ' s Business Report on March 5 stated, "the European
troubles are daily blessings to America." The Republican
was disturbed by the statraents of both Southern politi-
cians and newspapers about the danger of the Anglo-French
alliance to the United States. It predicted Russian sup-
52
port for the South 's ambition in the Caribbean. ^
The National Intelligencer maintained its moderate
tone in reporting the war early in 1854, The regular con-
75
tributions of its London correspondent were pro-British,
but the Intellig;encer also expressed concern over English
belligerence prompted by the Battle of Sinope. When the
Russian minister, Baron Bodisco, died in January 1854 the
Intelligencer wrote that he was in "his conduct here ever
true to the character of a minister of peace." The
paper regarded the war as regrettable, more "on the score
of common humanity" than of American interests. One of the
articles from London predicted that the war would determine
the fate of Europe for the next half century at least.
Britain and France had tried diplomacy for peace long e-
nough. Another published item, a letter from Cairo,
warned against illusionary hopes of Turkish regeneration.
It deplored the British and French failure to support Po-
land and Hungary in 1851 and 1849. If these nations were
independent they would be the formidable barrier against
Russian expansion that Turkey could never become. While
discussing the Eastern Question, the Intelligencer contin-
ued its editorial battle with the Union over Caribbean mat-
ters. It rebuked the Union for denouncing Great Britain
in connection with the Spanish seizure of the American
merchant ship Black Warrior near Cuba. According to the
Intellig;encer the United States was "on terms of the most
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friendly intercourse with Great Britain."
Thus as the war between Russia and Turkey widened into
a European war, American opinion still leaned strongly to
the Turkish side, although evaluations of the motives of
Turkey's Western allies differed widely. Such confusion,
reinforced by the strength of historic attitudes, would
cause a major shift in American sentiment when the war
changed from a defensive conflict on the part of Turkey t
an Anglo-French invasion of Russia in the fall of 1854,
CHAPTER IV
The outbreak of the Crimean War almost immediately
produced a conflict between the State Department and the
American minister in Constantinople. Carroll Spence, who
had been appointed by President Pierce to succeed Marsh,
left the United States in late 1853 when pro-Turkish sen-
timent was at its height. Upon arriving in Turkey Spence
was appalled by the poor morale of the Turkish army. It
was apparent that British and French support would be need-
ed to save it from defeat. According to Spence the Turks
had acquired many Christian vices and had lost "the Chiv-
alric and enterprising characteristics of the Saracen,"
Constantinople's stores were filled with English and French
goods, and even the Turkish bazaars appeared less oriental
than they had been a few years earlier. Spence saw Con-
stantinople as a potentially good market for American prod-
ucts. Coarse cotton goods from the United States had re-
cently been competing successfully with those of Great
Britain in South America and China; they might also do so
in Turkey.
Spence visited the Sultan in the company of Captain
Long of the U.S. steamer Saranac and Commander Turner of
the U.S. corvette Levant . Upon presenting his credentials,
the new minister commended the protection extended by Tur-
key to the Hungarian refugees and then expressed United
States' sympathy for Turkey. America's policy of avoiding
"national interference" in European quarrels, he stated,
would never restrain the United States from lending moral
support to any nation fighting for a just cause, Spence
concluded by voicing the hope that "the termination of the
conflict between your Majesty and the Czar of Russia may
accord with your most sanguine expectations." ^
Spence 's statement reflected what he thought was the
seeming unanimity, both official and unofficial, of Ameri-
can sentiment in support of Turkey. This had been evident
just before he had sailed. But lately, with the entry of
Britain and France into the war, State Department policy,
not to mention public opinion, had begun to shift. Shortly
before Spence 's interview with the Sultan, Lord Clarendon
(in an address to the British Parliament) had stated that
the Anglo-French alliance implied a united front by the
two powers on questions concerning both hemispheres. This
assertion aroused worry in both the State Department and
Congress. Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan was particularly
emphatic in warning his colleagues that the new alliance
posed a threat to the Monroe Doctrine. With this in mind,
the Pierce administration did not want to give the impres-
sion that the United States was fully sympathetic to the
Allied cause. Spence, to be sure, had not gone beyond
what Commodore Stringham had said to the Sultan the previ-
ous summer, but much had changed since then. The new en-
voy learned this* with considerable surprise, in a despatch
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from the State Department. Marcy reprimanded Spence for
having taken an excessively pro-Turkish stand in the light
of potential dangers inherent in the Anglo-French alli-
5ance.
Spence, defending his action, denied that his kind re-
marks to the Sultan had in any way committed the United
States. He recalled the pro-Turkish sentiment prevalent
at the time of his departure: Did not both native-born and
naturalized citizens abhor the expansion of the Russian Em-
pire as "the extension of the area of despotism in Europe"?
Spence also alluded to the conviction of leading Protes-
tant churches that a victory for Greek Orthodoxy would
spell the destruction of all other Christian sects in Tur-
key, But the essential difference between Marcy and Spence
was that the latter did not regard the Anglo-French alli-
ance as a threat to American interests in the Western Hem-
isphere. In his reply, Spence emphasized the traditional
Anglo-French rivalry and predicted that the alliance would
not last long.
The American minister was beginning to have some
doubts about his own position. Following his arrival
Spence had talked with many Central European refugees in
Constantinople, and he now concluded that their enthusiasm
for Turkey, based on the expectation that Austria would
support Russia, was waning. Spence toodid not expect Aus-
tria to enter the war, but it disappointed him to discover
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that his opposition to Russian expansion (with or without
Austrian support), was not shared by the revolutionaries,
who only seemed interested in fighting Austria. These rad-
icals were obsessed, and it appeared to Spence that they
might even support Russia if Austria came out openly on the
Allied side, ^
Spence *s confidence in his policy was further shaken
by a Turkish decree expelling all Greeks from Constanti-
nople. The pro-Russian sentiment already existing among
these people had been intensified by an insurrection of
their fellow nationals in Epirus, a Turkish province. The
American minister interceded on behalf of the Greeks; but
assured Reshid Pasha of his purely humanitarian motives and
denied any intention of working against Turkish interests.
Having urged the Turks to follow the same lenient policy
they had so far observed towards the Russians resident in
Ottoman territory, Spence was able to report to Marcy that
his appeal on behalf of the Greeks had some success. Many
of them had been permitted to remain.
Some of the most intricate diplomatic issues growing
out of the Crimean War concerned the maritime rights of
neutrals. With the war impending, Buchanan attempted on
February 1? to persuade the British to agree to a "free
ships, free goods" policy in dealing with neutral commerce.
The American position was that non-contraband goods on en-
emy ships
- if they originated in a neutral nation - as
well as similar material on neutral ships should not be
seized by a blockading squadron. Moreover, the United
States refused to recognize any port as being blockaded un-
less the dominant naval power actually was able to close
the harbor. Prussia, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian
countries supported the American position. Even more sig-
nificantly, Count Walewski, the French ambassador in Lon-
don, had revealed that France also urged Britain to follow
this course. ^
In his February 17 conversation with Buchanan, Lord
Clarendon seemed apprehensive about the possibility of Rus-
sian privateers being fitted out in United States ports.
In this connection Buchanan advised President Pierce to
issue a proclamation calling for vigilant execution of the
Neutrality Law. A few weeks later, however, Clarendon sug-
gested a treaty between the United States, Great Britain
and France, in which the captains and crews of privateers
would be considered pirates. Buchanan, objecting strenu-
ously, drew up a list of eight reasons against such an a-
greement. He emphasized that the treaty would violate
United States neutrality by attempting to punish as pi-
rates, American citizens who served on Russian privateers.
Buchanan was particularly concerned about the repercussions
that would follow if the British executed any naturalized
8
Irish-Americans captured aboard these privateers. (Brit-
ish law did not recognize the naturalization of British
subjects as American citizens at this time.) After dis-
cussing Buchanan's objections, Clarendon admitted that some
were valid. On March 22 he informed the American minister
of his intention to abandon the proposed treaty, ^
Several days before the British government withdrew
its anti-privateering proposal, Lord Clarendon announced
England's acceptance of the "free ships, free goods" prin-
ciple for the duration of the war. Buchanan, failing to
notice a certain vagueness in Clarendon's statement, was
highly pleased. The decision seemed to mark the abandon-
ment of that traditional British policy which proclaimed an
unhampered role for her powerful navy in times of inter-
national crisis. Proud of his own part in this historic
event, Buchanan speculated:
The effect of this, . . . will be to give
our vessels a great advantage over British ves-
sels in the carrying trade. ... Should Russia
be prevailed upon to adopt the liberal policy to-
wards neutrals announced in the Queen's declara-
tion, we may expect a harvest for our carrying
trade such as it has never before experienced.
I could almost wish myself to be in St. Peters-
burg for a fortnight. 10
In Washington the State Department was less satisfied
with the British declaration on neutral rights than Buchan-
an, and decided to seek a clarification of British policy
on certain specific issues. Secretary Marcy requested that
Buchanan ask the British government to permit American mer-
chants to take those goods out of Russia which had been
purchased both before and after the blockade began. In
complying Buchanan discreetly refrained from presenting
Marcy's second point. His hesitation proved to be justi-
fied, for Clarendon raised several objections to allowing
American vessels to take out cargoes purchased even before
the blockade had begun. It was immediately apparent that
Buchanan's enthusiasm about the initial British announce-
ment on maritime policy had been premature. There was
still a great gulf between the American and British inter-
pretations of a "free ships, free goods" policy. On July
4, 185^ Clarendon informed Buchanan that American vessels
which already had their cargo on board when the blockade
•*.
, .
was established could leave, but no ships which were not
actually laden, even if the cargo was purchased before the
blockade began, could pass through the squadron^ '^'^
Clarendon's response was a great disappointment for
Buchanan, and his bitterness increased when, in the spring
of 185^, the Allied governments established the blockade
of the Russian coast. Instead of mentioning only specific
ports, as Buchanan had hoped, their proclamation inter-
dieted trade with the Russian shores of the Baltic and
Black Seas. In a despatch to Secretary Marcy Buchanan ex-
pressed his chagrin at both Clarendon's note on American
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commerce with Russia and the nature of the Anglo-French
blockade:
This long delayed answer is different from
what might have been expected from my conversa-tions with him and Sir James Graham, and from
what I have some reason to believe it would havebeen if the interests of the United States hadbeen seriously involved.
. . . France and England
might as well have declared in a sweeping clausethat they had blockaded all the coasts of Russia,both m Europe and Asia. Their declaration much
resembles the old orders in Council and the Ber-lin and Milan decrees. 12
In addition to the maritime controversy, Buchanan re-
mained worried over the general policy of Britain and
Prance towards the United States. He agreed with the sen-
timents expressed by Marcy in his rebuke to Spence with re-
spect to the danger that the defeat of Russia by these pow-
ers might lead to an alliance between them to check American
expansion. In particular, this association might be a
threat to American acquisition of Cuba. But Buchanan did
not, however, foresee any immediate danger of such action.
He was convinced that, presently already engaged, the Brit-
ish would not risk a war with the United States over Cuba.
It would bring "utter ruin" to many English manufacturers;
and their influence would therefore be sufficient to block
such a conflict. Napoleon III, according to Buchanan re-
garded the possibility of American control over Cuba with
much greater hostility than did the British. Worried a-
4
bout the influence of the Empress Eugenie, whom he de-
scribed as being "in heart and soul a Spaniard," Buchanan
believed that it would be advantageous for the United
States to purchase Cuba while Britain and France were en-
gaged in war with Russia.
While Buchanan was negotiating with Clarendon in Lon-
don, President Pierce and Secretary Marcy took two impor-
tant initiatives concerning the European war. They at-
tempted to interest the belligerent powers in American medi-
ation, and proposed an international agreement on the
rights of neutrals. The idea of American mediation had
been suggested by Joseph Ingersoll, Buchanan's prede-
cessor in London, even before hostilities had begun. Eli-
hu Burritt, the most famous American pacifist, dined with
Pierce at the White House on March 24, and urged the Pres-
ident to make an offer of mediation to the belligerents.
Pierce and Marcy were pleased with the idea. Continuation
of the war could only solidify the Franco-British alliance.
It was also true that such an action, if successful, would
greatly increase American prestige in Europe. (It would
also acknowledge services previously rendered by the bel-
ligerents; Russia had offered to mediate during the War of
1812, and England had helped settle the debt dispute be-
14
tween the United States and France during the 1830 's.)
Marcy requested information from Thomas Seymour, the
American minister in Saint Petersburg, as to how the Rus-
sian government would react to an American mediation pro-
posal. Seymour's recent interviews with Nicholas I had
convinced him that the Russians were eager to gain whatever
American support they could, were it only benevolent neu-
trality. Even before the formal Anglo-French declaration
of war on Russia, Seymour had observed that many persons
in Saint Petersburg were hoping that the British blockade
of the Baltic would produce clashes between Britain and
the United States similar to those preceding the War of
1812. The Czar expressed the desire to see more of the
American flag in the Baltic, and implied that the war pre-
sented an opportunity for the United States to seize the
Baltic trade, heretofore dominated by Britain.
An American challenge to the blockade would have been
a great victory for Russia whether or not it led to Anglo-
American conflict. For not only would an increase in Amer-
ican trade in the Baltic help Russia by ending England's
pre-eminence in this area, it would, if such conflict
broke out release a swarm of privateers to prey upon Brit-
ish commerce. But since American trade with Russia was
comparatively small, the United States government was not
likely to risk war with England for that reason alone.
American shippers were soon to discover that providing
transports for Britain and France was a more lucrative in-
vestment than increasing their activities in the Baltic.
Seymour, on May 26, informed Marcy of the Russian gov-
ernment's probable acceptance of American intercession.
In early July Marcy told Baron de Stoeckl, the Russian min-
ister in Washington, that the United States would soon of-
fer its mediation to the belligerents. England, Stoeckl
commented, was likely to reject the suggestion; and Marcy
said: "Let her do so. It will be one more count against
her in our eyes. You surely cannot object to that." Al-
though skeptical about the American plan, Stoeckl advised
Saint Petersburg to accept it.
The Russian minister was correct in his prediction con-
cerning the Allied response to American mediation. Drouyn
de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, informed his repre-
sentative in Washington, Eugene de Sartiges, to reject the
proposal politely, since a dangerous precedent would be
set if a European war were ended by American diplomatic ac-
tion. After this rebuff, which was supported by the Brit-
ish government. Pierce and Marcy abandoned their idea of
18American mediation.
At the time that Marcy broached the European powers
on mediation, he proposed a permanent "free ships, free
goods" convention to Russia, Britain and France. Both
Stoeckl and Count Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, saw
the offer as an opportunity to strengthen the friendship
between Russia and the United States. On July 22 the two
nations signed the neutral rights convention in Washington
The United States Senate unanimously ratified the treaty
on July 25.
Britain and France, however, reacted coolly to the
proposed treaty. Both powers insisted that such an agree-
ment must be accompanied by an American renunciation of
privateering. Allied rejection of United States mediation
and of the neutral rights convention helped shift American
opinion, both official and unofficial, in a pro-Russian
on
direction.
Allied military activity, in the months following the
Anglo-French declaration of war on Russia, was somewhat
less spectacular than many observers had expected. The
British public had anticipated a great victory when Admi-
ral Sir Charles Napier's fleet sailed to the Baltic, but
the only substantial achievement of his campaign was the
capture of the Russian fortress of Bomersund in the Aland
Islands. Apart from this the British limited themselves
to blockading the Russian ports and to occasional raids on
21the small Baltic harbors.
Napoleon III was in favor of an immediate attack on
Sevastopol, Russia's naval base in the Crimea, but the Brit
ish vetoed this suggestion because they expected a Russian
advance on Constantinople. But the British fear of an at-
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tack on the Turkish capital soon proved to be as unfounded
as their exaggerated hopes of a Baltic Trafalger. After
crossing the Danube the Russian array was held up for two
months at the Turkish fortress of Silistria.
Now an event occurred which had a major impact on the
outcome of the war and an important effect on American pub-
lic opinion. Emboldened by Russian defeats, the Austrian
government saw an opportunity to establish itself as the
dominant power in the Balkans. It sent an ultimatum to
Saint Petersburg, demanding the withdrawal of Russian
troops from Moldavia and Wallachia and threatening to join
the Anglo-French alliance if Russia refused to comply.
Nicholas I, bitterly recalling the events of 1849 but not
wishing to acquire another enemy, ordered the evacuation of
the Principalities.
With the Russian army stalled at Silistria, the Brit-
ish and French realized that they had exaggerated the dan-
ger to Constantinople. They sent a small squadron to the
Russian Black Sea coast, which bombarded the port of Odes-
sa, and moved their troops from Constantinople to Varna on
the Bulgarian coast. Shortly afterward, a cholera epidemic
broke out among the Allied troops and caused heavy losses
even before their first encounter with the Russians. Be-
fore the Anglo-French force could advance to the relief of
Silistria, the Russians had abandoned the siege and had
withdrawn from the Principalities. Austrian troops now oc-
cupied Moldavia and Wallachia. Having lost the opportuni-
ty to engage the Russians near Silistria, the British and
French governments now ordered their forces to invade the
Crimea and capture Sevastopol.
Divisions in American public opinion became more pro-
nounced during the few months following the Allied decla-
ration of war. The nearly unanimous pro-Turkish sentiment
of 1855 rapidly evaporated. Most Southern newspapers and
politicians became ardently pro-Russian (or, at least,
anti-British). Northern Democrats and expansionists alike
also revealed new admiration for Russia, often manifest in
anti-British diatribes. Whig politicians and newspapers
tended to lean to the British side, although their public
statements rarely were enthusiastic. The Whigs advocated
a policy of strict neutrality for the United States and
the avoidance of any expansionist adventures that might
produce a clash with Britain and France. The abolition-
ists and the Protestant clergy who were interested in mis-
sionary activity preferred the Allies and sought to retain
their early enthusiasm for the Turks. Catholic opinion was
divided between those who supported France against the Rus-
sian "schismatics" and those who, like Orestes Brownson,
regarded English "heretics" as being worse than these
25
"
"schismatics."
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On April 5 the Washin5:ton Union
, the organ of the
Pierce administration, described the entry of Britain and
France into the war as the "most effectual check" given to
American sympathy for the Sultan's cause. Emphasizing
Anglo-American commercial rivalry, it took the Whig New
York Courier and Enquirer to task for its pro-British
stand. It found particularly obnoxious the Courier 's
statement that Anglo-Saxon solidarity should contribute to
Anglo-American unity:
The allegation that we are descendents of
Englishmen is as ridiculous as the rest of the
Courier 's casuistry. It belongs to a bygone
age^ Tt is part of a dead and buried philoso-
phy. The ties of blood that bind us to England
are growing weaker and weaker, from physical as
well as political causes. She never regards
these ties when she can stay our progress or de-
feat our designs. 26
The Union strongly supported the Pierce administration
in conflicts with Britain over maritime rights and priva-
teering. It printed another letter from the "Retired
Statesman" which suggested that the United States draw up
a new code of maritime law. America's policy of neutral-
ity was enabling the nation to assume a place as one of the
world's great powers. The American people had only them-
selves to fear now: "If they do not turn upon themselves
and commit suicide by becoming the dupes of political
priests and abolition traitors, it needs no prophet to pre-
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diet that they will, at no distant period, become the fore-
most nation of the earth, and transcend even the glories of
their illustrious parent." ^'^
In the enthusiasm of its new policy, the Union saw
Russian and American expansion as similar in nature. The
paper made its point quite clear in an editorial entitled
"The Two Sick Men - Cuba and Turkey." Russian control of
I
Constantinople was as logical and justifiable as American
domination of Cuba. In each case, Britain and France were
trying to prevent a young nation from fulfilling its legit-
imate destiny. The United States should strengthen its
harbor defenses to meet the threat from the elderly powers:
"We should then be able to set at defiance all selfish and
treacherous combinations of other powers, which look as im-
pudently to the West as they do imperiously to the East." 28
The anti-administration National Intelligencer contin-
ued to advocate a policy of non-intervention in the Euro-
pean war, and deplored all talk of annexing territory in
the Caribbean. It prided itself on the impartiality of its
war reporting. While pro-Allied articles from its London
correspondent appeared regularly, the paper often included
letters from persons sympathetic to Russia and editorially
opposed the idea of a "revolutionary" crusade against "des-
potism" in general or Russia in particular. It praised a
Connecticut Courant editorial which denounced "Young Amer-
ica" and its filibustering expeditions. This article
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warned of the inevitable defeat of the United States in any
naval war with either England or France. The break between
Austria and Russia pleased the Intelligencer because it
pushed many European revolutionaries into a pro-Russian po-
sition. "Young America" no longer had a united front of
European monarchies to denounce. A Paris correspondent
flatly asserted "the democratic party in Europe are pro-
Russian."
One contributor to the Intelligencer
, in a communica-
tion from Marseilles, favored Turkish expulsion from Europe
by Russia. He believed that Russian conquest of Constan-
tinople "would be in favor of the United States in every
way as regards commerce and free trade." The Intelli-
gencer lauded Britain and France for adopting the "free
ships, free goods" principle and simultaneously praised
the American-Russian treaty which permanently endorsed it.^^
_Hunt*s Merchants' Magazine , a leading commercial jour-
nal of New York, agreed that the United States would enjoy
commercial gains if Russia controlled Constantinople. One
author, in an article entitled "Commercial View of the
Russo-Turkish Question," denounced the Allies for attempt-
ing to monopolize world trade. Apprehensive about the
possibility that they would attempt to check the spread of
American commerce, he wrote:
No American can be indifferent to the result
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of this war. It affects us as an expansive, ac-quiring, and commercial people; it affects us as
a liberty-loving and independent nation; for if
It succeed m drying up the stream of a mighty
nation's trade, it will check in it the devel-
opment of civilization, the intelligence of the
masses, and their approach to independence; forCommerce has never yet failed to banish tyranny
from the midst of that people who cherished her,
and by her magic touch, barren regions have
blossomed like a rose, and the slaves of tyrants
became the noblest defenders of human liberty. 51
The South 's foremost commercial journal, De Bow's Re-
view of New Orleans, took a similar stand on the war. In
an article entitled "An American View of the Eastern Ques-
tion," William H. Trescot, a Southern diplomat, argued
that, with the exception of the United States, Russia was
the only power in the world with a fixed foreign policy and
the only one making constant progress. He thought English
policy to be commercial rather than political in nature;
it was continually changed to remain consonant with "the
interest of Manchester and Liverpool." Russia, on the con-
trary, had made the extension of her empire to Constanti-
nople the sole diplomatic goal for two centuries. Trescot
commended Russia for its role as "the natural and necessary
support of the conservatism of the world." He had little
sympathy for the events of 1848, a time when "the future
fortunes of all Europe were compromised by a rash revolu-
tion." Contrasting Russia's political conservatism with
the commercial conservatism of England, Trescot expressed
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his dislike for the latter because it attempted to prevent
the "natural" growth of other nations, particularly the
United States and Russia.
In Trescot's opinion all healthy societies attempted
to expand at the expense of their neighbors. This invari-
able historical tendency was stigmatized by hypocritical
English publicists when it benefited any nation besides
their own:
You cannot bring into contact an earnest,
living will, and a feeble, effete nature, with-
out the absorption of the one into the other.
Place England alongside India, the United States
by Mexico and Cuba, Russia by Turkey, and a half
century of diplomacy or war will not, cannot,
prevent the inevitable result. The first prin-
ciple of life is progress, $$
Trescot did not wish to see the power of Britain di-
minished. In fact he complimented the English for their
pioneering role in commerce and constitutional liberty.
After all, "nursed at her bosom, great empires have grown
into the perfected manhood of national life." But for a
long time England had been interfering all over the world.
The growth of a counterbalancing European power therefore
would be a gain for everyone, Russia was best suited for
this role, since her conservatism was the best counter-
weight to the restlessness that afflicted both Britain and
France, In the past, the mutual rivalry of these two pow-
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ers had helped to maintain a balance of power in Europe and
the rest of the world. Their alliance, at this time, was
a dangerous portent. It might now be impossible for Eng-
land to renew her accord with Russia if Napoleon III at-
tempted to wage a revolutionary war to overthrow the Vien-
na settlement of 1815. In the Western Hemisphere, Anglo-
French unity would be a serious threat to American securi-
ty.
For the United States to play a proper role in "the
troubled times at hand" it would need three things: a re-
formed diplomatic service, a stronger navy, and "an honest,
determined neutrality." In Trescot's opinion, America
should warn the belligerents that it would not permit the
war to be extended into the Western Hemisphere: No New
World possessions would be allowed to change hands except
in subordination to American interests. This warning would
be mainly directed against any British attempt to seize
Alaska from the Russians. The United States must have a
stronger navy to enforce such a policy, because no weak
nation could maintain an honest neutrality. Trescot point-
ed out that "if the fleet of Sir Charles Napier were now
in the Gulf, what would be the force of our protest?" -^^
The New York Tribune remained moderately pro-Allied
during the early months of the war. It warned against Rus-
sian diplomatic attempts to arouse support in the United
States. The Tribune was particularly scornful in comment-
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ing upon the pro-Russian stand of the Washinp:ton Union :
"The editorials of the Washington Union astonish European
statesmen, who are silly enough to associate the name of
Jefferson with the present Democratic party, and to fancy
that the Cabinet of President Pierce indeed has sympathy
for liberty, or at least brains enough to make people be-
lieve that it has such sympathies." Although the Trib-
une deprecated pro-Russian tendencies in America, it was
less than enthusiastic about the Allies. When Austria
seemed on the verge of Joining the Western powers, the
Tribune lost what little interest it possessed for their
cause, commenting ruefully that Austria might come out of
the war stronger than ever. The peoples of Europe would
gain nothing from the conflict. ^'^
The Springfield Republican advised the United States
to follow a policy of strict neutrality. It was generally
sympathetic to the Allies and hoped that Italy and Hungary
would benefit from the war. Nevertheless, the paper felt
that "we cute Yankees" ought to be able to keep cool during
the conflict. The United States could gain much through
neutral trade, it speculated, since there was demand for
American flour, cotton, and provisions.
William Lloyd Garrison's Liberator retained its paci-
fist position, but its editor was convinced that Nicholas
I was mainly responsible for the war. One editorial, a
"psychometric" study, described the Russian Emperor as
follows
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The Emperor is invincible in the convictionthat he is designed by God to spread the Musco-
vite
_
government over territories of the heathen.
Russia is moved by its chief towards the East.
^ _
His moral nature is so constituted that sus-picion of human nature is inevitable. He is e-
nough superstitious to believe himself the spir-itual and legal head of a God-made institution:
but his nature is unable to form a clear and
steady belief in the intrinsic goodness of any
fellow being. This silent conviction - I might
say skepticism - tends to render him cruel, des-
potic, absolute. 39
The Liberator also printed a letter from Angelina
Grimke Weld which compared the war in Europe to the strug-
gle over slavery in the United States. Mrs. Weld predic-
ted that America would soon be faced with a "desperate and
bloody struggle" equal to the European conflict. She
thought the slaveholders in the West were as determined to
murder liberty as was the Autocrat of Russia in the East.
Orestes A. Brownson, now a convert to Catholicism,
took sharp issue with the Archbishop of Paris, who had
called the war with Russia a crusade against the "heresy
of Photius." Brownson agreed with Trescot in viewing Rus-
sia as a valuable conservative force in the world. Brown-
son' s Quarterly Review was one of the few American Journals
to defend the Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolu-
tion. Brownson denied that giving assistance to a friendly
power to put down a rebellion was intervention in a polit-
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ical or legal sense. He described the Anglo-French alli-
ance as an attempt to secure "the universal dictatorship
of both hemispheres." In Brownson»s opinion the Slavic
peoples were the least aggressive in Europe. When Britain
and France rebuked Russia for being aggressive, it was like
Satan rebuking sin. ^"^
America, Brownson believed, would ultimately supplant
Britain as the greatest commercial nation in the world.
She should shake off the remains of colonial dependence and
do everything possible to hasten the arrival of this day.
Brownson advised a "close alliance" with Russia, Spain and
the states of South America to counterbalance the Anglo-
French alliance. It was also essential for the United
States to build a strong navy which would "enable us to
42
cope with that of the greatest maritime power."
The spring and summer of 185^ saw American opinion
shift against the Allies. Several factors combined to pro-
duce this change. When Britain and France joined forces,
fear of a possible extension of this alliance to the West-
ern Hemisphere immediately developed. Anglo-French rival-
ry had heretofore generally been beneficial to American
interests (i.e. the French sale of Louisiana in 1805 to pre-
vent its capture by the British). If the two powers acted
in concert in the New World they could probably prevent fur-
ther American expansion. Southern political leaders were
particularly sensitive to British threats to their interests
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in the Caribbean, and in addition they disliked England as
the home of abolitionist agitation. The Pierce adminis-
tration generally supported Southern viewpoints in both do-
mestic and foreign affairs. British threats to American
policies were not really dissipated by Clarendon's obvious
attempts to please Buchanan.
As Austria moved away from Russia towards the Allies,
Americans found a further reason to change their stand.
Austria was more widely hated in the United States than
Russia at this time, and her action in demanding the Rus-
sian evacuation of the Danubian Principalities convinced
most Americans that the war was not a struggle between the
liberal and reactionary forces of Europe. It was no longer
possible to regard Turkey as the underdog deserving sym-
pathy in a conflict with a bully. The two empires which
had Joined in protesting Commander Ingraham's rescue of
Koszta were now close to war with each other. This pro-
duced a particularly dramatic change in the attitude of
"Young America." By the middle of 1854 this group was
openly praising Nicholas I, whom it had only recently de-
nounced as the assassin of Hungarian liberty. He was now
a great friend of the United States. Thus, as the Allied
armies prepared to invade the Crimea, American opinion had
already swung drastically against them.
CHAPTER V
After the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Danu-
bian Principalities the Anglo-French army, commanded by
Lord Fitzroy Raglan and Marshal Jacques Saint-Arnaud, era-
barked from Varna for the long-awaited attack on Sevasto-
pol. This undertaking was a hazardous one so late in the
season, but the British press was clamoring for decisive
action, and neither Allied power wished to see the year
pass without any military successes. President Pierce was
not one of the Allies' well-wishers. Hoping for British
defeats, he had obtained a large map of the battle zones
and puzzled over it after every arrival of overseas news.
Allied forces landed in the Crimea in early September,
185^ and marched south towards Sevastopol. They were con-
fronted by Russian troops occupying a strong position on
hills overlooking the Alma river. After several hours of
hard fighting in which little tactical skill was displayed
by the generals on either side, Anglo-French forces cap-
2tured the Alma heights.
The Allies now decided upon a wide detour around the
city, to establish supply bases at Balaklava (British) and
Kamiesh (French). They then proceeded to advance against
the south side of Sevastopol. This complicated maneuver
gave the Russians time to construct, under the direction
of a brilliant engineer, Colonel Todleben, a remarkable
system of earthworks. A preliminary Allied bombardment
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failed to silence the Russian batteries, leading to the
postponement of the assault. ^
The excitement created in London by the news of the
Battle of the Alma was closely observed by Nathaniel Haw-
thorne, whom Pierce had appointed to the American consulate
in Liverpool as a reward for writing his campaign biogra-
phy in 1852. In London when the news of the victory of the
Alma arrived, accompanied by a false rumor of the capture
of Sevastopol, Hawthorne was relieved when he heard that
Sevastopol was still in Russian hands;
I am glad of it. In spite of his actual
sympathies, it is impossible for a true American
to be otherwise than glad. Success makes an
Englishman intolerable; and already, on the mis-
taken idea that the way was open to the prosper-
ous conclusion of the war, the Times had begun to
throw out menaces against America. I shall nev-
er love England till she sues us for help, and,
in the meantime, the fewer triumphs she obtains,
the better for all parties. 4
Unlike the majority of his fellow New England intel-
lectuals, Hawthorne had approved of the Mexican War. He
contrasted English unity (which he regarded with a mixture
of distaste and admiration) with the bitter political dis-
sension among Americans during the invasion of Mexico. In
England "each man comes forward with his little scheme for
helping on the war," but in America the situation was very
different: . . . "When our soldiers fought as good bat-
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ties, with as great proportionate loss, and far more valu-
able triumphs, the country seemed rather ashamed than proud
of them." ^
Hawthorne's pro-Russian thinking was shared by George
Templeton Strong, the prominent New York lawyer and trus-
tee of Columbia College, who several years earlier had
been skeptical about Kossuth and the enthusiasm displayed
for him in New York. In domestic affairs Strong was e-
qually opposed to Northern abolitionists and Southern pro-
slavery expansionists, finding both groups to be lawless.
When the Crimean War began Strong was torn between a sense
of kinship with England, an aversion for Napoleon III, and
a feeling that Russia was the future power in Europe « The
Continent was past its prime, he felt, and Russian domin-
ation might be better than a victory of the revolutionists;
These months are important in the history
of the century, perhaps of the age. ... That
the' civilization of Western Europe, continental
Europe, at least, is effete and worn out, like
that of the Roman Empire, I can't doubt. Should
the ultimate triumph of Russia introduce a new
element, Cossack or Slavonic or whatever it may
be, into the social life of the Old World, shat-
tering and destroying all its present organiza-
tions, the disruption may well prove a bless-
ing. 6
Although Strong described himself as a partisan of the
Czar in this war, he disliked the thought of being anti-
British, "our brethren in race, speech and culture . . .
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Preferring an Anglo-Russian entente against France, as in
1812-1815, he could see no good reason for the Anglo-French
alliance. The war was being waged "to maintain the debil-
itated existence of Mahometanism and polygamy in Europe."
The Pierce administration was in full accord with the
sentiments of Hawthorne and Strong on the first Allied vic-
tory in the Crimea. This was evident to Sir Edmund Head,
the newly appointed Governor General of Canada, when he
visited Washington before proceeding to his post. After an
interview with President Pierce at the V/hite House, Head
noted the administration's pro-Russian sympathies:
President Pierce is an ordinary looking man
and, I should think, possesses very ordinary
faculties, though it is unfair to Judge him from
an interview which took place when he was ill,
arrayed in a dressing gown and slippers. Marcy,
the Secretary of State, is a cunning, slow
speaking, and intensely tiresome person. He has
some humor but it is so long in coming out that
the point of the story evaporates before one can
catch it. . . . The U.S. Govt, and its support-
ers are really most anxious for the defeat of
the French and the English in the Crimea. - Our
success is gall and wormwood to them. I could
clearly see this by the way the President talked
- how 'he could not understand the way we got to
Balaklava etc. etc.' unfolding his map. I did
not give him much comfort but said (what turns
out to be the case) that it could only be ac-
counted for by the complete command of the sur-
rounding country given us by the battle of the
Alma. 8
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Pierce had good reason to wish for an Anglo-French de-
feat in the Crimea. Early in 185^ his Cabinet had conclud-
ed that the European war provided an invaluable opportu-
nity to acquire Cuba. Pierre Soull, the volatile American
minister in Madrid, constantly emphasized this theme in his
despatches to Washington. The decision to press Spain on
Cuba was made after Spanish authorities in Havana seized
an American merchant ship, the Black Warrior. Soule was
instructed to present an ultimatum to Madrid demanding im-
mediate redress. Although the Spanish government ignored
Soule 's forty-eight hour time limit, they eventually a-
greed to pay damages to the owners of the Black Warrior. ^
Hoping to gain Cuba by negotiation in the near future,
the administration did not insist upon Soule 's time limit.
Piercers Cabinet was united in desiring to acquire the is-
land, but there was much difference of opinion over how
far the United States should go to obtain it. Secretary
Marcy favored a cautious policy, while Jefferson Davis, the
Secretary of War, and Caleb Cushing, the Attorney General,
were willing to take greater risks. The Cabinet eventually
decided to request the American ministers to Britain,
Prance and Spain - James Buchanan, James Y. Mason and
Pierre Soule, to meet in Europe to make suggestions for the
acquisition of Cuba.
Both Mason and Soule were convinced that the Allied
pov/ers were too preoccupied with the Russian war to risk a
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conflict with the United States over Cuba. Mason empha-
sized the importance of American commerce to France, and
Napoleon Ill's need of a victory over Russia to establish
his dynasty firmly on the French throne. While acknowledg-
ing the close ties between France and Spain, Mason thought
that these other factors would prevent the Emperor from
taking any action in support of Spain.
In London, Buchanan was more cautious. He regarded
Napoleon III as "the controlling spirit behind the Crimean
alliance" and anticipated a break only with France, since
Napoleon was more deeply committed to upholding Spain's
control of Cuba than were the British. Of course, if both
Britain and France supported Spain, matters would be even
worse for the United States. Russia could render little
service to America in the event of a conflict with one or
more of the maritime powers. Buchanan predicted the even-
tual capture of Sevastopol by the Anglo-French array, but
only after an immense loss of life. But, he thought, the
12
war would not be ended by this event.
In the meantime, the United States faced the prospect
of a naval conflict at a time of domestic crisis. Some of
Napoleon's advisers were reported to believe that the slav-
ery question was about to split the Union. Although Bu-
chanan asserted his willingness to risk war to acquire
Cuba, he was clearly more concerned about the possible con-
sequences of the forthcoming consultation than were his
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colleagues in Paris and Madrid. He warned Marcy against
annexing the Sandwich Islands, which might provoke a clash
with Britain and France. In any case, these islands would
be indefensible unless the United States greatly increased
the size of its navy. Buchanan also complained to Lord
Clarendon of the hostility of the French government, which
the Foreign Secretary denied.
While Buchanan, Mason and Soule prepared to meet,
Carroll Spence, the American minister in Constantinople,
sent a vivid description of the Battle of the Alma to Wash-
ington. After speaking of the European Journals' accounts
of the engagement as "most discordant," he went on to give
a "succinct" report of the fighting from "reliable infor-
mation." In his opinion few battles in history have result-
ed in* such heavy casualties in so short a time (the battle
lasted three hours). Although Spence praised the parade-
ground advance of the British infantry, he pointed out
that two more such costly victories would be more disas-
trous than a defeat. As for the fate of Sevastopol, the
American minister doubted if the city's defenders could
1^hold out for long.
All the leading American newspapers devoted extensive
space to the Battle of the Alma. William Howard Russell's
description in the London Times was widely reprinted in the
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United States. Russell's letters were a milestone in the
history of nineteenth century oournalisra, since he was the
first regular war correspondent to be employed by a news-
paper. Of significance in the coverage was the lack of
pro-British sentiment - despite the fact that American pa-
pers derived most of their information about the war from
British sources. On the whole, the dependence of the Amer-
ican press on British sources seems to have had little in-
fluence on the editorial policies of the newspapers, except
those few which sympathized with Britain from the start. "^^
Two weeks before the Battle of the Alma, the Washing-
ton Union had again stressed Russian-American similarities.
Each power had expanded "naturally across a continent while
England and Prance conversely were constantly establishing
overseas colonies. The great differences between America
and Russia were outweighed by their common rivalry with the
powers of Western Europe:
Notwithstanding that the opposing principles
which /jnerica and Russia respectively represent
shall eventually run into lines which must meet,
and, when they do, with forces whose concussion
will shake the world to its very centre; yet, for
many generations to come, they are likely to be
kept far asunder by the old principles ruling
Western Europe, which intervenes between them.
. . .
They are first destined to crush out these
abnormal and effete systems of government, which
degrade, brutalize and enslave the masses under
the 'law and order' principle, by maintaining, as
vested and sacred rights, the privileges of dy-
nasties, families, and castes, irrespective and
regardless of the claims and rights not only of
individual men, but also of entire races andpeoples. 16
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The initial Anglo-French victory in the Crimea was
"gall and wormwood," admitted the Union
, but the paper was
encouraged when the Allies failed to follow up their suc-
cess with an immediate assault on Sevastopol. The paper
contrasted the rapid progress of the American campaign in
Mexico (particularly the capture of Vera Cruz) with the
hesitations of the Anglo-French army. A French commentary,
which pleased the Union
, conceded that the Crimean cam-
paign was being ridiculed by many Americans: '*To see our
American brethren almost daily lavish their raillery on the
slowness of the operations on the Black Sea and the Baltic,
it is easy to perceive that, in their opinion, the Eastern
war forms a miserable contrast with that with Mexico." "'"'^
Unlike Buchanan, the Union regarded Britain rather
than France as America's most dangerous foe. It praised
the bravery of the French troops at the Alma while pointed-
ly omitting any similar compliment to the British. It also
considered the tone of the French press to be less anti-
American than that of the British. In the long run, stat-
ed the Union , Russia possessed great sources of strength
which her opponents lacked. One of the most potent of
1 ft
these was her "exemption from revolutionary convulsions."
The New York Tribune also published an article corapar-
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ing the Crimean and Mexican Wars. On September 14 the an-
nual celebration or the capture of Mexico City by veterans
of that war took place: "Col. Wheat
. . . eulogized Gen.
Scott as owing his elevated position to his sword only. He
was quite certain if the Anglo-French army in the East
could get rid of their generals and admirals and have Gen.
Scott to lead them, in a short time they would not have an
enemy on the face of the earth."
On October 17 the Tribune reported the Battle of the
Alma and the false rumor of the fall of Sevastopol. A se-
ries of headlines preceded the story:
Fall of Sevastopol!
The Russian Force Annihilated
Ten Ships of War Sunk
Ten Thousand English and French Killed and Wounded!
Eighteen Thousand Russians Dead
Twenty-Two Thousand Prisoners
A Thousand Guns Captured
Fort Constantine Blown Up
Sxirrender of Menchikoff 20
The casualty figures were wildly exaggerated and the Allied
forces had not even attempted an assault on Sevastopol.
Editorially the paper expressed skepticism about the an-
nounced capture of the Russian fortress. A few days later
its incredulity was confirmed by new headlines: "Downfall
of Sevastopol a Hoax," "The City Not Yet Attacked." De-
spite this deception, the Tribune believed that the Allies
would take Sevastopol by mid-November. Shortly afterwards,
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the paper printed a full report of the Battle of the Alma,
including Russell's despatches to the Times
.
The Sprinp;field Republican based its reporting of Cri-
mean events on the articles in the Tribune
. Its initial
comment, before the news of the hoax had arrived, lamented
the "incongruities of civilization and enlightened educa-
tion in this age." There had been great anguish over the
loss of 250 lives when the passenger ship Arctic sank some
weeks earlier, but the world "receives with more of rejoic-
ing than of sadness the intelligence that thirl^y thousand
men have perished in fighting on the shores of the Black
Sea." The Republican also reported the new Anglo-French
plan to attack Sevastopol and commented on the deficiencies
in the British medical service which would become notorious
during the coming winter. It asserted that the official
report of the Battle of the Alma gave "a graphic panorama
of this unfaltering and hard-fought conflict, which seems
to revive, somewhat, the sanguinary memories of Europe un-
der the reign of the first Napoleon."
The Liberator maintained its strict pacifist stand
through 185^. It condemned Kossuth's efforts to persuade
Britain and France to proclaim their support for Hungarian
and Polish independence (an action which would have brought
Austria into the war on the side of Russia). Such an ex-
tension of the war, according to Joseph Barker, one of the
Liberator's English correspondents, would be of no benefit
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to the European masses. Barker even believed that Russian
rule (at least for a short time) might be a good thing for
Europe's people:
The despotism of a Russian conqueror would
awake and unite them, whereas now they are divid-
ed and half asleep. I therefore rather wish forthe success of Hussia. I certainly wish for thedownfall of the English Aristocracy. I hate theEnglish Aristocracy more heartily than I canhate any other tyranny, except for the American
slaveholding oligarchy. 25
The initial reaction of the National Intelligencer 's
New York correspondent to the news from the Crimea was sim-
ilar to the Republican 's. He contrasted the "comparative
indifference" with which the news of heavy battle casual-
ties was received with the "wail of distress and sorrow"
that followed the Arctic 's sinking. The Intelligencer 's
London reporter, continuing his pro-British stand, criti-
cized Prussia for permitting the smuggling of contraband
goods for Russia through its ports. Because the Prussian
people were at the head of German civilization they should
be the natural allies of Prance and England against Russian
despotism. Unfortunately, Prussian foreign policy was sub-
servient to Russia.
The National Intelligencer saw hope for progress in
Russia through the development of "public opinion" (i.e. an
informed and influential middle class such as existed in
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Ensland and America). But it thought a century must elapse
before this tendency could seriously modify the traditional
Russian system of government. Two "parties" existed in
Russia, the paper editorialized; one was the Old Russian
(or Panslavic) party, the other the Saint Petersburg (or
German) party. The former were ardent expansionists while
the latter were cautious and conservative. In a statement
clearly intended as a commentary on the "forward" policy of
the Washington Union
, the Intelligencer declared that "the
party of Old Russia in the eastern continent bears, we see,
a striking resemblance to the party of Young America in the
Western." The strength of Russian religious patriotism was
also emphasized.
While the British and French were installing their
siege guns south of Sevastopol, the Russians brought up
large reinforcements and, on the morning of October 25,
they surprised and routed a Turkish unit at Balaklava. A
classic cavalry charge by the British Heavy Brigade pre-
vented the Czar's horsemen from exploiting this success.
The victory of the Heavy Brigade was the decisive event of
the battle, but it was followed by the famous attack of the
Light Brigade on the Russian artillery, in response to a
misinterpreted order.
On November 5 the Russians, hoping to force the Allies
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to abandon the siege, made a major assault on the British
positions on Mount Inkerman. The English held their ground
for several hours until a counter-attack by a large French
force compelled the Russians to withdraw. Lord Raglan and
General Canrobert (Saint-Amaud had died in late September)
now realized that their forces would have to spend the win-
ter in the Crimea. After Inkerman the Anglo-French army
was in no condition to assault Sevastopol. ^'^
The British suffered yet another disaster on November
14 when a storm wrecked many of their ships outside the
harbor of Balaklava, including the vessel which was carry-
ing all the winter clothing and most of the medical sup-
plies for the army. This calamity, combined with gross in-
• competence and red tape in the medical and supply depart-
ments, caused a high death toll from disease and exposure
during the winter of 1854-55* (Florence Nightingale became
famous through her efforts to correct these conditions.)
In Sevastopol, the Russians suffered from many of the
same ills that afflicted the British. As there were no
railroads south of Moscow, all reinforcements and supplies
had to be sent over the abysmal roads of the Ukraine. The
Russians probably lost more men by disease and exposure on
the march to Sevastopol than in the fighting itself. In
general, the Russian medical corps was afflicted by abuses
29
similar to those in the British service.
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The progress of the Anglo-French campaign was avidly
followed in the United States. The North American Review
remarked how "the various items of information have been
eagerly devoured by the American public upon the arrival of
every steamer." This appetite was so great that Henry
David Thoreau thought his countrymen were obtaining a vi-
carious release from their own problems by reading about
the battles across the sea:
They have a census-table in which they put
down the number of the insane. Do you believe
that they put them all down there? Why in every
one of these houses there is at least one man
fighting or squabbling a good part of his time
with a dozen pet demons of his own breeding and
cherishing .... If perchance he resolve at
length that he will courageously combat them, he
says 'Ay, ay! I will attend to you after dinner!'
And when that time comes, he concludes that he is
good for another stage and reads a column or two
about the Eastern War! Pray, to be in earnest,
where is Sevastopol? Who is Menchikoff? And
Nicholas behind there? Who the Allies? Did not
we fight a little (little enough, to be sure, but
Just enough to make it interesting) at Alma, at
Balaclava, at Inkerman? We love to fight far
from home. Ah! the Minie musket is the king of
weapons. Well, let us get one then. 51
The general shift in the American attitude towards the
war, which was already evident before the invasion of the
Crimea, appears clearly in the newspaper accounts of the
battles near Sevastopol during the autumn of 185^. As the
winter came on and Sevastopol still held out, much of the
American press took great delight in ridiculing the incom-
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petence of British generalship and military administration.
The French army was generally spoken of with greater re-
spect, although Napoleon III was frequently denounced. The
Washington Union even recalled the old alliance between
France and the United States in a generally favorable edi-
torial on the French army. Clearly the majority of the
press (unlike Buchanan) tended to regard Britain as the
main enemy of the United States and rejoiced in her set-
backs. The courage of the Russian defenders of Sevastopol
received increasing emphasis in newspaper reports.
Press comments on the Charge of the Light Brigade, not
surprisingly, show that a chance to ridicule the British
simply could not be ignored. Laughter was widespread, a-
long with remarks which insulted, condescended, and drew
the inevitable contrasts between British and American mili-
tary prowess. After Lord Tennyson produced his poem on the
Charge, Graham' s Magazine published a scathing review:
It is to be remarked that the British poet
Laureate can find nothing to celebrate so much as
a bloody blunder - an insane and ghastly charge
proving the disgraceful generalship of British
leaders! British poetry can find no genuine in-
spiration in the war movement itself, a movement
in which England is governed by imbecile councils
and leagued with despots. The poet turns aside
from the great argument to sing his dirge of ad-
miration and sorrow over the courage and slaugh-
ter of a cavalry brigade. 35
The Washington Union reprinted with great pleasure an
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extract from The New York Times (a paper it rarely agreed
with) on Lord Cardigan, entitled "The Soldier of Civili-
zation." The leader of the Charge of the Light Brigade,
Cardigan is portrayed as a frivolous sensualist and a beau-
tiful animal, quite similar to his horse:
Withm a week after Cthe death of a mistress!
we saw the spoiler in his accustomed spot in the
opera-box, with his jewelled lorgnette planted on
some new beauty with a steady, sensual stare,
. . •
His light brown hair he wears in short
curls, and carries a weighty moustache of the
same hue.
. . .
Like it chis horse'J
, he obliges
every mute instinct and passion; like it, he re-joices in the battle and rushes forward with aglorious animal courage against the foe; but heis nothing more. 34
Some Americans had a different view of the Battle of
Balaklava. Thomas W. Higginson, the abolitionist leader,
who had warned against Senator Douglas' supposed intrigues
with Nicholas I, admired Lord Cardigan's performance. He
asserted that Cardigan was a nobler man on the battlefield
than he was in London. Ralph Waldo Emerson also had high
praise for English courage and enterprise, which he con-
trasted with Russian passive obedience:
Of absolute stoutness no nation has more or
better examples. They are good at storming re-
doubts, at boarding frigates, at dying in the
last ditch, or any desperate service which has
daylight and honor in it, but not, I think, at
enduring the rack, or any passive obedience, like
jumping off a castle roof at the word of a Czar. 35
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By the end of 1854 the pro-Russian tendency was defi-
nitely predominant in Southern newspapers, while New Eng-
land remained the only section of the nation where sympathy
for the Allies was widespread. In New York, such diverse
journals as the expansionist New York Herald and the anti-
expansionist Tribune became champions of the Czar against
British imperialism. Commercial circles in the city dif-
fared widely in their evaluation of the war. Hunt's Mer-
chants' Map;azine favored Russia, while the Journal of Com-
merce supported the Allies. Still, the year 1854 closed
with the balance tilted in favor of Russia in the New York
press. Western opinion was also predominantly pro-Russian.
Senators Cass of Michigan, Douglas of Illinois and Gwin of
California frequently denounced British policy in the Sen-
ate, All were proponents of "Manifest Destiny" and saw
England standing in the way of the United States, just as
she was barring Russia from Constantinople.
In short, the sectional division of American opinion
on the Crimean War was remarkably similar to that which had
prevailed during the second war with Britain from 1812-14.
The United States had declared war in 1812 mainly at the
demand of the South and West, while in 1854 the expansion-
ist designs of these sections once again clashed with Great
Britain.
In 1812 New England had opposed war with Britain and
saw its interests crushed by Southern and Western aggres-
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sion. The South had supported Napoleon, whom New England
Federalists detested as both a Jacobin and a despot. Simi-
larly, in 1854, New England again was confronted with a
militant South, attempting to extend its control over new
Western and Caribbean territories, and singing the praises
of Nicholas I. The West, of course, remained more "Cana-
dian-minded" than any other section. In each case Britain
and New England had much in common (hostility to Napoleon
in 1812 and opposition to Russian and American expansion
in 1854).
Some New Englanders contemplated secession from the
Union during the Crimean War, as had the Hartford Conven-
tion in 1814. While the domestic controversy over slavery
was the chief source of this latest secessionist mood,
there was considerable similarity between the New England
secessionists of 1814 and those of 1854 -56. In 1814 the
people of Bangor, Maine had welcomed British troops and re-
quested permission to renew their oath of allegiance to
King George III. New England farmers also had supplied
much food to the British forces in Canada. During the Cri-
mean War the London Times once predicted that New England
would side with Britain in a conflict with the rest of the
United States. If the Pierce administration had found it-
self at war with England as a result of an attempt to seize
Cuba, it is quite possible that this prophecy would have
38
come true.
The growing American sympathy for Russia was ex-
plained by the Washington Union: "The Czar," editorialized
the Union, "has never allowed even the slightest shade of
misunderstanding to arise between him and our government.
Britain and Prance, in contrast, had been involved in con-
stant altercations with the United States. The Union then
returned to its favorite theme: the futility of all ef-
forts by old and declining powers to check strong young na-
tions like Russia and the United States. The Allied block-
ade was like "Harlequin attacking the Giant with his wood-
en sword" since the Russians were not dependent upon over-
seas trade. Because of this commercial independence they
could continue the war indefinitely:
The masses of the population of Russia don't
care a cent for the price of stocks, and are suchincurable barbarians that it matters not to them
whether the bulls or the bears are in the ascend-
ant at the Paris Bourse or the London Exchange.
They think more of the Virgin Mary and the saints
than of bankers, brokers and stockjobbers, and
are governed in a far greater degree by their pi-
ety than by their politics. In short, they are
a very dangerous people to take by the beard. 59
The Allies, according to the editorial, could hardly count
on Austria and Prussia to bail them out of their perilous
position at Sevastopol. If these powers entered the war,
they would probably be on opposite sides, since they were
rivals for the leadership of the German Confederation.
Russian military power in the Crimea was highly
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praised by the Union, which as.e.ted that the boasts of an
eas. Victory round in the British press had been thorough-
ly discredited. According to the Union the Allied failure
to capture Sevastopol demonstrated the ability of any well-
trained people, fighting on their soil, to defeat an
invader. This truth should be of great significance to the
United States, "whose progress is constantly interrupted by
at least one of the powers now engaged in the conflict of
the Crimea,"
The Union criticized the National Intelli^enc.r fo.>
asserting that ardent American democrats were as eager Tor
war as any kings. Considered an attack on the spirit of
Manifest Destiny, it was countered by a denial of any
"similarity between American progression and European ag-
grandizement." American expansion, stated the Union, al-
ways meant "liberty and peace" while European imperialism
produced "oppression." Nor was there reason to believe
that America's appetite for war was on the increase.
While the Union championed Russia against the Allies,
its Whig rival in the capital, the National Intellig:encer
.
continued to follow a middle-of-the-road course when re-
porting the Crimean campaign. It still favored Turkey a-
gainst Russia as far as the original quarrel was concerned,
seeing it as a case of right struggling against might.
But the other powers, found the Intelligencer
, were con-
cerned only with establishing their own supremacy. The
e was
threat posed by Russian possession of Constantinopl
minimized; it would not necessarily be disastrous to the
West. That was merely a British obsession. Once again the
Intelligencer reminded its readers that "Russia is an inteL
ligent despotism." The alliance of Austria with the West-
ern powers made a general European war more likely. Such
a possibility made it essential for the United States to
display great wisdom to avoid being drawn into the con-
flict. By remaining aloof, America would escape many mis-
eries and reap a rich harvest of neutral trade. The war
also revealed, according to the Intelligencer , the failure
of popular enlightenment to extinguish the martial spirit:
"Popular passions and so-called national interests take
the place of princely passions and dynastic interests" in
the nineteenth century,
Disagreeing with the Washington Union on most domestic
issues, the New York Tribune frequently equalled the Union
in anti-British sentiment. Horace Greeley, the Tribune 's
editor, believed that Great Britain was collaborating with
the American "slave power" in an attempt to repeal the pro-
tective tariff. If free trade were established, the United
States would become a permanent economic "colony" of Brit-
ain. The South would then be able to import British goods
more cheaply than it now did and would find satisfaction
in the decline of Northern industrial power. Because Rus-
sia was maintaining the highest protective tariff in Eur-
ope, Greeley sympathized with the Czarist Empire, despite
his general opposition to the principles on which it was
based. Greeley suspected a connection between the British
war against Russia and Britain's cooperation with the
Southern slave-owning oligarchy: The objective of both en-
terprises was to spread free trade and English industrial
supremacy all over the world.
When the United States Senate ratified the "free
ships, free goods" treaty with Russia, the Tribune ex-
pressed high praise for this agreement which "must consti-
tute a new chapter in international codes," The paper did
not fail to note that the new accord would be "very unpal-
atable to England." While the Tribune commended the cour-
age of the British troops at Inkerman and thought they had
proven themselves to be superior in quality to the Russian
forces, it denounced British diplomacy for seeking an al-
liance with Austria. The Tribune made public a London ad-
dress by Louis Kossuth, in which he advised Britain to
"throw her overboard" and encourage the Polish and Hungar-
ian revolutionaries. England was now more in need of Po-
land and Hungary than they were of her. Kossuth concluded
with sentiments subscribed to by the Tribune : "With us,
victory; without us, defeat or a disreputable, insufficient
armistice. Mine is the advice, yours the choice."
Putnam ' s Magazine asserted that the United States must
improve its armed forces. The collapse of the British com-
missariat and medical service in the Crimea showed the fol-
ly of imitating the English military system; France and
Prussia provided better models.
Graham
'
s Mag;azine applauded Nicholas I for trying to
develop Russian industry behind the shelter of a protective
tariff. Its editor agreed with Greeley that free trade
was a doctrine admirably suited to enrich England but im-
poverish the rest of the world, which could not yet com-
pete with British industry. No ruler should be called "a
fool or tyrant" because his policy aims at increasing the
wealth and power of his country by means which are opposed
to British interests.
At a time when many other American newspapers and pe-
riodicals were moving in the opposite direction, Littell '
s
Living Age took a strong pro-Allied editorial stand. It
believed the British had made a great mistake in not de-
claring war on Russia in 1849, at the time of the Hungarian
revolt. The United States would probably have allied it-
self with Britain under such circumstances. Now, its edi-
tor stated, the American people distrusted the half-heart-
ed manner in which Britain seemed to be waging the war.
The alliance with Austria was further calculated to reduce
American enthusiasm for the Allied cause. England and
Prance had thrown out "some most impolitic hints as to the
future regulation of American affairs." Nonetheless Lit-
tell '
s
was opposed to those Americans who "desire to see
Russia hold her ground
. . . strongly and long." Allied
Victory would end Russian support for despotic govex..ent
in Germany and enable a united German state with a consti-
tutional government to be established. The revival of Po-
land, Hungary and Italy would also be possible if "the
Northern plague" were removed.
Thus, American attitudes towards the Crimean War had
divided along sectional lines by the end of 185^. Broadly
speaking, New England was pro-Allied while the rest of the
country was pro-Russian (or at least anti-British), The
South was the stronghold of the most enthusiastic pro-Rus-
sian sentiment. Domestic debates over slavery, national
expansion, and the tariff played a vital role in determin-
ing attitudes towards the war. President Pierce's admin-
istration followed a policy of neutrality with pro-Russian
leanings. Ironically, Southerners saw Britain as the lead-
er of an international abolitionist conspiracy, while Hor-
ace Greeley believed that the British were working hand in
glove with the "slave power." These cross-currents com-
bined to produce a demand for a new American mediation
effort when Congress reconvened in December 1854.
CHAPTER VI
Shortly after Congress convened in December 1854 Eep
resentative Tho.as L. Clingman of North Carolina suggested
a joint resolution of the House and Senate which would re-
quest the President to tender an offer of mediation to the
belligerents. The war threatened "to be of long duration,"
the Clingman resolution asserted, "and disastrous to the
industrial and social interests of a large portion of the
civilized world." It defended the value of American in-
terposition on the grounds that the United States had "no
immediate interest in the contest and no purpose to inter-
fere forcibly or in an unwelcome manner." ^
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts introduced a
similar resolution which called upon the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee to consider the expediency of American
mediation to end the conflict. He too stressed the de-
structiveness of the war and the commercial disruption it
created.
Although the proposals of Clingman and Sumner were al-
most identical, the motivation behind them differed consid-
erably. Sumner hoped to end hostilities before the South
would be tempted to seize Cuba while Britain and France
were distracted by their Russian campaign. He made his ob-
jective clear in a letter to the Earl of Carlisle which
emphasized the need for Britain to make peace with Russia:
prised by any audaci^? ' 'Ph^^"dicament of Enslanrt an^ * Present pre-
by the war wf?f^Sss?a! llTelkAlr^'
lay bare their policy anri -i ^oll ^^agSi and
we should have a North, f ^^^^
Clinsman, on the other hand, gave prominence to a mat.
ter close to the heart of the South when he connected the
decline of cotton prices from 1851 to 1854 with the Euro-
pean war. This decline was not Clingman's only reason for
supporting mediation. Speaking in the House on January 3,
1855, he exaggerated the war's effects on shipping inter-
ests. The value of sea-borne freight was reported to be
from twenty to fifty percent lower than it had been at the
outset of the conflict. American farm produce was in dan-
ger of losing some of its markets, because heavy war tax-
ation would reduce food consumption in the belligerent
countries. ^
Stock prices in the United States had already fallen
sharply as a result, and Clingman feared that a prolonged
war also would adversely affect American purchasers of
European goods. Furthermore, the increased manufacture of
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war material would decrease production o£ civilian goods,
thus raising prices. ^
Clingman, throughout his speech, endeavored to rebut
the claims of those who thought the United States would
benefit from the war, economically or politically. Drama-
tizing his commercial argument, he asked his audience to
imagine America as the only civilized nation on earth and
the rest of the world as inhabited by savages. Under these
circumstances the United States would have neither imports
nor exports. The destruction of wealth due to the war
would lead to an approximation of this situation and con-
sequently reduce the volume of American trade. In the
realm of politics, if the European balance of power were
shifted in favor of either Russia or the Western nations,
the United States would also stand to lose. ^
Believing the European conflict the result of numerous
misunderstandings, Clingman looked for a favorable response
to an American mediation offer. He regarded the leaders of
both sides as being too sagacious to hope for a complete
victory. Clingman recalled the Russian offer to intercede
in 1812, Britain's help in the American-French dispute dur-
ing Jackson's administration, and French assistance to the
United States during the Revolutionary War. It was the
duty of the American government to reciprocate these serv-
7ices.
In Clingman' s opinion, revolutions resulting from the
since
Crimean War would be of no benefit to the Europeans,
genuine liberty could not be established in the midst of
war: "There are some who look with hope and pleasure to
this condition of things.
. . . You may see one tyrannical
government overthrown and another, stronger and more tyran-
nical, erected in its stead. The only liberty which is
worth preserving is that which is founded upon law." ^
The contention that the United States would profit
from neutral trade was regarded by Clingman as the argu-
ment of a "vulture" and thoroughly unworthy of a great na-
tion. He saw American mediation as a means of dispelling
European convictions about the grasping and rapacious char-
acter of Americans. Clingman described the war as one
"between the different branches of the great Caucasian
family
- the white races of men, who have shown by their
superior mental and moral endowments, their right to con-
trol the world and regulate its destinies." Its end would
set European civilization back on the road of progress. ^
Congressman E, M. Chamberlain of Indiana opposed
Clingman on the mediation issue. In his view peace would
bring no help to Europe's masses. It would, instead,
"thrust them back into that most helpless of all conditions,
where the silence of despotism is the synonym of peace."
Chamberlain predicted that America would be able to find
new trade channels as a result of the conflict; the sta-
tistics cited by Clingman, he declared, indicated only the
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initial effects of the war.
War could give the European revolutionaries an unpar-
alleled opportunity, Chamberlain contended; the aspirations
Of the Forty-Eighters had ended in failure because all the
great powers had been at peace with each other and had been
able to devote their full attention to suppressing internal
disorders. If the Crimean conflict were prolonged and were
to spread into Italy and Germany, the European monarchies
would exhaust themselves and the revolutionaries would have
their chance. In addition, he pointed out, continuation of
hostilities would provide the United States with an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the performance of the improved weapons
being used at the siege of Sevastopol. American ingenuity
could put this experience to good use in some future crisis.
Chamberlain, a strong supporter of American expansion in
the Caribbean, then recommended a revision of the nation's
traditional neutrality policy, one which would permit its
citizens to engage in military action anywhere in the world
at their own risk. He concluded by denouncing the United
States Navy's interference with filibustering expeditions
against Cuba. "'""^
The Clingman resolution received the support of Repre-
sentative C. W. Upham of Massachusetts. He emphasized
America's indebtedness to the belligerent powers for their
previous intercession. Since she was invulnerable to in-
vasion but had no designs of aggression, America's media-
tion would display both her strength and disinterestedness.
Above all, it would be a great service to civilization. ^2
This attempt to revive America's effort to end the war
failed, the House and Senate committees on foreign affairs
voting to table both the Clingman and Sumner resolutions
on the grounds that the administration had already offered
assistance to the European powers but had received little
encouragement. Petitions in favor of American mediation
had been submitted by various citizens groups in New York,
Delaware and South Carolina (notably from the Chambers of
Commerce of New York City and Charleston), but these pe-
titions were filed away along with the resolutions.
The extent to which the Crimean War affected domestic
trade and economic conditions was clear by the spring of
1855. American commerce did not reap the windfall of neu-
tral trade that had been predicted by some at the war's
outset; yet, on the other hand, the disruption of normal
trade patterns was less damaging than had been anticipated.
There was a major decline in American-Russian trade due to
the Allied blockade, but such trade had always been only
a small part of the total overseas commerce of the United
States. Most of America's exports to Russia consisted of
cotton, and the decline of this commerce partially explains
the militant pro-Russian sentiments of some Southern polit-
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ical leaders. Despite occasional Russian hints of favor-
able commercial concessions, the United States sovernment
made no attempt to challenge the blockade in the Baltic and
.
Black seas. An American steam frigate was directed to the
Baltic, but it developed engine trouble shortly after leav-
ing Southampton, England. Similar plans for a Black Sea
cruise were abandoned when the British and French advised
Commodore Stringham that they would not look with favor on
such an action.
One reason for the absence of agitation against the
Allied blockade was the lucrative prospect opened by the
Anglo-French need for troop and supply transports. The
American clipper ships were the fastest sailing vessels a-
float, and many of them went into the English and French
service. Their chartering helped to offset the war's ini-
tial unfavorable effects upon the American economy. In
the spring of 1854-, for instance, the British and French
withdrew large sums invested in the United States. This
action, combined with revelations about financial scandals
on Wall Street, had precipitated a minor panic. There was
much unemployment in the large Eastern cities during the
winter of 1854-55, but economic conditions improved in the
spring. Even earlier, in the fall of 1854, a large number
of American transports sailed to Constantinople, and an
American observer in France noted that six clipper ships
were plying regularly between Marseilles and the Crimea by
July 1855, carrying Prench troops and supplies.
Captain John Codman, an American merchant marine of-
ficer, who served both the French and the Turks during the
war as commander of a steam transport, later recalled his
experiences. He noted their rivalry, claiming that both
the British and French held the Turks in contempt and all
three had greater respect for the Russians than for each
other. Codman thought that Napoleon was pleased at the
publicity given to the conditions in the British army dur-
ing the winter of 185^-55, since, by contrast, it made his
own forces look superb and enabled the Prench to humiliate
their old rival.
Codman was convinced that England erred in not accept-
ing Nicholas I's 1855 suggestion for Turkish partition.
Since the "sick man" was bound to die sooner or later, the
war only temporarily checked and at great cost, Russia's
advance. The British, he concluded, had failed to make
such an agreement with the Czar because they feared Napo-
leon's reaction to it. Codman also noted that the British
had iinderestimated Russian resistance in the Crimea. Or-
thodox religion gave powerful support to Russian patriot-
ism, he declared, and "the lesson of Bunker Hill had been
forgotten. No people should be despised who have their
own soil to defend."
The effect of the Allied blockade on American commerce
with Russia is evident in statistics on the export trade.
15^
In 1853 the value of such soods was S2, 313,175; $335,521
in 1854; in 1855 it diminished to ^..8,940. Cotton continued
to make up the great bulk of this reduced trade, while rice
was the second largest item.
The Russians had encountered difficulties in increas-
ing their small arms production, and pre-emptive buying by
the British in Belgium limited Russian access to an impor-
tant source of weapons. These difficulties were increased
in April 1855 when Prussia forbade the shipment of Belgian
arms across its territory. Of the 13,000 muskets ordered
from Belgium by the Russians, only 3,000 were delivered
during the war. The Czar, then, was eager to get whatever
he could from the United States and did purchase a small
amount of American arms. Samuel Colt, visiting Saint Pe-
tersburg, negotiated a contract for several thousand mus-
kets. He then returned to America accompanied by a Russian
officer disguised as his valet, a necessary precaution a-
gainst a possible search by an English or French boarding
party. The muskets were loaded in New York and shipped to
Russia under some cotton bales, but they were only a very
small contribution to the total Russian war effort. Al-
though the Russians hoped to obtain larger orders in the
United States, most American companies did not want to risk
running large amounts of contraband goods through the
blockade. "^^
Agricultural exports did not increase as rapidly as
expected. During the summer of 1854 a severe drought af-
fected all the farming regions of the United States. The
resulting poor harvest left no large surplus to ship over-
seas. But weather conditions improved in 1855 and the Al-
lies were able to purchase large quantities of American
foodstuffs for their armies. Suffering from poor harvests
in 1854 and 1855, the French also imported much American
food for home consumption. They even reduced the tariff
duties on American salted meats to enable larger quantities
to enter France. In addition to foodstuffs, the French
purchased large quantities of American tobacco for their
Crimean forces. American agriculture's importance to
France was fully appreciated by the French government, and
helped to reduce the chances of drastic anti-American action
in the Western Hemisphere.
Despite the profits that American farmers were making
as a result of the Allied demand for agricultural products,
pro-Russian sentiment occasionally appeared in farm a'our-
nals. Greeley's Tribune had a great influence upon north-
em and western agricultural periodicals, and their edi-
torials on foreign affairs often echoed his opinions. The
Plough
,
the Loom and the Anvil praised the growth of Rus-
sian industry and the extension of Russian railroads. It
described the role of the American Major G. W. Whistler, in
the construction of the Moscow-Saint Petersburg line. It
quoted a letter, written by an English officer imprisoned
in Russia, commending the slow pace of Russian life as com-
pared to the hustle and bustle of English cities, a descrip.
tion equally applicable to the United States in these
years. Moreover, even on political matters the Plough and
Loom was only mildly critical of the Russian autocracy:
Some of the requisitions here set forthseem arbitrary, and a few of them are so, but '
^llK^^l^"^ conduce materially to the good or-
^hL community. In fact, something likethem exists m some of the New England States,We have personally known an applicant, in Ver-
mont, refused the 'citizen's oath,' which givesthe vote, on the ground of immoral character.There IS such a thing as being too lax, as well
as being too strict. 21
The cornerstone of Russian (and American) industrial
progress, according to the Plough and Loom
, was a protec-
tive tariff. Here again the opinions of Horace Greeley
were echoed. The Russian system (like that of the United
States) was "attractive of population," and French, German
and American mechanics found a great demand for their serv-
ices within it. But the effects of England's economic pol-
icy presented a dismal contrast to this pleasing picture
of Russia and America prospering behind their tariff walls:
"That of England is repulsive, as is seen by the forced ex-
port of men from England, Scotland, Ireland, and India,
now followed by whole cargoes of women sent by aid of pub-
lic contributions, presenting a spectacle almost as humil-
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latins to the pride of the sex as can be found in the slave
bazaar of Constantinople."
Neither the fears of Congressman Clingman nor the
hopes of Representative Chamberlain concerning the impact
of the Crimean War on the American economy were fully real-
ized. Nevertheless, most commercial interests in the Unit-
ed States favored the early re-establishment of peace. The
editorials of the National Intelligencer (which was closely
connected with Whig businessmen in both North and South)
and the petitions in favor of mediation make this evident.
Even though some American merchants profited from the war
(a fact acknowledged by the Intelligencer ^ the mercantile
community feared the conflict would eventually involve more
European powers or spill over into the New World.
Thus Whig opposition to American filibustering in the
Caribbean related to the desire to end Crimean hostilities.
If Allied support of Spain in Cuba extended the European
conflict to the Caribbean, the profits made in the carrying
trade would be almost immediately wiped out. Eor the ef-
fectiveness of the British blockade in 1814 was a living
memory on the Eastern seaboard. All things considered,
most American businessmen preferred a return of peaceful
commerce to the risks of an extended war.
It is significant that the extensive role played by
American merchants in supplying and transporting Anglo-
French forces, failed to generate strong pro-Allied senti-
ment among them. Similarly, the dependence of American
newspapers on British sources for war news had not pro-
duced a dominant pro-British bias in the press. Indeed,
Huntis Merchants ' Magazine, one of the leading commercial
organs of New York, was pro-Russian. Britain was the chief
purchaser of Southern cotton, but the Czar's cause was held
in higher esteem in the cotton states than elsewhere. Con-
versely, industrial New England was in direct competition
with British industry, but the Allies found most of their
support here.
The reasons for these inconsistencies varied. Most
American merchants who loaned out their ships or sold farm
products to the Allies, were merely seizing a business op-
portunity and had little- sense of ideological commitment.
In general, these merchants hoped for an end to the war for
the reasons already stated. However, since there was no
possibility of total Allied defeat, with a concomitant
shift in the political and economic balance of power, Amer-
ican businessmen were able to preserve a more neutral at-
titude. Some of them were well aware that Britain was the
chief competitor of the United States, and that some Brit-
ish political leaders were hostile to American growth.
Southerners, in assaying the political and economic
implications of the Crimean V/ar, considered the general
welfare of the slaveholding system to be paramount. They
regarded Britain as the center of abolitionism as well as
the chief opponent of American expansion into the Caribbean
and Central America. Russian serfdom, on the other hand,
seemed comparable to Southern slavery. Thus, the Richmond
Enquirer could write that nowhere outside Russia could a
more contented laboring class be found except in the Amer-
ican South.
Southerners were increasingly regarded as "the enemy"
in New England. Just as they saw Britain and the American
abolitionists as the chief threat to their society, so the
New England industrialists (although far from being aboli-
tionists) were coming to regard the expanding, low-tariff
South as the foremost menace to their interests. England's
economic rivalry with New England became insignificant when
compared to the potential threat of Southern political -
economic domination of vast Western and Caribbean territo-
ries. Since the American Revolution, New England leaders
had generally sought to prevent economic rivalry with Brit-
ain from developing into major political animosity. This
was a central theme of Federalist and Whig political doc-
trine, and is illustrated by Daniel Webster's conciliatory
policy towards Britain when he was Secretary of State dur-
ing the Tyler administration. However, the most ardent
New England supporters of Britain's war with Russia were
not industrial or commercial men, but the professional
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groups: clergymen, intellectuals, and reformers. ^8
In sum, it is evident that narrow economic motives
did not primarily shape American attitudes toward the bel-
ligerents, or produce strict neutrality and mediation res-
olutions. Long-range economic interests were combined with
broader social considerations, ideological preferences, and
domestic political rivalries. The general effect of these
varied pressures was to strengthen the American resolve to
remain neutral, and to evoke some sentiment in favor of me-
diation to end the war.
Some businessmen (chiefly in the South and New York
City), those closely connected with the expansionist wing
of the Democratic Party, favored Caribbean policies that
threatened to provoke a clash between the United States and
the Allied powers. The activity of these expansionists,
and the remarkable document emanating from the meeting of
Buchanan, Mason and Soule ended any chance for American me-
diation, even if Congress had approved the Clingman and
Sumner resolutions.
The rapid increase in American business activity in
Central America had followed upon the gold rush to Cali-
fornia. A railroad, financed by American capitalists, was
built across the Isthmus of Panama, and there was much dis-
cussion of constructing a canal in either Nicaragua or Pan-
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ama. In 1850 the United States and Britain signed the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty which provided for joint adminis-
tration of any canal that might be built. The two powers
also promised not to annex any territory in Central Amer-
ica. However, a dispute soon arose involving the interpre-
tation of this agreement. The British had established a
protectorate over the Mosquito Indians in 1848, at a time
when there was a possibility that the United States might
follow up its victory over Mexico by moving into Central
America. Britain claimed that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
did not apply to actions taken before 1850. The United
States, on the other hand, insisted upon a retroactive in-
terpretation of the anti-annexation clause
Buchanan's main task in London was to secure British
withdrawal from the Mosquito Coast protectorate and the is-
land of Roatan in the Bay of Honduras, which the Americans
feared would be transformed by Britain into a powerful na-
val base like Gibralter or Singapore. By the summer of
1854 the British, now heavily committed to the Crimean War,
decided to withdraw from Honduras. But an event occurred
which caused Britain to take a stronger stand in Central
America.
A riot broke out at Greytown, the "capital" of the
Mosquito kingdom, destroying American property and slightly
injuring Solon Borland, the American consul and one of the
leading members of the Democratic Party's "Young America"
faction. In response, President Pierce decided on a, show
of force, and ordered Captain William Hollins of the U.S.S.
C^ane to demand reparation. When it was refused, Hollins
bombarded Greytown, then landed his marines, who burned the
town to the ground. Both the Northern and the British
press denounced this action. Buchanan, acting on his own
initiative, assured Lord Clarendon that the administration
would disavow Hollins' action.
But the American minister was mistaken. Secretary
Marcy also deplored the destruction of Greytown, but Hol-
lins* actions had not specifically violated his instruc-
tions, although they were more extreme than the President
or his Cabinet expected. Public disavowal of this bombard-
ment would be too great a loss of face for the United
States, in the midst of the Central American negotiations.
The British Cabinet similarly concluded that abandonment of
the Mosquito protectorate when confronted with such a bold
American challenge, would also be humiliating. Thus Clar-
endon informed Buchanan that Britain would not withdraw.
A few months after the Greytown affair, American re-
lations with Britain and France were further strained by
the revelation of the Ostend Manifesto, drawn up at the
meeting of Buchanan, Mason and Soule. This document, in-
tended to be confidential but soon disclosed by both Amer-
ican and European newspapers, asserted that the United
States would be justified in seizing Cuba if Spain refused
to sell the island since it was vital to American security
and domestic tranquility (i.e. the possible effects on the
South if Spain emancipated the slaves in Cuba).
Soule's influence had been dominant at the conference,
and his chief argument for decisive action to acquire Cuba
was the involvement of Britain and France in the Crimea.
However, the angry reaction to the Manifesto in both the
European and Northern press was so great that Secretary
Marcy immediately disavowed it. In addition to possible
international complications, the Pierce administration
feared that support of the Manifesto would complete the
ruin of the Democratic Party, which had already been badly
split by the Kansas-Nebraska Act.
Although the Ostend Manifesto was a diplomatic fiasco,
setting back any chance of American acquisition of Cuba,
its bellicosity rendered a small service to the Russians.
Spain had been considering the despatch of troops to the
Crimea; and now, alarmed by American threats, Madrid re-
quested Britain and France to guarantee its possession of
Cuba in return for support against Russia. But England,
anxious to avoid a second war if possible, refused to give
such a guarantee, and Spain abandoned any thoughts of join-
ing the Allies.
Upon his return to London after the Ostend conference,
Buchanan turned his efforts towards preserving friendly re-
lations with Great Britain, a task made doubly difficult
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by the srowing pro-Russian sentiment in the United States
and by British alarm over American designs on Cuba as well
as Central America. Buchanan »s basic dilemma was that Eng-
lishmen who normally sympathized with the United States
supported the war. Repeatedly stressing the popularity of
the war in Britain, he warned America of the loss of many
of its friends due to the anti-British tone of much of its
press. He urged Secretary Narcy to persuade the Washington
Union to tone down its editorial hostility to Britain. At
the same time, he believed Russian diplomatic support to be
vital on occasion, in order to protect American national
interests. When Lord Clarendon suggested submitting the
Anglo-American dispute over the Mosquito protectorate to a
third power for arbitration, Buchanan replied that Britain
was now at war with the only arbiter the United States
could accept.
Buchanan was convinced that the British ministry would
not dare to make a compromise peace with Russia, since it
would lead to its fall. In a letter to John W. Forney, the
editor of the Washington Union, he explained England's at-
titude towards the war:
The present war with Russia is a war of the
masses of the British people. It is especially
a war of those who from their liberal and pro-
gressive sentiments are most strongly inclined to
favor our country. Their only apprehension is
that the Government from dynastic prepossessions
have not conducted it and will not conduct it
So^hf ^^^c^^yigo^ as they ought to have done.Whether rightly or wrongly, the British Liberals
rtll^^^ '^.^^ ^ promote progress andfree principles. 38 ^ ^ ^
Buchanan was frequently approached by European revo-
lutionary leaders inquiring about possible American sup-
port. Despite his sympathies for the Polish, Hungarian
and Italian causes, he carefully avoided giving the radi-
cals any official encouragement. Once again he was caught
between two fires; the American doctrine of neutrality as
well as the need for Russian diplomatic support on the one
hand, and America's enthusiasm for oppressed European na-
tionalities on the other. France's radicals did not great-
ly appeal to Buchanan since they were not subject, unlike
others, to foreign rule. Napoleon III, he believed, was
a usurper; yet the French people had ratified his seizure
of power by an overwhelming vote. The French "have chosen
Louis Napoleon," Buchanan concluded, "let them have him.
... I am not partial to him, neither to Ledru Rollin,
Louis Blanc, or Victor Hugo, or any red Republicans and
Socialists."
Buchanan conferred with Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Min-
ister, in late December 185^. In Aberdeen's opinion, the
importance of "a sincere and lasting friendship between
Great Britain and the United States could scarcely be over-
rated." He added that the war in which Britain was now en-
Saged n,ade it .ore important than ever to „,aintain good re-
lations with America. Buchanan, concurring, remarked that
"the progress of civilization throughout the world, re-
quired that Great Britain and the United states should be
the best of friends."
Despite this cordial exchange, England now definitely
refused to accept a "free ships, free goods" treaty similar
to that signed by the United States and Russia in 185^.
When Buchanan suggested such a convention to Clarendon,' the
Foreign Secretary "replied in a significant manner: 'I pre-
sume this is the same Treaty you have already made with the
Emperor of Russia.' I said. Yes, the very same."
In the course of this conversation Clarendon complained
about the pro-Russian tone of the American press, and al-
luded to an article in the London Times which rationalized
Russo-American friendship on the grounds of mutual aggres-
siveness and lawlessness. Extreme democracy and rigid au-
tocracy produced the same results. Buchanan denied that
this explained the partiality of some Americans for Russia;
and attributed it to a concern over possible Anglo-French
intervention in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.
In England, meanwhile, revelations about the condition
of British soldiers in the Crimea had produced a great out-
cry against the Aberdeen Coalition government, A motion
was introduced in Commons which would set up a Parliamen-
tary committee to investigate the conduct of the war. With
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its passage, the Coalition government resigned. Lord Palm-
erston, the Home Secretary, formed a new ministry and prom-
ised a more vigorous prosecution of the war. Buchanan was
sorry to see Aberdeen supplanted by Palmerston, who had
long opposed American expansion in the Western Hemisphere.
He now anticipated greater difficulty in resolving the Cen-
tral American question. He also worried about the relative
increase in French prestige following the revelations of
British blunders. Napoleon III, in Buchanan's opinion,
would never agree to end the war until Sevastopol had been
captured. The Emperor must have a peace with glory or
would probably be overthrown. If Prance were to play the
leading role in taking Sevastopol, it could be dangerous
for the United States because of Napoleon's eagerness to
check American expansion.
In contrast to Napoleon, the British governing class
wanted peace, Buchanan believed, but hesitated to suggest
it because of the popular demand for victory: "The govern-
ing class in this country are doubtless anxious for peace.
The continuance of the war may still further demonstrate
the incompetency of the existing system successfully to
govern the country and the necessity of a large infusion of
hh
the popular element in high places."
Nathaniel Hawthorne agreed with Buchanan that the Cri-
mean War was weakening aristocratic political dominance.
The American consul considered the present nobility to be
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superior in character to any previous generation. Neverthe^
less, the test of war had found it wanting in intelligence;
hence it would no longer be able to maintain all the pre-
rogatives "quietly conceded" to it. One year of war had
"done the work of fifty ordinary ones-; thus England had
been given "a vast impulse towards democracy." Hawthorne
revealed that his own feelings with respect to the war were
closely related to prevailing American opinion. Separation
from his country made him aware of "a continual and imme-
diate correspondence with the national feeling."
The collapse of the Aberdeen Coalition provoked exten-
sive comment in the American press. The Tribune was unable
to discover any redeeming qualities in this regime:
Great Britain has had many a seedy admin-
istration to boast of, but a Cabinet so seedy,
needy and greedy, and at the same time so pre-
sumptuous as All the Talents never existed.
They began with unbounded boasting, lived upon
hair-splitting and defeat, and ended in disgrace
as Complete as it is possible for man to at-
tain. 46
The Tribune also offered the new Palmerston ministry
some advice on how to remedy the conditions which had
brought down Aberdeen's government. Britain's army would
have to be drastically reformed if she were to continue to
exercise any major influence in Continental affairs. To-
wards this end it urged the introduction of conscription,
better training of officers, and promotion by merit rather
than by purchase. Any army raised entirely by voluntary
enlistment would be aristocratic in character, the Tribune
stated, because the rank and file would be drawn mainly
from the lowest social classes and the officers would form
an exclusive caste. The middle sections of society are ab-
sent from such an army, which then was not genuinely repre-
sentative of the nation. Such Criticism was aimed at both
the British and American armies. The latter, according to
the Tribune
,
was "one of the most aristocratic in the
world." The American and the British armies could only be
democratized by adopting a form of conscription similar to
the Prussian.
The Spring:field Republican saw the replacement of
Aberdeen by Palmerston as a sure sign of Allied determi-
nation to prosecute the war more vigorously. Hardly enthu-
siastic about this development, it did not go as far as
the Tribune in denouncing British policy. According to the
Republican
, pro-Russian sentiment was not strong in the
United States, except among certain Southern politicians.
Instead, most Americans were indifferent to the outcome of
hostilities because it was now clear that whatever side
won, there would be no benefits for Europe's masses. Aus-
tria was "the most unrelenting and cruel despotism on the
globe," the Republican declared, and English and French at-
tempts to draw her into the war on their side did more than
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any other event to discredit their cause in the eyes of
Americans.
Many papers predicted an expanded conflict following
the alliance between the Western powers and Austria, but
some American readers were more fascinated by religious
prophecies about the war's effect upon the world. The
Republican printed a lengthy discussion of Edward Fletch-
I
er»s pamphlet which forecast events for the next fifteen
years. Fletcher had deduced from a study of the strange
beasts in the Book of Daniel that a Russian conquest of
Turkey as well as a French victory over Austria and the Pa-
pacy was imminent. The sequel would be Russian domination
of the Continent. Such developments were only the begin-
ning. Fletcher went on to prophesy that the English would
occupy Palestine and restore the Jews to their old home.
Russia would then seek to expel Great Britain from the Holy
Land, and the United States would intervene on England's
side. At this point, owing to a fit of "Judicial madness,"
civil war would break out in Russia; and, as a result, the
two Anglo-Saxon powers would emerge supreme in the worldo
The victory would be a prelude to "the good time . . . when
governments will no longer be needed by a perfected race."
Fletcher's pamphlet sold 150,000 copies in a short time and
is an excellent example of the eschatological literature
that flourished in both nineteenth century England and the
United States.
secular forecasts about the future also circulated in
the winter of 185^-55- There was a rumor to the effect
that Russia and the Western powers would make peace and in-
vade the United States. The Republican , ridiculing this
report, offered some suggestions for improving Springfield'
defenses
:
4-v
I£."the subsequent disclosures
. . „ confirmthese dire portents of war, we have certain sue--gestions to make to the legal authorities forthe resuscitation of the old redoubt on ArmoryHill and the erection of mud barricades over-looking the several railroads, by which the in-
vaders will doubtless enter Springfield after
sacking Boston and New York. SO
While the opposing armies in the Crimea prepared for
the spring campaign of 1855, the attempt to revive the
idea of mediation in the American Congress failed, despite
petitions from important commercial groups. American re-
lations with Britain and France deteriorated rapidly during
the last half of 1854, precluding any acceptance of United
States mediation, even if a new offer had been made based
on a Congressional resolution. The Greytown affair, the
Ostend Manifesto, Anglo-French suspicions of American de-
signs on the Sandwich Islands, and several lesser disputes
ruled out this possibility. Allied mistrust of American
plans had reached the point where Eugene de Sartiges, the
French minister in Washington could believe that the United
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States intended to turn China into an "American India."
Events in the Caribbean would continue to damage relations
between the United States and the Allied powers as American
filibusterers attempted a private application of the Ostend
Manifesto in Central America. Concurrently, other Americans
were active in Russia itself, testifying to the fact that
Anglo-French suspicion of collaboration between the giants
of the East and West had some solid foundations.
CHAPTER VII
Russia's American friends made numerous offers of as-
sistance. Baron de Stoeckl, the Russian minister in Wash-
mgton, received many inquiries from persons wishing to fit
out privateers for Russia, or otherwise contribute to her
war effort. If American privateers were secretly sent out
and captured by the British, the confrontation, Stoeckl be-
lieved, would initiate an Anglo-American war. This conflict
would effectively divert England fzom the war in the East.
Additionally, America's involvement, Stoeckl expected,
would force her to cease protecting revolutionaries and
troubling other states.
Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister, was
less enthusiastic about attempts to draw America into the
war. Satisfied with American neutrality and the "free
ships, free goods" treaty, he feared that any secret priva-
teering enterprises would only turn American opinion a-
gainst Russia. He therefore ordered Stoeckl to be cau-
tious. ^
In early 1855 Stoeckl believed he had found an irre-
sistible privateering opportunity. Beverly Sanders, a San
Francisco businessman involved in trade with Alaska, had
been a leading figure in an abortive plan to turn that col-
ony over to an American private company for safekeeping
during the war. He now offered to send several privateers
to attack the British gold fleet after it left Australia,
This adventure also interested Senator Gwin of California,
an ardent expansionist. Stoeckl wrote Nesselrode on Feb-'
ruary 5, 1855 urging him to accept the Sanders plan. But
Nesselrode,apparently convinced that the days of Sir Fran-
cis Drake were over, refused to endorse his minister's plan
Rather he instructed Stoeckl to inform his American friends
that if they wanted to send any ships to a Russian Pacific
port and have them fitted out as privateers there, it
would be acceptable. This procedure would not have been a
violation of American neutrality in the opinion of the
United States government, since Secretary Marcy had in-
formed Stoeckl at the outset of hostilities, that he did
not care what Americans did at their o^n risk abroad, so
long as they did not use American territory as their base.
Sanders, as Nesselrode undoubtedly expected, was not inter-
ested in such terms and the project was dropped. ^
Ivan Golovin, an anti-Czarist Russian nobleman living
in exile in New York City, commented extensively on the
commercial spirit of the Americans, which he thoroughly
disliked. In his Stars and Stripes , or American Impres-
sions he found that hostility to Great Britain was the
main motive behind the apparently widespread pro-Russian
sentiment in the United States. But Golovin also observed
the eagerness of Americans to profit by selling their muni-
tions to both sides:
RussianI So'^of^^^S' °^ Americans forK s are a harmless nature; the Yankoo=sell gunpowder to both belliserent nartif,greatest part of their toniagls employel' in
'
iizrof woS:ied'soi-uiers 01 the Allies to and from the Crimpa 'Tothe Russians, who should complain of sioh ^ T>raoeeding they reply that they would be ver? ^happy indeed to lend their ships to the Czar but
making SoLy!T* opportunity of
I
The United States, Golovin concluded, was following
the wrong path in politics and morals. The
' competitive
spirit in business and an "unbounded love of material in-
terests" were not going to resolve the great questions of
the nineteenth century. Like a generation of British and
French travelers before him, Golovin believed European ad-
vocates of democracy had been misled into an exaggerated
belief in the perfection of American institutions. To
Golovin, the greatest service the United States could rend-
er to European democracy would be the purification of its
institutions, placing them "above the sneers and criticisms
of European monarchists." Corruption in America was re-
markably similar to corruption in Russia:
Suffice it to say, that the Americans them-
selves confess that corruption among them is so
great that despotism alone can extirpate its
root
. . , that New York is a Sodom. As for the
magistrates, they are nearly all of them indict-
ed this very moment for misdemeanors; they must
steal, having but this resource, for their sit-
uations are worth nothing, and take their whole
time. The very reasoning you meet with in fius-
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sia. Russia alone can match America upon thic:point; there they steal hay from horses medicine from the sick, bread from the so!diersfiruits and wine from the Emperor. 5
Andrew D. White, then an attache at the United States
Legation in Saint Petersburg, observed many of the Ameri-
cans who came to the Russian capital during the war. He
described how the "heavy conservatism of Russian officials-
thwarted Samuel Coifs efforts to sell them an improved
musket similar to the Minie rifle which the British and
French were using in the Crimea. The Russian officers,
convinced that their men were too ignorant to use any weap-
on other than the old "Brown Bess" musket, refused to give
Colt a contract. ^
White described some of his countrymen, who were con-
fidence men, as "curiosities of civilization" and purvey-
ors of nostrums which would guarantee a Russian victory
over the Western powers. Thomas Seymour, America's minis-
ter in Saint Petersburg, and his aides had to be constant-
ly on the alert to keep these adventurers within the bounds
of propriety in their dealings with the Russian government
and with each other. Hoping to sell a new type of cannon
to the Russians, one inventor gave a demonstration of his
weapon to some of the highest ranking officers in the
Czar's army. When the gun was about to be fired it was
discovered that a rival inventor had stolen an essential
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part of it, and the demonstration ended in failure.
Another promoter in Saint Petersburg, a New York City
ward boss and agent for a breech-loading musket company,
had smuggled some specimens of arras over the frontier.
This "big, rough, and rosy" politician was presented to the
Czar, who provided two aides-de-camp to show the salesman
and his wife around the Russian capital in court car-
riages. ®
Russian agents in Paris, at the outset of the war, had
persuaded a large number of young American physicians and
surgeons who were studying in that city to join the Russian
array. These men were given high pay and rapid advancement
in the hope that this would strengthen pro-Russian feeling
in the United States. However, their speedy promotion
aroused anger among Russian surgeons, and some of these
Americans were badly treated and died. Seymour intervened
to extricate others from Russian service, a task which he
took very much to heart: On several occasions White "saw
tears in Governor Seymour's eyes as he dwelt upon the
death of some of these young fellows whom he had learned
to love during their stay in Saint Petersburg." ^
In the spring of 1855 the Anglo-French squadron re-
turned to the Baltic. White went to Cronstadt to observe
this impressive fleet. One hundred three-decked ships of
the line were stretched across the Gulf of Finland in front
of the fortresses of Cronstadt. The Russians kept their
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own fleet in port, sheltered by the guns of the fortresses.
White later commented on the Russian failure to cover a few
of their large ships with railway iron which was available
in Saint Petersburg. Since all the British and French ships
were made of wood, a few iron-plated ships would have en-
abled the Russians to win "the most prodigious naval vic-
tory of modem times." He made this comment much later,
however, after perceiving the value of ironclads in the
American Civil War.
American opinion of the war again had a major opportu-
nity for expression when Czar Nicholas I died suddenly on
March 2, 1855. Nicholas had suffered blow after blow: the
failure of his troops to expel the Anglo-French force from
the Crimea (in the autumn of 1854), the loss of Austrian
support, and the Russian defeat by the Turks at Eupatoria
in February 1855. Weakened by a severe cold, Nicholas re-
fused to curtail his official activities. Exposing himself
too often to the winter weather, he died of pneumonia.
Thomas Seymour lamented his death and recalled several
friendly interviews with him. In Seymour's opinion, Nicho-
las possessed a "perfectly irresistible" personality, and
his handshake was "a good republican grasp." Andrew D.
White saw the Czar several times including one occasion
when Nicholas was riding in a sleigh about a week before
his death. The appearance of the Czar made a deep inipres-
sion on the young American: "Colossal in stature, with a
face such as one finds on a Greek coin, but overcast with
a shadow or Muscovite melancholy
... he bore himself
like a God."
British theatre audiences cheered the news of the Em-
peror's death, but the American response was quite differ-
ent. Most newspapers and periodicals had at least moder-
ately favored the late Czar. The United States Review
,
that organ of "Young America" (formerly the Democratic Re-
view)
,
had been consistently pro-Russian since the war be-
gan and now denounced British rejoicing. The Fort Adams,
Arkansas, Item bitterly commented on the British reaction
to the Czar's death: "It is said that a lion never preys
upon a carcass. The British Lion is an exception to this
rule." -"-^
Putnam ' s Magazine had a long article on Nicholas which
concluded with a generally laudatory summary of his career:
Russia contains in her soil the greatest
diversity of mineral wealth; but Nicholas knew
how to use the granite, converting it into a
safeguard of national independence and greatness.
... In the history of Russia Nicholas will
ever shine as one of her most useful sovereigns,
as the efficient pioneer of her ultimate destiny.
... He simultaneously diffused light and dark-
ness; but light is perennial, and darkness dis-
solves and disappears in the abyss of Time. 14
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According to Putnam's, Nicholas- greatest error had been
his intervention in Hungary in support of Austria in 18^3.
If the Hapsburg Empire had then broken up, Russian influ-
ence on the Continent would have been much greater. Aus-
trian opposition to Russian expansion in the Balkans was
now threatening to add another member to the anti-Russian
coalition. Nicholas, it followed, had gone against the
national interest in aiding Francis Joseph in the name of
"monarchical solidarity." "'^
The National Intelligencer had high praise for Nicho-
las I and expressed hope that his son, Alexander II, would
seek peace with the Allies. It also rebuked the British
for rejoicing over the Czar's death, commenting that such
actions would only encourage Alexander to continue the war.
Nicholas had occupied one of the most important places in
modern history, according to the Intelligencer
, and
may be regarded, perhaps, as the greatest Sover-
eign of modern times, and few have filled a wid-
er space in the history of the world. . . . With
the genius of Frederick in administrative capac-
ity, he had almost the genius of Napoleon for
war. His moral and conscientious qualities sur-
passed those of either, 16
The V/ashington Union commended Nicholas for having
resisted the policy of "universal intervention" pursued by
England and France. It also encouraged Alexander II to
continue the struggle against the coalition which claimed
"a right to clip the wings of nations whenever they aspire
to too high a flight." Shortly before the death of the
Czar, the Union had printed a letter signed "Old Louisiana"
which compared the Cossacks to Kentucky and Tennessee fron-
tiersmen of Jackson's day. Any man who had conversed with
Nicholas, the writer declared, would take his word against
the bond of all the rest of Europe.
A New York Tribune editorial praised Nicholas as an
upright man but condemned his basic principle of autocracy.
It contrasted him with American "doughface" politicians
(Northern men with Southern principles), noting that the
Czar never assumed a false mask of liberalism or "concocted
his schemes in darkness." But great men were becoming
anachronistic in the nineteenth century. Since the age was
great in itself, it was not favorable to the growth of
"captains of the race." The Tribune continued to deplore
the tendency of the war to strengthen the old despotisms
of Europe. Austria's alliance with the Western powers was
particularly galling. In contrast to its portrait of an
upright Nicholas, the paper described Francis Joseph as "a
consummate diplomatic trickster." Despite an almost total
difference of opinion on domestic issues, the Tribune and
the Union agreed that England rather than Russia was the
chief threat to the world balance of power.
The very vocal Southern support for Russia, which was
combined with a desire to expand in the Caribbean and Cen-
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tral Amei-ioa, caused a leading English magazine, the West-
ninster Revievj, to sarcastically comment that "America has
a Russia within her borders." ^9 typically, the expan-
sionist United States Review, shortly after the death of
Nicholas I, produced a short poem glorifying Russian hero-
ism at Sevastopol:
w^f^^J ^^^^ sea and land,With bristling guns your ramparts stand.Defiant, isolated, grand,
Sebastopol
!
The unconquered spirit of the CzarStill hovers o'er the field of war.
Flashing from death, a shrouded star,
Sebastopol! 20
CHAPTER VIII
Although maoority opinion in the United States favored
Russia by the end of 1854, anti-slavery and missionary
movements provided strong ties binding New England to Great
Britain. Nathaniel Hawthorne was the only prominent New
England intellectual who was sympathetic to Russia, and he
had long been skeptical about abolitionism and most other
reform movements. Emerson, Thoreau, Theodore Parker, Wil-
liam H. Channing, Edward Everett, Thomas W. Higginson, and
Charles Sumner all favored Great Britain with varying de-
grees of enthusiasm. Most of these New Englanders, though
disturbed by the British alliance with Napoleon III, gen-
erally accepted it as a necessary evil. The great varia-
tion in their political opinions, ranging from conservative
Whigs like Everett, to radical abolitionists like Parker
and Higginson, suggests the inclusiveness of New England
support for the Allied cause.
The North American Review
, Boston's leading literary
journal, was pleased with the initial success of the Allied
forces in the Crimea. It dispelled the excessive fear of
Russian power that had prevailed since Napoleon I met dis-
aster in 1812. Understandably, then, the Review praised
the "promptness and vigor" with which Britain and France
had formed their "countervailing alliance." But it was
very critical of what it considered British complicity
with Russian aggression up to 1853 » since England had ac-
quiesced in every step of Russian expansion over a half
century. But it concluded that Britain and France had at
last taken a firm stand and hoped for an Allied victory:
France and England forget the con-tests of the past m the common danger that hov-
ers round the future, let Austria disdain to holdthe heritage of the Caesars at the hands of theCzar, and there need be little fear that the Cos-sack shall ever again cross the Rhine, or thatthe double-headed eagle shall guard exclusivelythe waters of the Golden Horn. 2
At the beginning of the Crimean War, Ralph Waldo Emer
son saw the conflict as giving scope to the ancient "pirat-
ical" spirit of the Anglo-Saxons and counteracting the en-
ervating effects of peace, commerce and luxury dominant in
English society since 1815. The British soon proved that
their old martial qualities remained. Their heroism, in
Emerson's opinion, excelled that of any other nation:
There is an English hero superior to the
French, the German, the Italian, or the Greek.
When he is brought to the strife with fate, he
sacrifices a richer material possession, and on
more purely metaphysical grounds. He is there
with his own consent, face to face with fortune,
which he defies. On deliberate choice and from
grounds of character, he has elected his part to
live and die for, and dies with grandeur. This
race has added new elements to humanity and has
a deeper root in the world. 3
Emerson admired the exemplary courage displayed by the
English nobility who dominated the officer corps. It dis-
pelled the exaggerated fears of Emerson and others about
the decline of manly spirit in an age of luxury. "There
are few noble families," said Emerson, "which have not
paid, in some of their members, the debt of life or limb
in the sacrifices of the Russian war." His praise of the
English aristocracy partly reflected upon American politi-
cal tensions in the 1850»s. For this was a decade in which
self-made men were frequently elected to high office, and
many New Englanders, including Emerson, saw this kind of
"democracy" and slavery going hand in hand. Hence the
anti-democratic implications of Emerson's praise of Eng-
land. ^
In the Judgment of Emerson, the world's security de-
pended upon England's. Frequently contrasting the ordered
liberty of Great Britain with the turbulence of France, he
expressed satisfaction with the capacity of English politi-
cal institutions to avoid the mutability which character-
ized the Continent. Nineteenth century Western culture,
particularly the "practical common sense of modern soci-
ety," derived its essential spirit from England. No nation
could resist the spread of English ideas, even if it were
at war with Great Britain. To Emerson "the Russian in his
snows is aiming to be English," while "the Turk and Chinese
also are making awkward efforts to be English." The Ameri-
can genius was "only the continuation of the English genius
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into new conditions more or less propitious." ^
Despite Emerson's Anglophilic sentiments, he saw much
to criticize in England. Por example, he denounced English
foreign policy up to the Crimean War. This policy, with
its sympathy for European conservatism, led England to
"betray" Poland, Hungary, Italy and (until 1853) Turkey. ^
Henry Thoreau's sardonic comments about Americans who
eagerly read the war news were not consistent with his gen-
eral attitude towards the Crimean War. Shortly before the
conflict began a young English gentleman, Thomas Cholm-
endely, had visited Thoreau at Concord. A friendship de-
veloped and the Englishman, upon returning home, sent Thor-
eau some books on Oriental religions. Thereafter Cholm-
endely enlisted in the British army and wrote that his reg-
iment would soon be departing for the Crimea. Thoreau 's
reply reveals much about the complexity of his attitude to-
wards .war. He had opposed the Mexican War and believed
that man was degraded by military discipline. But he also
thought (along with many of his romantic contemporaries in
both Europe and America) that a military life exemplified
certain virtues which were rapidly disappearing in the com-
mercial civilization of the nineteenth century:
I believe that it is only necessary that
England be fully awakened to a sense of her po-
sition, in order that she may right herself, es-
pecially as the weather will soon cease to be
her foe. I wish I could believe that the cause
in which you are embarked is the cau<.P n-r i->.^people of Fnp^innH se oi the
time to timP L"^ *° ^^<l"i^^ ^ "^i- f^o-
in the good fight .... 7
o^uuxs ever
Like Emerson, Edward Everett, former Secretary of
State and President of Harvard College, supported the Al-
lies against Russia. As a leading member of the Massachu-
setts Whig Party and one of the most articulate conserva-
tive spokesmen in the North, he was hostile to abolition-
ism, unenthusiastic about the 18^8 European revolution, and
feared the Russian menace to the Western world more than
did Emerson. In a letter to the National Intellio:encer
.
Everett deplored the anti-British and pro-Russian tone of
much 0^ the American press. He prophetically warned that
those who. are still alive in fifty years "will see Russia
the scourge of all Europe, Asia, and even America." The
Allied powers were "engaged in a great and glorious work
for the liberties and security of the whole civilized
world." Everett's 1854 Fourth of July speech was a call
for American national unity in the face of great opportu-
nities. He predicted a transfer of world power to the
Western Hemisphere: the European war and a vast influx of
immigrants would accelerate this process. ^
William H. Channins, another Boston Brahmin, spent the
winter of 1854-55 in England. Strongly endorsing the war,
he warned that if Russia was able to become a sea power as
well as a land power, all of Europe as well as the East
would eventually fall under her domination. The obo'ective
Of Allied campaigns in the Baltic and Black seas was to rid
Europe of "this giant incubus" by destroying the Russian
fleets and bases in the two inland seas and preventing her
from ever rebuilding them. Channing was impressed by the
"wonderful unanimity" of all the English classes in support
of the war. All Dissenters as well as most Anglicans saw
the war as a means of diffusing a purer form of religion in
the East. The dominant tone was, Channing wrote, "We are
in for it, now let us go through with it." ^
Despite these prevailing sentiments, Channing noted
the existence of several vocal anti-war groups. On two oc-
casions he found himself in the unusual position of "a
stranger defending the policy of this nation against its
own subjects." Channing broke down the varieties of anti-
war opinion into two categories: one group feared a Russian
victory and emphasized that, for over a century, Russia had
emerged triumphant from every war in which it had engaged.
The Russians could protract hostilities until the Western
powers and the German states would be glad to make peace
on almost any terms. They could be checked only by the de-
velopment of a higher civilization which would eventually
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undermine Czarist autocracy and cause the dreaded empire to
divide naturally into several states. A second anti-war
group disliked Russia but argued that Nicholas was grad-
ually improving conditions there. Moreover, the growth of
commerce and industry would reduce Russian belligerence.
In any case, the Christian Russians were much better than
the Moslem Turks. This group believed, moreover, that the
Orthodox people in Turkey were Russia's natural allies.
The two great English spokesmen for free trade, John
Bright and Richard Gobden, Channing observed, denounced the
war on the grounds that Russia was clearly in the right:
England was interfering in matters which were of no con-
cern to her. According to Bright and Gobden, the conflict
was "a wicked, presumptuous, heaven-defying war, and . . ,
its sure end will be England's humiliation and remorse,"
Channing believed, however, that they had only a very small
following for their anti-war views. "'"^
There was also an English faction which greatly feared
Russia's defeat. Ultra-conservatives, they regarded Nicho-
las as a bulwark of European civilization, " the conserva-
tive par excellence
, the head of the party of Order; these
dread the letting loose the People of Europe, now awed into
stillness." Still another small group in the anti-war ranks
were unconditional pacifists.
Furthermore, Channing feared a possible increase in the
strength of the anti-war bloc because many government sup-
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porters were angered by the Anglo-French treaty of alliance
with Austria (of December 2, 1854). This treaty potential-
ly obliged England to support (or at least not to oppose)
the status £uo in Hungary and Italy. Such a course would
be intolerable to the more ardent enemies of Russia, who
had assumed that Austria would be fighting with the Czar at
the outset of hostilities. These opponents of the Austrian
alliance, he felt, could bring about a general disillusion-
ment with the war.
Channing nonetheless was optimistic about the outcome
of the war. Convinced that the Allies would capture Sevas-
topol, "because the temper of the French and English is of
a higher tone than the Russian, and will win the day," he
also hoped to see Poland and Hungary regain their national
independence as a result of the conflict. Such a develop-
ment seemed possible, Channing thought, although it would
break -up the entente between Austria and the Western pow-
ers. Channing wanted the peace treaty to include guaran-
tees of an independent Poland, Hungary, Finland and (pos-
sibly) Bohemia. He also favored a revived Greek Empire,
with Constantinople as its capital, although he did not ex-
plain how this could be reconciled with the Anglo-French
policy of upholding the territorial integrity of the Turk-
ish Empire.
Channing advised the pacifists that their cause would
ultimately benefit from an Allied victory over Russia.
"An immense development of the peace principle" would re-
suit, he wrote, from the reaction against the military sys-
tem represented by the Czar:
Nicholas looms up above the bloody cloudlike a gigantic embodiment of the very principleOf all evil; as the great arch-fiend and theprince of devils, the wholesale murderer
. Hi.,pretence of being the ?epresentatI7i-5f-Ghris-tian order, serves but to complete the hideous
t^anfLpf "^'^ 'r^' ,^^^P°^i3^- PeacefufchrL-.ians leel
- as toward a wild beast - that thewhole war system, of which he is the imperson-
ation, must be destroyed ; and they are reallylighting lor a peace which shall be permanent. 15
The war taught some lessons pleasing to Channing. One
was to confirm that the higher forms of civilization (i.e.
England and France) produced "the grandest style of hero-
ism." The battles at Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman could be
so interpreted: intelligence and virtue, Channing concluded,
was superior to brute force in battle as in other situa-
tions. Another lesson, "terribly taught," was the grow-
ing importance of science to those engaged in conflict:
... war as a science is fast reaching its
possible culmination, by insuring such swift and
sweeping destruction as to make fighting impos-
sible.
- So far as the Russians have done any-
thing in the Crimea, it has been by their scien-
tific engineering and gunnery. ;*.nd in a few days
we shall hear a most appalling account, I pre-
siime, of the superior French and English science
in the same branches. 17
Channing found two final reasons for satisfaction with
the war: the reoonciliation and alliance of France and Eng-
land after centuries of hostility; and the stimulus war
provided to the growth of democracy in England. Regarding
the first point, the French and the English were united in
"the upholding and diffusing of a form of civilisation, the
essence of which is constitutional freedom, and the out-
ward signs of Which are peaceful industry and commerce."
Napoleon III was an autocrat, to be sure, but in the long
run this did not matter because France was "at heart a
nation of freemen."
Revelations of aristocratic incompetence in the Cri-
mea, Ghanning believed, would lead to a greater emphasis
within the British government and army on promotion accord-
ing to merit rather than by purchase or patronage. He was
pleased to observe a general acknowledgement that the mid-
dle and working classes were the most vital elements in
British society. And he hoped that a series of practical
reforms and a widening of popular education would enable
Britain to fulfill its role as "the leader of free govern-
ments in Europe." "'^
The early years of the nineteenth century encompassed
the Second Great Awakening. The intensity of this reli-
gious revival gave rise to the overseas missionary move-
173
ment. In Britain, both Anglicans and Dissenters estab-
lished foreign missionary societies in the 1790' s, and
American churches soon Tollowed this precedent. The Ameri-
can Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, chartered
in 1810, was essentially an alliance of Presbyterian and
Congregational clergymen who agreed to subordinate their
doctrinal differences to the great task of spreading the
light of Christ among the heathen.
The Ottoman Empire soon became one of the main areas
for American missionary endeavor. Since the Holy Land was
part of the Turkish domains, missionaries felt a partic-
ularly strong emotional attachment to this region. They
believed that the century would witness the collapse of the
Pope and the Sultan, the two "great impost ers." Their in-
terest was further stimulated by the many nineteenth cen-
tury prophecies about the imminence of the millennium, and
conversion of the Near East would be a sure sign of it.
These missionaries carried American secular civilization
as well as religious convictions with them. The United
States, they thought, should serve as a model for less for-
tunate nations, a belief they combined with Christian tra-
21ditionalism.
American missionaries concentrated on converting the
Orthodox, Armenian and Nestorian Christians in the Near
East. Although their activities alarmed the Turkish gov-
ernment, missionary work continued, owing to the efforts of
Stratford de Redcliffe, the influential British ambassador,
who was able to persuade the Porte to acquiesce. Large-
scale conversions of Moslems to Christianity was the great
Turkish fear. But this anxiety was unwarranted. American
missionaries made little progress among the Moslems by the
1850' s. Nonetheless, the Orthodox Church obstructed Prot-
estant activity in every possible way. To be sure, some
conversions took place, as well as a number of transfers by
Armenian Christians to the sects represented by the mis-
22sionaries.
Orthodox hostility toward American missionaries inten-
sified the long-standing Protestant antagonism towards Rus-
sia, particularly amongst the Calvinist and evangelical
groups. American sympathy for Kossuth and the Hungarian
cause in 18^9 had been based partly upon the fact that he
was a "Protestant hero," struggling against both Catholic
Austria and Orthodox Russia. The growth of Protestantism
and of liberal political institutions were inextricably
linked in the minds of most American reformers. Protes-
tantism was believed to provide the combination essential
for any successful democracy; namely, education, social
responsibility and freedom from foreign influences. It op-
posed Russian and Austrian absolutism as well as the agnos-
tic and atheistic radicalism of both France and Germany.
It alone seemed capable of creating a proper balance be-
tween liberty and authority.
A Protestant triumph in the Near East, many believed,
was the best strategy for outflanking the influence of
European despotism and eventually undermining it. Most of
the missionaries regarded Islam as a dying religion, in-
capable of effective opposition to the Protestant surge.
On the other hand, the "corrupt" forms of Christianity,
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, would be capable of fanaticll re-
sistance. Since Turkey was increasingly dependent on the
protection of European nations, particularly Protestant
England, conversion prospects seemed even more favorable.
Biblical prophecies about "the drying up of the Euphrates-
just prior to the millennium were interpreted as meaning
that the collapse of Islam and the conversion of the Near
East prefigured the Second Coming. Some Protestant clergy-
men in both Britain and the United States identified Rus-
sia with the invading tribes of Gog and Magog, mentioned in
the Book of Ezekiel. Russia's defeat, therefore, would be
another step toward the millennium. In any case, the war
would speed up the pro'cess of Islamic conversions.
Missionary spokesmen, early in the Crimean War, tried
to ignore the presence of Catholic France as the chief ally
of Protestant England. This was difficult, for Napoleon
III had long been as unpopular as the Czar amongst America's
evangelists. Most missionaries and their friends at home
sought a simplified explanation: the conflict was between
Anglo-Saxon Protestant liberty and Russian Orthodox despot-
ism. Fearing that a Russian victory would mean the expul-
sion of all non-Orthodox missionaries from any conquered
territory, American Protestants could regard France and the
Papacy, at least for the moment, as lesser evils.
The Reverend David T. Stoddard, an American missionary
in Persia, described his apprehensions about a Russian vic-
tory:
Feb. 17, 185^ - What the end will be weknow not. It may result in the triumph of Rus-
sia. Woe then to missions. Woe to civilization.
Woe to freedom. May God in mercy avert such a
calamity. ... We try, however, to give our-
selves no anxiety on these subjects, but to
leave them all to Him who will bring light out ofdarkness, and, amid all the marchings and counter-
marchings of armies, will take good care of his
own precious cause. I need hardly say that all
our sympathies are against Russia. We long to
see her humbled, if not crushed. It is cheering
to see that England is at last waking up, and
that the Queen calls Nicholas 'our common en-
emy. • 26
Stoddard's sentiments were shared by the Home Mission-
ary magazine, which stressed the need for Anglo-American
cooperation in missionary activities. Denouncing Russian
despotism, the Papacy, French revolutionary turbulence, and
the "infidel" Biblical criticism of German scholars, the
Home Missionary predictably concluded that only the Eng-
lish and Americans had a pure form of Christianity to offer
the world. While the rest of Christendom stagnated under
oppressive monarchies or experienced outbreaks of "godless
anarchy," the two great Anglo-Saxon nations had undertaken
an enterprise in which they had no hope of assistance fro.
others. This venture was nothing less than an "attempt to
deliver this earth from the dominion of sin." If the Czar
did not capture Constantinople, then the Protestants cer-
tainly would; and, once again, it would be a "center of em-
Pire," but it would radiate the spirit of American Chris-
tianity rather than the despotism of Nicholas. ^7
The 1854 annual report of the A.B.C.F.M. expressed con-
fidence that Near Eastern events stemmed from God's general
plan for the evangelization of the world. The profane
might attribute the Crimean conflict to mere earthly rival-
ries, but missionaries knew the true source of these hos-
tilities. The Prophets had predicted ages ago that every-
thing under heaven would be given "to the saints of the
Most High." Historic events had ever been a part of God»s
design: "Has not God always followed in the track of the
conqueror, to borrow the illustration of John Foster, and
borne away the spoil? Have not missionaries, again and a-
gain, sowed the good seed of the Word in the very furrows
of war?"
Rufus Anderson, Secretary of the A.B.C.F.M. from 1823
to 1866, traveled in the interior of Asia Minor during the
Crimean War and observed what seemed to be Russian intrigue
among the Moslems. He heard it rumored that if the Rus-
sians were victorious, they would protect Islam by expel-
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ling the Protestant missionaries from Turkey. Anderson
firmly believed that "there are times when the movements of
armies are evidently made subservient, in Divine Provi-
dence, to the progress of the Gospel" - as the Crimean War
clearly proved. Anderson had feared Turkish compliance
with the Czar's ultimatum on the protectorate question dur-
ing the 1853 diplomatic crisis; and, in his opinion, "only
the seasonable return of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe" pre-
vented it. A hero and an ally to Anderson, the British
ambassador was also one to most American missionaries in
the Near East.
Revelations of incompetence in the British army in the
Crimea, so disturbing to the English press during the win-
ter of 185^-55, also alarmed the Home Missionary
. Its ed-
itors wondered whether England's position in Europe and the
world would permanently decline. If it did, they believed,
it would be a great disaster for Protestantism and modern
civilization. The United States would then have to assume
the role of Protestant champion. The Home Missionary hoped
that "the mother may not lose the place until the daughter
be prepared to take it." It criticized England for her
hostile and condescending attitude towards the United
States in the past, adding, however, that "we are, as com-
pared with all other nations, but one people"; and it
warned that her government and army needed immediate re-
form. If Sevastopol did not fall, it predicted, aristo-
cratic rule in England would be over.
In oversimplifying the struggle, American Protestant
journals continued to ignore Prance's role, while avidly
seizing upon any evidence of Catholic sympathy for Russia
as proof that Rome and Saint Petersburg were really allies.
According to the Christian Review Catholics in Austria,
Ireland and England all hoped for a Russian victory. Car-
dinal Wiseman of England and Orestes Brownson in the United
States, the Review declared, were outstanding examples of
Catholics who leaned to the Russian side. The duty of
American Protestants in this situation was clear:
The sympathies of American friends of Chris-
tian Missions, for whose interests Sir Stratford
de Redcliffe, the English Ambassador, has accom-
plished so much, are naturally and justly with
the Turk; and it is a marly appeal which the late
series of articles in the Independent is now mak-
ing to Americans who sympathize too much with
Russia. 51
Some American missionaries in the Near East noted local
pro-Russian sentiment among Catholic priests who, it was
assumed, were afraid of Protestant encroachments. The Rev-
erend Henry Lobdell, who brought the Gospel to northern
Persia, claimed that priests were urging their small con-
gregations to pray for a Russian victory since it would
mean the expulsion of the heretical missionaries.
George P. Marsh, the former American minister in Con-
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stantinople, remained a staunch supporter of the Near East-
ern missions and the Allied cause. Writing to the 1855 an-
nual meeting of the A.B.C.F.M,, Marsh noted that missionary
activity fortunately had not been seriously impeded by the
war. Moreover, an Allied victory would free Turkey from
"the open rancor and secret intrigues of Greco-Slavic big-
otry," and prepare the way for the regeneration of the East
and ultimately for the oppressed nationalities of Eastern
Europe. American missionary presence in the Turkish Empire,
in Marsh's opinion, was one of the main reasons for "the
political and military movements which have shaken Asia and
Europe since 1855." European reactionaries were, he stated,
quick to see the menace posed by the extension of American
influence into the Near East:
The iron heel, that crushed the rising
hopes of continental liberty in 1849, is again
armed to tread out the glimmering spark of civil
and religious freedom in the oriental world.
The friends of human progress in Asia meet their
most formidable obstacle in the relentless hos-
tility of 'the great conservative power of Eu-
rope.' 55
Missionaries in the field displayed the same confidence
in the protection of Providence that characterized the writ-
ings and speeches of Anderson and Marsh. Because of heavy
fighting between Russian and Turkish forces in the Cauca-
sus and Armenia, the mission at Erzerura had to be tempo-
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rarily abandoned. But all the other stations remained ac-
tive. A report from the Armenian mission, describing the
missionaries' spirit, was read to the 1854 meeting:
Planted in the bosom of the Turkish emi^ireconvulsed with the shock of arms, and the ?hea!'tre of events attracting at this 'moment the gaze
r.Ltt^
Civilized world, the mission is moving
unimpeded prosperity, enjoying peace
I t ^ J"" "^^^^^ As in the bushthat burned, and was not consumed, God is withthe mission m the fire, 34 » ^ ^oa
In Constantinople, the Reverend William Goodell
thought that the missionaries had carried on their work
with less interference during the war than at any previous
period. He regarded this as certain evidence of God's sup-
port for evangelization. During the diplomatic negotiations
preceding the outbreak of the conflict, Goodell also noted,
the missionaries had offered a special prayer for Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe, that "devoted friend of the cause
of Christ."
Another missionary in Constantinople, Cyrus Hamlin,
rendered considerable assistance to the British army when
its commissariat collapsed during the winter of 1854-55,
He established a bakery (in which all workers were converts
to Protestantism) and contracted to supply bread to the
British troops. This enterprise proved so successful that
Hamlin then set up a laundry establishment which operated
in the same way. Another contract was signed with the Brit
ish army, and the laundry, like the bakery, earned a rep-
utation for efficiency in the midst of incompetence. ^6
The national magazine of the Methodist Church, the
Methodist Quarterly Review
, like the American Board's mis-
sionaries, supported the Allied cause. The Reverend J. H.
Perry of Brooklyn, thought that every friend of human prog-
ress, and particularly every citizen of the United States,
should sympathize with the Allies. A Russian victory would
be, in his opinion, "the most disastrous event that could
occur to civilization, to freedom, or to Christianity." If
the Russians were to gain control of Constantinople, they
would turn it into the base for "another wave of that dark
sea" of barbarism which had swept over Western Europe dur-
ing the declining years of the Roman Empire. The Review
had no doubt that Britain and France were acting in accord-
ance with the right principles:
But aside from political reasons, if we can
suppose the nations to be moved by motives of
justice or equity, the Allies are fully justi-
fied in interposing in behalf of Turkey. VJe
have an unshaken belief in the righteousness of
the abstract doctrine of 'intervention.' A
strong nation is under as clear an obligation
to interpose in behalf of a weak one, threatened
with injury or ruin, as a strong man is to inter-
pose in behalf of a v;eak one when assaulted by
one stronger than himself. 58
The Review's chief expert on military strategy at
tempted to discredit the opinions of those Russian sympa-
thizers who explained the long duration of the siege of Se
vastopol as evidence of Russian superiority in combat and
ensineering. He asserted that the campaign was protracted
because Allied generals had neglected some of the first
principles of siege warfare, rather than because of the
skill of Sevastopol's defenders. The Allies had ignored
three of the doctrines of Marshal Vauban (the great French
military engineer of the reign of Louis XIV): the besieg-
ing army must totally surround the fortress it is invest-
ing; it must possess at least five times the numerical
strength of the defenders; and it must have superior artil-
lery. None of these conditions existed at Sevastopol.
As the war continued, more books and articles contain-
ing eschatological prophecies appeared in the United States
Some were written by Americans, others by Englishmen. One
of the American contributions, S. D. Baldwin's Armageddon,
or the Overthrow of Romanism and Monarchy
, found the exist-
ence of the United States foretold in the Bible and pre-
dicted that America was destined to "annex peaceably or by
force nation after nation, till our republic embraces the
entire earth." This process of conquest would begin after
the United States succeeded in repelling an invasion by the
\inited powers of Europe, America would be "Israel restored
and would play the leading role in bringing about the mil-
lennium. For expansionists of this type, at least, Eng-
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land would pose no problem to energetic American activities
throughout the world.
American Unitarians avoided the millennial emotional-
ism common to evangelical denominations, but remained sym-
pathetic to the missionary movement and favored the Allied
cause. A Unitarian view of eschatology appeared in the
Christian Examiner, in a review of a sermon by Dr. John
Gumming of the Church of Scotland (entitled "The War and
Its Issues"). Gumming, who supported the war, urged
prayers for victory; but he nevertheless predicted that
Russia would be temporarily successful and "sweep Continen-
tal Europe." The last great battle between the English and
Russians would be fought in the Holy Land:
The formidable pov/er from the East and
North, symbolized by the great northern hail,
that is to light upon the nations and upon Anti-
christ during the last or seventh vial, will
close its career where the reasons for that ca-
reer at first originated - and its very exist-
ence also - by the shrines of Jerusalem, the
mountains of Megiddo, or in the land of Pales-
tine. 4-1
The review pointed out the inconsistency in Gumming' s pro-
war stand and his prediction of a Russian victory. It re-
gretted the wide circulation of such "unsatisfactory dis-
cussions" among America's Christians.
The Examiner ' s editors, to be sure, firmly supported
England. They saw no reason for immediate American inter-
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vention in Europe but thought that at some future date the
American and British flags might fly side by side in "the
last great struggle against the aggression of Orientalism."
Meanwhile, Americans would have to overcome two varieties
of European despotism at home; namely, "the absolutism of
the radical terrorist, and of the despot, whether priest or
king." ^5
The Christian Examiner (of October 185^) contained a
martial exhortation to young missionaries. It recalled how
the Duke of Wellington, England's late great military lead-
er, once rebuked a young Anglican minister who had ques-'
tioned the value of foreign missions. "Look to your march-
ing orders," contained in Christ's instructions to his dis-
ciples to "preach the Gospel to every creature," the old
soldier had advised himo The Examiner thought this a "hap-
py generalization, since Saint Paul had described Jesus
Christ as the Captain of our salvation and his disciples
as soldiers. In an age when skeptical men were question-
ing whether the doctrine of Jesus was superior to Greek
philosophy, it was good for Christians to be reminded of
their "marching orders": "... the single-eyed deference
to authority, regardless of consequences, for which the
Iron Duke was celebrated, shone out in this speech, and
teaches us how much more true and beautiful it is, in mat-
ters of such high import, to obey than to criticize."
J. S. Everett, a missionary to the Armenians in Con-
stantinople, reported that although the new Armenian Prote,
tant Church was small at present, it was destined to grow.
According to him old Armenian Church members had despaired
Of resisting the evangelical advance with arguments, and
simply hoped for a Russian victory. But the reverses suf-
fared by the Czar's forces in the Crimea had shaken even
this last hope and "multitudes are already convinced of
their errors, and they say that the truth is altogether
with the Protestants."
In an article on "The Future of Constantinople," the
Missionary Herald commented on the shock felt throughout
Christendom when Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453.
But this event, the Herald rationalized, had ultimately se-
cured the city as a field for Christian effort in the nine-
teenth century, and Constantinople was now becoming "the
great base of operations for the social and moral regener-
ation of Asia." American missionaries were conducting a
new siege of Constantinople. Their guns consisted of semi-
naries, printing-presses, and Christian schools, "an artil-
lery more pacific, but infinitely more effective than the
great cannon of Mohammed."
It was fortunate for Protestantism that the Orthodox
Church had not remained in control of Constantinople since,
according to the Herald
, there is no power that persecutes
the Gospel more relentlessly than a false form of Chris-
tianity. Turkey was more tolerant than Austria or Russia
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because she was weak and obliged to depend on the Christian
powers for protection. Eventually, the spreading Protes-
tant message would free the regions around the Black Sea
"from the incubus of Turkish and Russian tyranny."
P. 0. Powers, chief of the missionary station at Treb-
izond on the Turkish shore of the Black Sea, described the
wartime tribulations of his parishioners. Unemployment and
the difficulty of obtaining the necessities of life had
forced some of them to move elsewhere. Prices, since the
outset of war, had doubled or tripled. Merchants and farm-
ers were making large profits, Powers noted, but most Prot-
estants in Trebizond were "humble artisans." A cholera ep-
idemic had added to their troubles, and several parishion-
ers had died.
A more optimistic report came from the Greek Protes-
tant congregation at Demirdesh, near Constantinople.
(These people had been regarded as apostates by their fel-
low Greeks who sometimes, attacked them.) Its fortunes
suddenly changed when the French Vice Consul was faced with
the necessity of hiring someone to take charge of the vast
number of cattle that the French army kept in the area. He
chose the leading Greek Protestant of Demirdesh, giving
him authority to hire and pay for the necessary workers:
This brought all Demirdesh to his feet, and
those who hod sometimes beaten him, and even used
weapons of death against him, came bowing down to
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es?lv thu^/?^ ^"^^ '^^^ ^aithrull/^nd^onlt y, hus returning good for evil tn i-hc ^1tonishment of his enemiec. anH^^ I ^ 2^'
the truth. ^9
^^®° ies d m testimony for
The mission to the Armenians at Erzerum was closer to
the actual war zone than any other American station. In-
deed, there was heavy fighting between the Russians and
Turks in this area all during the war. For several months
in 1855 a Russian advance on Erzerum was constantly ex-
pected. Many of the Protestant converts fled; and, natu-
rally, no new ones were forthcoming in this atmosphere.
Those who were inclined to Protestantism avoided the mis-
sionaries who consoled themselves by noting that a large
number of persons were "intellectually convinced" of the
truth of Protestantism, and some of these confessed that
"we know our duty but do it not."
While the Erzerum Protestants were fearfully expecting
the Russians to take their city (as they had during the war
of 1828-29), the missionaries to the Nestorians in northern
Persia experienced no interruption in their work. (The
Nestorians were a Christian sect that had broken with the
Orthodox Church during the doctrinal disputes of the early
Middle Ages.) The United States at this time was attempt-
ing to negotiate a trade agreement with Persia, which the
Russians favored because they hoped it would counterbalance
British influence in that country. The Czar's agents.
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therefore, were very generous in their dealings with the
missionaries. Indeed, the latter were actually assisted
by the Russian consul in Tabriz and the commander of the
Russian troops in the area when communications with Erzerum
and the West were disturbed, and Russian officers saw to it
that they were soon able to communicate with their brethren
51again.
In general the missionary movement remained pro-Allied,
fully convinced that the war had contributed to the spread
of Protestantism. Speeches at the Missionary Jubilee at
Williams College in the summer of 1855 suggest as much.
This meeting, which commemorated the fiftieth anniversary
of the founding of the missionary movement, was addressed
by the Reverend Elias Riggs, a twenty-four year veteran of
the Armenian mission. He described some of his experiences
in Constantinople during the war:
We witnessed reviews of the Allied forces
and saw their regiments depart in their complete-
ness and pride; and in some instances we saw
their shattered fragments return after the cam-
paign. But in the immediate vicinity of the cap-
ital there was no fighting. In respect to our
work I should say that, on the whole, the prog-
ress of the war rather promoted than hindered it,
and that in many ways which time forbids me even
to enumerate. 52
Rufus Anderson was even more strongly persuaded that
the Crimean War had contributed to the spreading of the
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Protestant gospel in the Near East. In his speech to the
Jubilee, Anderson even asserted that almost every war, rev-
olution, invention and discovery of the nineteenth century
had been used by Providence to prepare the way for the con-
version of the world. The only serious difficulty now
troubling the Missionary Societies was that of finding re-
cruits to fill the many places available all over the.
world.
In an attempt to arouse Williams graduates of 1856 to
Join the missionary movement, the Reverend Miron Winslow,
a Ceylon missionary, exhorted them to remember the lessons
of Sevastopol. Interested in increasing the number of re-
cruits for service in India, Winslow pointed out that a
sergeant's guard could never have taken Sevastopol, and
that the present size of the Indian mission was equivalent
to such a force. In Winslow's opinion it would be a good
thing if half of New England's pastors migrated to India.
It would be a great gain for India, and God's Providence
would certainly see to it that new ministers would come for-
ward to take charge of the work at home.
William G. Schauffler, an American missionary active
in the Near East since the 1850' s, had an opportunity to
give his opinion on the Crimean War to Princess Olga,
daughter of Nicholas I, and Crown Princess of Wurttemberg.
Born in Stuttgart, Schauffler had migrated to Russia with
his parents as a child, and then came to the United States.
He graduated from Andover Theological Seminary and Joined
the small group of American missionaries in Turkey, devot-
ing many years there to a largely unsuccessful attempt to
convert the Jews of Constantinople, Smyrna and Salonika. ^5
Visiting Stuttgart in 1855, at the height of the Cri-
mean War, Schauffler spoke to a large meeting and blamed
the war on Russia's desire to control Constantinople as
well as Greek Orthodoxy's jealous fear of the American mis-
sionary inroads. The Greek Patriarch, according to Schauf-
fler, had warned the Russian Embassy in Constantinople that
if the Americans were not speedily expelled from that city
he could not answer for the consequences of their presence.
The Crown Princess, disturbed by Schauffler 's speech, grant-
ed an interview at which she heatedly denied that her fa-
ther the Czar had any designs on Turkish territory. His
sole objective, she declared, was to secure guarantees for
the rights of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Em-
pire. Schauffler denied that the Czar's intentions had
been motivated by religion but added sarcastically: "It
may, however, now be a consolation to Russia to see that
the wishes of Russia about Turkey, as defined by your High-
ness, are now being in course of accomplishment by the war
itself." (After this comment the Princess "dropped back
into her sofa without replying a word.")
British missionary organizations fully appreciated the
work of their American counterparts and approvingly noted
ern
their mutual agreement on the Eastern Question. Lord
Shaftesbury, the reformer, in an address to the British
Turkish Missions Aid Society, praised the Americans for
their pioneering work in the Ottoman Empire. The East
Question, he noted, had provided the means for establish-
ing peace and friendship between two old enemies, Britain
and France. The same sense of common interest between Brit
ish and American Protestants in the East, in Shaftesbury's
opinion, should also lead to better relations between their
countries. The greatest achievement of the American mis-
sionaries was their demonstration to Moslems and Jews a-
like, that there existed a form of Christianity untainted
with idolatry. Shaftesbury's view of the "idolatrous"
Eastern Christian churches was echoed by the American Rev-
erend William Goodell, who said that Christianity in this
region had become a "ghastly skeleton."
The Crimean War dealt a severe blow to the activities
of peace societies in both Great Britain and the United
States. These societies had flourished between 1848 and
1853. Elihu Burritt, the "Learned Blacksmith," worked
closely with British advocates of international arbitra-
tion, among them the two leaders of Manchester liberalism,
John Bright and Richard Gobden. Peace sentiment had
reached a high point in 18^1 at the time of London's Great
Exhibition, with its theme of human prosress. Louis Napo-
leon had proposed a reduction of naval armaments to Britain
in 1849, promising to make proportional reductions in the
French fleet if Britain agreed to such a policy. But the
ministry rejected this offer on the grounds that its fleet
had global commitments, while the French were not in a com-
parable situation. Nevertheless, the proposal had aroused
enthusiasm among the peace societies. In I851 it was gen-
erally believed that the progress of industry and commerce
and the decline of militarism went hand in hand.
When war between Russia and Turkey began, it soon be-
came apparent (as Burritt ruefully acknowledged later),
that much of the Anglo-American peace sentiment was super-
ficial. The near-unanimous support that both the English
Dissenters and their American colleagues gave to the war
was particularly disappointing to thorough-going pacifists,
who had formerly shared many reform enthusiasms with
them.
The opposition of many New England clergymen to the
Mexican War seemingly provided the basis for a strong peace
movement among America's evangelical Protestants. But this
opposition had been based more on a conviction that the war
was a Southern plot to extend slavery rather than a belief
that armed conflict was evil. The Crimean War began at a
time when many Northern clerics, in the wake of the threat-
ened extension of slavery into Kansas and Nebraska, were
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revising their attitudes towards the use of force. Men
like Charles Sumner, who a few years earlier had described
war as a relic of barbarism with no place in the nineteenth
century, now urged support for Kansas free-soilers in their
war with the "slave power." The reaction of most evangel-
ical Protestants to the conflict in the East was similar.
Russia's advance posed a threat to American missionary ac-
tivity, which was diffusing the light of a pure Christian-
ity in the Turkish territories. Russia, like the American
slave states, was threatening to reverse the beneficent;:
course of nineteenth century civilization. In the face of
such a menace, few were able to maintain a stand in favor
of unconditional pacifism.
American Quakers, like their counterparts in England,
remained unalterably opposed to the Eastern war. One of
their journals, the Friends ' Intelligencer
, emphasized the
effects of the war on the American people:
Our merchants and manufacturers, our banks
and railroads, our commerce and navigation, own-
ers of real estate, investors in stocks of all
sorts, employers and employees, the rich and the
poor, but especially the thousands of unemployed
and well-nigh famishing poor, all are real,
though indirect sufferers from the war now rag-
ing six thousand miles off upon another conti-
nent. 61
Deploring the "comparatively insignificant" causes of
the war, the Intelligencer praised the English Society of
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Friends for its anti-war position and lamented the slow
progress of Christianity in Western nations. These nations
were following the "heathen models" of Greece and Rome rath-
er than the doctrine of Christ. One of the worst aspects
of this situation, declared the Intellig:encer
. was the
false glamor which poetry and music gave to war. Such a
tradition, which ultimately went back to Homer's Iliad
,
could only be overcome by a better understanding of Chris-
tian principles:
All goes to prove what strange and half-
sighted creatures we are. Were it not so, war
could never have been seen in any other asoect,
than that of unmingled hatefulness; and I can
look to nothing but the progress of Christian
sentiment upon earth, to arrest the strong cur-
rent of the popular and prevailing partiality
for war. 62
Although Quakers differed from most of America's evan-
gelicals in their opposition to the Crimean War, they
shared the satisfaction of all missionaries over the de-
cline of Islam and over prospects for a renaissance of
Christianity in the Near East. The Intelligencer was
pleased to note that the missionary schools and the print-
ing press were more potent means of conversion than the
swords of the old Crusaders. Turkey might survive as a pow-
er but the Islamic religion would surely perish as Chris-
tian schools were established in its territory. The books
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Of the missionaries, according to the Intelligencer , en-
abled every educated Turk to see "at once that the Koran
is not inspired, but only the composition of an ignorant
camel driver."
Quaker concern with the false views of war cultivated
by poetry and music is a good example of one of the main
problems facing sober-minded pacifists like Elihu Burritt
at this time. By the mid-nineteenth century most educated
people in the Western world had been strongly influenced
by romantic literature. Although romanticism was not syn-
onymous with a glorification of war, most romantics empha-
sized the value of individual heroism. Dislike of insti-
tutionalized militarism often went hand in hand with admir-
ation for the heroic individual who stood out in battle.
Emerson, for example, denounced the evil effects of mili-
tary discipline during the Mexican War, but he had high es-
teem for Napoleon I, whom he regarded as being the arche-
typal man of the century. During the Crimean War, as in-
dicated earlier, he was gratified by the martial spirit of
the British nobility: commerce had not completely destroyed
the old heroic virtues. Here is the obverse of the convic-
tion of Burritt and others that commerce and peace were
partners in a beneficent development. For the romantics
saw commerce as undermining the tradition of individualism
and personal courage, and feared that it would be disas-
trous for Western civilization.
'ss was
Thoreau, like Emerson, had always admired heroism.
When his friend Cholmendely departed for the Crimea, he
later interpreted it as a demonstration that manUne
not absent from the modern commercial world. Thomas W.
Higginson followed the same path in expressing admiration
for Lord Cardigan's performance during the charge of the
Light Brigade. In emphasizing the need for heroic individ-
uals to combat a corrupt social system, abolitionists such
as Thoreau and Higginson invoked a tradition of military
heroism which remained strong in their age.
Essentially romantic is the conviction that when evil
appears Just men must fight. The moral stance of the Chris-
tian soldier became more exciting than pacifism in both the
United States and Britain, as missionaries, abolitionists,
and transcendentalists rallied to a variety of martial
causes in the 1850's. Even William Lloyd Garrison, who was
still advocating pacifism during the Crimean War, could mod-
ify his stand a few years later.
Such convictions made the campaign of Elihu Burritt
and other pacifists impossibly difficult. Burritt, during
the American Civil War, described the Crimean conflict as
the initial disaster in a chain of wars that had wrecked
the high hopes prevailing at the time of the Great Exhibi-
tion in 1851. A strong anti-slavery man, Burritt nonethe-
less believed that civil war was a greater evil than slav-
ery even if the conflict led to its abolition. One of his
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chier concerns for .any years had been the development of
Anglo-A.erxcan friendship. He hoped to put an end to the
legacy of bitterness deriving from the American Revolution
and the War of 1812 and to see the two Anglo-Saxon powers
cooperate in the peaceful diffusion of civilization over
the globe. But when the Crimean War began, Burritt was con-
cerned about American dependence on the British press for
news about the war, and feared it would create excessive
anti-Russian feeling in the United States.
Burritt deplored the conflict between Britain and Rus-
sia as much as he deprecated a possible Anglo-American war.
He agreed with the American missionaries on England's part
in spreading civilization, but he differed from them in
also reserving an important role for Russia. Although op-
posing all war, Burritt believed that "imperialism" was
beneficent insofar as it confined itself to peaceful com-
mercial and religious activities.
Like many of his contemporaries, Burritt regarded the
Teutonic race as the source of all that was best in West-
ern civilization, and he envisaged a process whereby Eng-
land and Russia would collectively "Teutonize" China and
the rest of Asia. He even believed that truly progressive
people in Russia were either Germans or under German in-
fluence. Once this influence became dominant, the last ves-
tiges of Russian barbarism would disappear and Russia would
Join Britain in diffusing the Teutonic way of life. Brit-
ain would lead the way in Southern Asia, and Hussia in the
northern part of the continent. Thus, rivalry would be re-
placed by cooperation in the spread of civilization.
Gerritt Smith, the New York abolitionist Congressman
who had abandoned his pacifism to support Commander Ingra-
ham in the Koszta case, returned to denouncing the Euro-
pean "war system" early in 185^. In a speech opposing in-
creased appropriations for the United States army and navy,
Smith asserted that Europeans needed a repudiation of war
debts more than a revolution. For its part, the United
States should avoid another "wide and sad step backwards"
such as the Mexican War. "The nation which is determined
to keep out of war," in Smith's opinion, "will never find
itself involved in war."
Like maiTjr pacifists. Smith began to make distinctions
between Just and unjust wars. The United States, as a mor-
al nation, must maintain an army and navy. Soldiers and
sailors should be "the conservators of the public peace"
and "characterized as Christians and gentlemen." This new
armed force would be paid higher wages than now existed in
the army and navy. It would also be of higher quality, by
which Smith meant, moral force would have a greater role.
He invoked the memory of Cromwell in a manner which suggests
a common bond between Smith and the more militant American
missionaries:
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lookeruoorL^"^ constituted, arex oxea pon as a simple brute force- anrt losuch they may serve to strike ter^ir Buf.om
Of conscience are respected and ^e^r^d by tSeir
hSIr^rAonfth^l" oonscientxousnesslakL 'their
nonp ?ho
e less courageous, and their arms
^11-trated in
.
The foreign policy advocated by America's missionaries
and reformers was quite different from that favored by the
government and the majority of the people. It was both more
isolationist and more interventionist than the policy of
the Pierce administration. In the Western Hemisphere, the
missionaries opposed expansionism by war or filibustering
which was advocated by the supporters of Manifest Destiny.
They disliked both the pro-slavery and anti-British aspects
of President Pierce's Cuban and Central American actions.
On the other hand, missionary spokesmen frequently as-
serted that if Britain were ever seriously threatened by a
Continental coalition, the United States should enter into
a military alliance with her. The evangelists emphasized
the spiritual community between the United States and Great
Britain and favored Anglo-American cooperation in the work
of spreading Christianity and civilization around the
globe. Here was the second great point of difference be-
tween the missionaries and the advocates of Manifest Des-
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tiny. According to the latter, the United States was the
unique .oral exemplar for the rest of the world and. in the
western Hemisphere, the direct propagator of Anglo-Saxon
democracy. Britain was part of a corrupt Europe and. to
some, was even more decadent than the rest of that conti-
nent. In addition to this. Britain was the chief obstacle
to the spread of American influence in the world. But the
missionaries wanted the United States and Britain to stand
together as carriers of the purest form of Christianity and
the best that Western civilization had to offer less for-
tunate nations.
CHAPTER IX
In January 1855 Piedmont-Sardinia, whose 1848 chal-
lenge to Austria had aroused
.uch American enthusiasm, al-
ixed herself to Britain, Prance and Turkey. An expedition
ary force of fifteen thousand men was sent to the Crimea
Count Cavour, the Sardinian Prime Minister, believed that
an alignment with the Western powers would set the stage
for introducing Italian issues at the peace conference and
ultimately for the expansion of Piedmontese power in
Italy. 1
Surprisingly, the Piedmontese entry into the war did
not reverse the anti-Allied trend dominant in the American
press at this time. Even Sardinia's staunchest admirers
deplored her alliance with the Crimean coalition. Ameri-
cans had applauded her role of gallant underdog in the
struggle against Austria during 1848-49. They were also
impressed by Cavour- s economic policy, which improved agri-
culture and encouraged industrial growth. Moreover, the
regime's anti-clerical policy (particularly the seculari-
zation of many raonastaries) endeared Sardinia to ardent
American Protestants. But these factors apparently were
not enough to win approval for the Sardinian decision to
enter the war.
America's press generally portrayed Piedmont as a dupe
of the Western powers. The New York Tribune asserted that
the Italian kingdom had allowed itself to be drawn into
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fighting the battles of its enemy, Austria, a development
Which would set back Italian liberalism for years. Haps-
burg power in Italy would be stronger than ever when the
war ended. Russia, the Tribune acknowledged, had given
diplomatic support to Austria against Sardinia in the war
of 1848-49, but it could see no possible gain for Italian
nationalism in Cavour's policy of intervention on the side
of the Western powers. ^
Sardinia's entry into the war was criticized on simi-
lar grounds by the Washington Union
, which once again found
itself in the unusual position of agreeing with Horace
Greeley. The Union added some disparaging comments on the
quality of Italian troops and was confident that they would
give the Russians little trouble. The British subsidy to
Piedmont, declared the Union
, was proof that John Bull was
up to his old game of paying others to fight his battles for
him. (England's support of Spain's retention of Cuba was
a similar policy applied to the Western Hemisphere.) ^
Another criticism of Piedmontese policy came from a
very different source. Orestes Brownson's sympathies had
turned more and more in the direction of Russia as the war
went on. Although apprehensive about the future growth of
Russian power, he believed that Britain's maritime suprem-
acy was as hostile to "the best interests of the human
race" as any potential Russian preponderence. Brownson had
long disliked Sardinia because of its role in the 1848 revo-
lution and particularly because of the recent seculariza-
tion Of its monastaries. The Piedmontese, in Brownson's
opinion, represented the vanguard of British commercial
civilization in Italy, Commerce and revolutionary atheism
were ultimately moving towards the same goal; i.e., the
destruction of Europe's traditional Christian culture.
Consequently, it was not surprising that "ever since 1822,
Great Britain has been the well known ally of the revolu-'
tionary party on the Continent." Sardinia's entry into
the Crimean War provided further confirmation. ^
British commercialism and British Protestantism were
equally objectionable to Brownson, and he believed that the
basis of American foreign policy should be opposition to
both. In general, Brownson could be relied upon to take a
stand exactly opposite to that of the American missionaries
on any issue. England's purpose in waging war on Russia,
he thought, was to destroy Czarist maritime power and there-
by eliminate a potential threat to her own commercial su-
premacy. The United States should "shake off the remains
of
. . .
colonial dependence." If this were done America
would soon supplant Britain as the world's leading trading
nation. The United States should build a navy capable of
challenging England's and attempt to counter the Anglo-
French entente with a "close alliance with Russia, Spain
and all the American states." The United States already
possessed the potential of a great world power:
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,
.
Nothing prevents us from being the fir^tmilitary power in the world but thf want of dowerful neighbors and a battlefield. Bri?am IS destined one day to pale befor^ us asTyre paled before her daughter Carthage andwhen there will be no Romt to avenge her or tningulf us in our turn. 6
, o
There was a curious contradiction in Brownson's atti-
tude towards America's future commercial and military great-
ness. On the one hand he hoped that America would supplant
England in both fields; on the other, his dislike of modern
commercial civilization led him to seek an Anglo-American
war, thinking it would force the United States to become
more of an agricultural nation again: The injuries that
the British fleet could inflict on American trade and on
her coastal cities would "in the long run, prove an advan-
tage to us, both under an economical and a moral point of
view."
Brownson, then, oscillated between advocacy of American
maritime supremacy and contempt for commerce as the means
by which English Protestantism had corrupted modern civili-
zation. In his opinion America would need a stronger reg-
ular army as well as an enlarged navy. He deplored the na-
tion's traditional prejudice against regular troops. Un-
like Buchanan, who regarded Napoleon III as a greater men-
ace to the United States than Great Britain, Brownson saw
the British as the main enemy. At the outset of the Cri-
mean V/ar he had suspected that the French emperor was the
prime ™over behind the conflict, but by 1855 he was con-
vinced that England had made the new Man of Destiny her
dupe:
internal peace, to subserve the policy of thfhaughty Island Queen. 8
Brownson was pleased by the shift in American public
opinion toward the war as it progressed, for it seemed in-
creasingly closer to the national interest. When the war
began "the sympathies of this country were very generally
with the Allies; now they are as generally with Russia."
Ultimately, Brownson believed the war would strengthen
Russian power. The Western allies had thrown Russia back
upon herself and compelled her to develop her resources.
They had injured her, Brownson declared, but the Crimean
invasion was not enough to make it difficult for such a
vast empire to recover from the losses it had sustained. ^
This war, in Brownson 's opinion, had again demon-
strated British diplomatic skill, particularly in enlist-
ing the support of her ancient enemy France in the cam-
paign to check Russian expansion. The weakening of Russia
as a maritime power would be an indirect blow to American
interests, he thought, since the United otates in theory
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Should look favorably upon all challenges to English com-
mercial primacy. Eventually, British power would certainly
decline, but not because of a war:
T.r>oH-^^J
contingency, we, therefore cannot
kJ? ^ ^^^^ Great Britain; she willdoubtless fall one day, but not by FreAch poli-cy, or Continental combinations; when she fallsIt will not be by a European war, but through
successful competition in trade and manufactures
of the United States, and the rivalry of her
colonies become independent states. 10
While Americans continued to debate the merits of each
side in the war, Allied troops opened their spring campaign
against Sevastopol. After a heavy bombardment, the Allies
captured the outlying redoubts of the city, but only at
high cost. Meanwhile, an expedition to Kertch, a port that
supplied Russian forces in Sevastopol, achieved a great
success. The Allies took the Russians by surprise and cap-
tured the town with few casualties. However, the Allied
sack of Kertch and the mistreatment of civilians, particu-
larly by the Turks, injured their cause in the eyes of neu-
tral public opinion, particularly that of the United
States.
In the Baltic, the British fleet commanded by Admiral
Richard Dundas unsuccessfully attacked the Russian fortress
12
of Sveaborg. The Allies sustained a more serious de-
was
mas-
feat on June 18, when a
.aa'or assault on Sevastopol was re-
pelled. Their losses were heavy, and for a while there
much sloomy talk about the impossibility of capturing Se-
vastopol. Carroll Spence, the American minister in Con-
stantinople, informed the State Department that "the most
sanguine have now become the most discouraged."
the momentary Allied despondency was unjustified. The
sive Allied bombardment caused continuous Russian casual-
• ties, and the destruction of their supplies at Kertch had
also been a severe blow. In addition to this, the Czar was
forced to maintain large forces in Poland, the Baltic ter-
ritories and along the Caucasus frontier. Thus, Russian
military strength was dispersed over four fronts.
Lord Raglan, the British commander, died of cholera
shortly after the failure of the June 18 attack. His suc-
cessor. General Sir James Simpson, possessed little more
ability or dynamism than Raglan, but by now the main direc-
tion of the campaign was in French hands. General Jacques
Pelissier, who had recently succeeded Canrobert, was de-
termined to capture Sevastopol regardless of cost. "^^
During the early summer of 1855 peace negotiations at
Vienna between the Allies and Russia foundered because of
Britain's insistence upon the demilitarization of the Black
Sea (i.e. Russia would not be permitted to maintain war-
16ships there). The Russians now made a final effort to
break the siege. But their assault having failed at the
evas-
Tchemaya, the Russian senerals were convinced that S
topol would soon be untenable, and they began to make prep^
orations to evacuate the city. -'-'^
The Allies, heartened by their success, in early Sep-
tember opened the heaviest bombardment in the history of
warfare, and on September 8 the final Allied assault took
place. General Pelissier had seen to it that the French
trenches were pushed close to the Russian lines, so that
the assault troops would have only a short distance to cov-
er. His troops captured the Malakov redoubt, which com-
manded the rest of the Russian fortifications. An attack
by British troops failed, however, because they were re-
quired to advance a greater distance than were the French.
But the fall of the Malakov was decisive. "^^
During the night of September 8 the Russians blew up
the harbor forts, set fire to the remaining ships, and e-
vacuated the city. They retained control of the fortifi-
cations on the northern side of the town. British and
French forces entered the ruined city on September 9. On
October 15 the rJational lntellip;encer reported the last
days of the siege:
Our readers will not regret that we have
devoted so large a space in our columns this
morning to the details of the final assault of
the Allies upon the town of Sebastopol, which
resulted in the destruction of that city and of
an important portion of its vast fortifications
together with the formidable navy of the Czar,
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Taken together it presents a vivid and thrillingnarrative of a series of the most stupendous and
orhis?ory/jf recorded upon the pages
American press opinion in the summer of 1855 continued
to favor Russia. As the siege wore on for month after
month, admiration for the Russian defenders mounted. One
enthusiastic expression appeared in a letter to the New
York Tribune:
The descendants of Ivan and Peter have ris-
en in their strength, and with their own trusty
arms hurled defiance at their foes. Sampson-
like they have broken the lion's Jaw, and the
Cross of St. Vladimir has held at bay the Cross
of the Legion of Honor and the Gross of St.
George from a bloody field. 20
Several factors contributed to continuing American
sentiment for Russia. Tension with Great Britain, France
and Spain increased in 1855, despite Secretary Marcy's dis-
avowal of the Ostend Manifesto. In March the Cuban ques-
tion again briefly flared when Spanish ships fired upon an
American steamer and a United States consul was arrested
for allegedly assisting Cuban rebels. President Pierce
ordered the navy's Home Squadron to Cuban waters and a
strong protest was sent to Madrid, coupled with a request
for a commercial treaty v/hich, it was hoped, would gradu-
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ally insinuate American influence xnto Cuba. The Spanish
authorities released the consul but once aga.n procrasti-
nated on the other issues. Since the administration would
not risk the domestic and foreign complications that an in-
vasion Of Cuba would almost certainly produce, the United
States achieved nothing.
The Cuban situation had quieted down when, in the sum-
mer Of 1855, William walker, an adventurer trained in both
medicine and law, intervened in a Nicaraguan civU war with
a force of fifty filibusterers
. The "Grey-Eyed Man of Des-
tiny" had been invited into Nicaragua by one of the contend-
ing factions, and he soon proved to be a masterful military
strategist, winning several spectacular victories over su-
perior forces, and capturing Grenada, the Nicaraguan capi-
tal. Walker became the country's virtual dictator under a
figurehead president. The American minister in Nicaragua
recognized his regime, but Secretary Marcy, again apprehen-
sive of Anglo-French reaction, disavowed this action. Al-
though Marcy had some difficulty in persuading President
Pierce and the more ardent expansionists in the Cabinet to
agree to the disavowal, his opinion finally prevailed.
Walker's activities in Nicaragua were heatedly de-
nounced in the British and French press. The Westminster
Review and Eraser's Magazine were convinced that American
support for Russia and for the filibustering expeditions
proceeded from the same source: the Southern slaveholding
Oligarch., Which was supporting hoth policies. The London
^conosist criticized those Americans who claimed that Brit-
ish hostility to the growth of the United States was re-
sponsible for pro-Russian sentiment. Only America's fili-
busterers. it stated, had anything to fear from the Anglo-
French alliance.
Both American and Russian public documents, declared
the London Weekly Chronicle, were characterized by the same
kind of bombast:
"Substitute the words Tree and enlight-
ened- for
-patriotic and religious' and the Russian docu-
ments would do for America The London Times again as-
serted that the differences between American democracy and
Russian autocracy were only superficial:
^y.^ n'^^^
slaveholding states sympathized withthe Czar as a slaveholder; the filibustering
^^^y ^0^1^ imitate if theycould, the vast scale of his aggressions; andDemocracy claiming that its will should be a-
sympathizes with a man who has es-
i^^^
for himself the same awful exemption;and both are led by their several creeds, so con-trary m appearance, so identical in fact, tohate a country where the law asserts her suprem-acy over the will of the many or the few, and
where the absolute equality of mankind is nopart of the political system; and therefore
serves as an excuse neither to the despotism ofthe one nor the tyranny of the other. 2M-
The French press was equally critical of America's
Caribbean policy. La Patrie asked whether it was Just
prudent that the nation which already extended from the
St. Lawrence to the Columbia River should also possess the
countries that bordered on the Caribbean and the Guir of
Mexico. Several French writers also claimed that America
and Russia were essentially similar in nature despite their
surface political differences. But La Gazette de France
coupled such comments with a reminder that war with the
United States would have a disastrous effect on world com-
merce. It pointed out the great extent to which France,
during the conflict with Russia, had to depend on American
foodstuffs to Offset crop failures. This ambivalent at-
titude was typical of both the French and British press.
Frequently there was bold talk about action to halt the ex-
pansion of the "universal Yankee nation," but it usually
ended with statements about the need to preserve peace so
as not to wreck the whole structure of the Western world's
commercial relations.
Ihe American press responded in kind to Allied threats,
and all aspects of the Anglo-French conduct of the war were
scathingly criticized. Lord Raglan's death produced much
comment about the folly of aristocratic domination of the
British army. The New York Tribune described Raglan as
being an example of what the English system "in its best
form" produced. Crimean events had proved that the best of
the English system was far from adequate. Raglan's whole
training had emphasized that "as long as things go on by
the prescribed regulations all is well."
The Boston Dail^ Chronicle thought that Lord Raglan's
greatest failing as a soldier had been an excessively mer-
ciful temperament. If Raglan had been like his great men-
tor, the Duke of Wellington, he would have captured Sevas-
topol within ten days after the battle of the Alma. How-
ever, Raglan did not want to cause heavy casualties either
among his own troops or Sevastopol's civilians. So he be-
gan regular siege operations after a long detour around Se
vastopol instead of immediately assaulting its northern de
fences. The consequence of this decision was 100,000 Al-
lied casualties. "Humane war" in the opinion of the Chron .
icle was always "the most merciless of things."
Angry editorials appeared in the American press about
the sack of Kertch after its capture by Allied troops, es-
pecially the destruction of some ancient Greek relics in
the city's museum. When the British press emphasized the
"Hango Massacre," an incident in the Baltic in which Rus-
sian soldiers allegedly fired on and killed several Brit-
ish sailors who were landing under a flag of truce, the
American papers recalled Kertch or French ruthlessness in
Algeria.
A vehemently pro-Russian book, William Giles Dix's
The Unholy Alliance : An American View of the War in the
^^^t appeared in the summer of 185^. Its author predicted
disaster and final ruin for Britain and France if they per-
sisted in the war. Regarding Russia as the champion of
"Christian ascendency" in the Near East, he claimed that
England followed a reactionary policy based on a "narrow
jealousy of the laws of national growth." Dix professed
to be an admirer of England and urged a change of course
before it was too late:
who ? "^^^^ urp;ently entreated by oneloves her as warmly as he loves his native •land, to consider which she prefers, to ?akesuch ground as an Anglo-Saxon and Christianrealm, as will not only invite but insure Ameri-
road'^o'ru?^ '"^'i^' °" ^^^^^^^ P-^-^^
ho? I ^"^^ eventually ground to pow-
itli- Ir''''
^^^^^^^ Russia, the West and thei^ast, the upper and the nether millstones of thedivme vengeance. 29
The New York Tribune took a similar view of the merits
of the belligerents. In an editorial entitled "The War and
Freedom," it claimed that most Americans residing on the
Continent were opposed to "Louis Napoleon & Co." France's
autocracy was worse than Russia's, because the Czar had
always governed in an authoritarian manner, whereas Napole-
on, by his coup d'etat of December 2, 1851, had deprived
the French people of rights they already possessed. The
Tribune summed up the differences by saying that "Russia is
despotic, but she is naturally, honestly so."
After the fall of Sevastopol, the Tribune was convinced
that the war would soon end. Chagrined by the Allied suc-
cess, it thought that failure of morale and inadequacy of
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supplies were major factors in the Russian decision to
abandon their Black Sea bastion. In the opinion of the
Tribune, "the cause of Russia is that of civilization, and
her defeat an injury to the progress of the world." ^1
The Tribune also praised Russia for having provided a
diplomatic counterpoise to the great maritime powers. Her
role was evident as far back as the Armed Neutrality of
1780, and was beneficial to all weaker commercial nations,
including the United States. Great Britain was "the most'
dangerous and direct enemy of the prosperity and civili-
zation of other states" because of its policy of Free
Trade, which was only a euphemism for world-wide British
commercial and industrial supremacy. Indeed, according to
the Tribune, Free Trade was even worse than this, for it
was dedicated to "perpetuating slavery where it exists and
creating it where it does not." Thus, the Walker expedi-
tion and other Southern adventures in the Caribbean, which
the Tribune regarded as acts of brigandage, were really in
harmony with British policy. This claim would have been
news to John Bright and Richard Cobden, but it was per-
fectly consonant with the Tribune 's image of the English
upper class as "that worst of all aristocracies" whose
"whole soul is found in its breeches pocket."
The National Intelligencer was less hostile to the Al-
lies than the Tribune
. Among America's major papers, it
probably came closest to a genuine neutrality. In its
opinion, the „ost beneficial result of the fall of Sevasto-
pol would be renewal of the peace negotiations which had
collapsed in the spring when the Russians had refused to
accept the British demand for demilitarization of the Black
Sea. However, for some time after the Anglo-French suc-
cess at Sevastopol there were no signs of new peace talks.
A Paris correspondent of the Intelligencer expected another
great battle in the Crimea before the winter. The paper
was particularly concerned about the danger of an Anglo-
American clash growing out of British resentment of both
United States support for Russia and its activity in the
Caribbean. Consistently opposed to all adventures in the
Caribbean, the Intelligencer denounced Walker's invasion of
Nicaragua, advised Pierce to take a strong stand against
filibustering and, urged his administration to do every-
thing possible to avoid a deterioration of diplomatic re-
lations.
While the siege of Sevastopol was drawing towards its
end, an American military commission was in Russia attempt-
ing to obtain permission to visit the Kussian lines around
the besieged city. This commission was established under
an order issued by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis on
April 2, 1855. It consisted of Major Richard Delafield,
Major Alfred Mordecai, and Captain George B. McClellan,
three outstanding officers. Secretary Davis, a veteran of
the Mexican War and an ardent Southern expansionist, in-
structed them to obtain information "with regard to the mil
itary service in general, and especially the practical
working of the changes which had been introduced of late
years into the military systems of Europe."
Each member of the committee was a specialist: Dela-
field concentrated on fortifications and other aspects of
military engineering, Mordecai on the organization and re-
cruitment of the European armies, and McClellan on infan-
try and cavalry tactics. There was some overlapping in
their reports, particularly between McClellan and Mordecai.
Much younger than his fellow officers, McClellan had es-
tablished a brilliant record in the Mexican War when he was
only twenty years of age. A considerable amount of ten-
sion developed between the young captain and his older col-
leagues. McClellan was the most pro-Russian of the members
of the commission; Delafield regarded all the European pow-
ers as potentially hostile to the United States because of
its republican form of government; while Mordecai was mod-
erately in favor of the Allies.
When the American officers had first arrived in Lon-
don they were given a friendly reception and immediately
received permission to visit the British lines in the Cri-
mea. The ministry provided them with letters of intro-
duction to Lord Raglan and Admiral Lyons, the naval com-
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mender in the Black Sea. However, the co.roission
.e.bers
did not set out immediately for the Crimea. They intended
to cross Europe first and hoped to visit the Russian posi-
tions at Sevastopol before observing the Allied forces.
When Delafield, Mordecai, and McClellan arrived in Paris,
they met their first rebuff. Napoleon III gave them an Au-
dience, but the French army refused to permit American of-
ficers to visit the French camp at Sevastopol if they also
intended a tour of the Russian lines. McClellan attributed
the denial to French displeasure over the Ostend Mani-
festo. 56
After leaving Paris, the three-man commission proceed-
ed to Berlin where they had a friendly interview with Baron
Manteuffel, the Prussian premier, and received permission
to observe the Prussian army. The Russian minister in Ber-
lin also received the Americans in a cordial manner and
provided them with letters of introduction to Russian of-
ficials in Warsaw. However, they were unable to obtain
permission to visit the Crimea from the Russian embassy in
Berlin, and were informed that only Saint Petersburg could
grant it. In Warsaw, Field Marshal Paskievitch and his
subordinates received the American delegation in a most
friendly spirit and (according to McClellan) manifested
"every desire to cultivate the 'entente cordial'" between
Russia and the United States.
In Saint Petersburg, Delafield, Mordecai, and McClel-
lan were presented to Czar Alexander II, who had recently
succeeded his father Nicholas I. Remarking on the good
reeling between the two countries, Alexander expressed the
hope that it would "not only subsist but increase," The
Americans visited the Cronstadt naval base and an encamp-
ment near Saint Petersburg. After leaving that city, they
proceeded to Moscow, where they again received a cordial
reception from Russian army officers. McClellan was con-
vinced that this kindness came from "their regard and good
feeling for Americans and clearly comes from the heart."
After reading of the failure of the Allied assault of June
18, McClellan expressed his pro-Russian sentiments in a let
ter to his brother John: "I suppose you have long ago re-
ceived the details of the assault of June 18th and are con-
vinced that the Allies were handsomely thrashed and com-
pletely defeated. God grant that the same result may fol-
low all future assaults and I believe it will be so." ^®
Despite the consistently cordial official attitude,
the three officers were denied permission to visit the Rus-
sian camp at Sevastopol. Like the French, the Russians re-
fused a permit if the Americans also planned to visit the
Allied camp. But the British and French eventually per-
mitted them entry into recently captured Sevastopol.
McClellan thought that a study of the wars in which
the Russians participated over the years would provide val-
uable knowledge for the American army. They had waged both
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large-scale and limited campaigns - "at one time carried on
by great masses on the level and unobstructed plains of
Europe, at another by small detachments in the rugged moun-
tains of the Caucasus and Asia Minor, or on the frontiers
Of Tartary and China
. . . Unlike the United States army,
which during peacetime was dispersed in small detachments
on the Indian frontier, the Russian army was maintained in
large masses for immediate action on the frontiers. The
army organization in corps, divisions, etc., was maintained
in peacetime, unlike the American army which had no peace-
time unit larger than a regiment; and only on rare occa-
sions were whole regiments brought together in the Indian
country.
Despite McClellan's admiration for the structure of
the Russian "active army," he was well aware of the weak-
nesses that the war in the Crimea had revealed. Designed
primarily to repel another large-scale invasion across the
Western frontier, like that of Napoleon in 1812, or to in-
tervene in Western Europe in support of established govern-
ments (i.e. the campaign in Hungary in 18^9), it was much
less well prepared to face an attack directed against one
point on the periphery of its territory, particularly when
this attack was combined with a threatening Austrian mobil-
ization and an Allied naval campaign in the Baltic. In
1812 the vast distances of Russia had worked against Napo-
leon; in 185^-55 they v/orked against the Russians them-
selves. McClellan believed that if the Russians had been
able to concentrate a larger portion of their forces in the
Crimea before the Anglo-French invasion, they would have
repelled the Allied forces.
Colonel Todleben's work in constructing the fortifica-
tions of Sevastopol was highly praised by McClellan, a tal-
ented engineer officer himself. In his opinion, Todleben
had devised "the most triumphant and enduring monument of
the value of fortifications." McClellan also paid tribute
to the courage and tenacity of the Russian troops defend-
ing Sevastopol:
... in our admiration of the talent and
energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten
that the inert masses which he raised would havebeen useless without the skillful artillery andheroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger
places than Sebastopol have often fallen underfar less obstinate and well-combined attacks than
that to which it was subjected. There can be nodanger in expressing the conviction that the
siege of Sebastopol called for the most magnifi-
cent defense of fortifications that has ever yet
occurred. 42
McClellan had great admiration for the Russian caval-
ry, which he regarded as the best mounted in Continental
Europe. He thought that the English heavy cavalry horses
were somewhat better than the Russian, but that the English
had "nothing to compare with the mass of the Russian ani-
mals for that purpose." The Cossacks aroused great enthu-
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siasm. NcClellan spoke with an old Russian general who had
served from Austerlitz to Paris in the Napoleonic Wars, and
later fought against the Persians and Turks. He informed
McClellan that the Cossack never used his sabre but relied
entirely on his lance, and that the carbine, which every
Cossack carried, was used only for signaling. This Russian
general believed that a dashing spirit was of paramount im-
portance for a cavalryman, and respected such a spirit when
he observed it amongst his adversaries. McClellan comment-
ed that his Russian informant was "strongly in favor of
snaffle-bits, sharp spurs, and Balaklava charges." In the
Allied camp, McClellan was later informed that the Cossacks
were even more versatile than their commander had portrayed
them as being:
.
the chasseurs d'Afrique told marvelous
stories of the expertness of the Cossack in the
use of the musket on horseback; and the Cossacks
of the line in the Caucasus, engaged almost daily
in hand to hand conflicts, have abandoned the
lance, and they are more dreaded by the mountain-
eers of the Caucasus than any other Russian
troops. 43
McClellan was so impressed with Cossack ability in
frontier warfare that he urged his government to form units
of Indians organized in a similar manner. Just as the Cos-
sacks were invaluable in the Russian campaigns in the Cau-
casus, Indian troops, incorporated into the American army
and commanded by "active and energetic regular ofricers,'*
would be or great help in contests wxth hostile Indians!
McClellan thought that frontier tribes like the Delawares
and Kickapoos could produce "partisan troops fully equal
to the Cossacks." Even in a large-scale war with a Euro-
pean power on the American continent, the use of Indian
cavalry, "under the regulations and restrictions necessary
to restrain their tendency to unnecessary cruelty, would
be productive of most important advantages."
In McClellan's opinion Lord Raglan and Marshal Saint-
Arnaud displayed none of the qualities of great commanders
in the initial advance on Sevastopol. "Slow and blunder-
ing" on the march, they failed to keep clearly in mind
.
their objective, the rapid capture of Sevastopol, and to
press steadily towards this goal. McClellan appreciated
the Allies great advantage: namely, their ability to rein-
force and supply their troops by means of steamships. He
pointed out that they could never have maintained such a
long siege so far from their home bases in the days of sail-
ing vessels. The Russians, he further noted had failed to
appreciate the advantages that steamers gave to a force at-
tacking Sevastopol by land. Most of the permanent fortifi-
cations were designed to meet a naval attack. Hence, Tod-
leben had to rapidly improvise land defenses; and if the
Allies had quickly followed up their victory at the Alma,
he would never have had time to set up his system of earth-
works. ^5
Allied naval operations in the Baltic and Black Seas
convinced McClellan that well-built rortxfxcat.ons would
always prove superior to the strongest fleets. This con-
firmed an opinion that had long been held by "all intelli-
gent military men." Sir Charles Napier's decision not to
attack Cronstadt in 1854 (a policy that was also Tollowed
by Admiral Dundas the following year) and the failure of
the Anglo-French naval assault on Sevastopol of October 17,
1854 were outstanding examples of this truth.
NcClellan had a low opinion of detached expeditions,
such as the one to Kertch and the Sea of Azov in the spring
of 1855. He did not think that they had any important ef-
fect on the outcome of the war. They weakened the main
body of the Allies while only annoying the Russians. In
addition, they resulted in the destruction of "more pri-
vate than public property." ^'^
Conceding that he and his fellow officers received a
friendly reception when they visited the Allied camp after
the fall of Sevastopol, McClellan was still hoping for a
turn of the tide in favor of the Russians. He admired the
English officers "in a personal manner," but thought there
was a strong probability that Britain and France would
turn against the United States if they succeeded in defeat-
ing the Russians without exhausting themselves. ^®
NcClellan, at Sevastopol, also much admired the French
trian
e
cora-
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zouave regiments (units of light infantrymen in Alge
costu-nes).
„cClellan enthusiastically described them-
"The zouaves are all French; they are selected from the old
campaisners for their fine physique and tried courage, and
have certainly proved that they are what their appearanc
would indicate, the most reckless, self-reliant and
plete infantry that Europe can produce." '^9
Major Delafield agreed with McClellan that the Euro-
pean powers might attempt to check "the spread of American
power and ideas." But Delafield thought that all the con-
tinental powers were potential enemies of the United States
and might jointly intervene in the Western Hemisphere,
while McClellan believed that the mutual rivalry between
Britain and France on the one hand, and the United States
and Russia on the other would guarantee a certain amount of
friendship between the latter two nations. Since the ex-
tension of American influence "tends to crush the ruling
principle, and with it involve the governors, nobles, aris-
tocracy, and monarchs in ruins," the United States, accord-
ing to Delafield, could not expect to find any political
friends amongst the European governments. ^°
Major Mordecai greatly admired the French army as it
had been reorganized in the age of the Revolution and Napo-
leon. France, in his opinion, had the only army in the
world with a "truly republican constitution." The old
privileges of special units and families (i.e. the purchase
or commissions) had been abolished and promotion was based
"on the single consideration of efficiency." The French
army provided "ample means of instruction to those who may
not have possessed the advantages of early education."
Common soldiers were frequently promoted to official rank,
something rare in other European armies. Mordecai thought
that this practice could only be applied successfully where
the army, as in France, was recruited by conscription from
the whole population; a small peacetime army like that of
the United States could not so operate.
Although Mordecai was certain that the French system
of commissioning and promoting officers was best, he was
less caustic in his criticism of the British purchase sys-
tem than many other Americans. Some good could be said for
it, he thought, although it was outweighed by the disadvan-
tages:
Such a system may secure the appointment of
men of refined character and high sense of honor,
ready to expose their lives freely in the service
of their country; it is not equally well adapted
to obtain men capable of the patient endurance oflabor, and the close attention to minute details
of duty and instructions, which form an important
part of the services required from a good offi-
cer, 52
In explaining the poor state of the British forces in
the Crimea, Mordecai noted that the army had made no prep-
arations for large-scale campaigns before the war. Most of
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its troops were scattered around the world in regimental or
smaller units. With the exception or Ind.a, (and so.e hast-
ily improvised maneuvers at Chobham dur.ng the French in-
vasion scare of early 1853) there had been no brigade or
divisional formations since Waterloo. The British army,
moreover, had no organized land transport corps, such al
the French possessed, a deficiency mainly responsible for
the collapse of its supply and medical services in the Cri-
mea. Mordecai praised the way in which British private
enterprise went to work to remedy this plight:
in thP^rSn^of r""^^ ^f"^ sufferings of the army
ed ac?in? n? ^^^r concert-
^reafrP^n?f
private enterprise, by which suchg eat esults are always produced in England,
?hP t^r^""^ '° governmenf; and att e ime of our visit to the Crimea, near the
close of the war, the British army was in fine
^^^^^v"""?'
clothed, well lodged in huts sentirom England, and abundantly suDplied with the
necessaries of life, and even many luxuries. 53
Mordecai had the highest praise for the small corps of Eng-
lish horse artillery. He admired the richness of its uni-
forms, the high quality of its horses and equipment, and
its quickness in maneuvers.
Carefully noting every instance of American equipment
being used by the various European armies, Mordecai was
pleased to discover that the new British arsenal at Enfield
was being built in imitation of the United States Arsenal
at Springfield, Massachusetts. (English omcers, having
Visited Springfield in the spring of 13,,, recommended the
abandonment of the old British practice of relying on pri-
vate contractors to make the army^s weapons.) Mordecai al-
so Observed that the machines being installed had been pur-
Chased from the Ames company of Chicopee, Massachusetts.
.
At the same time, he reported that Russian officers were
in the United States to buy similar machinery. Prussian
and Austrian arsenals used American sewing machines in or-
der to make cartridge bags and similar materials. ^5
In Mordecai 's opinion, the vast number of artillery
pieces used at Sevastopol, and the high proportion of guns
of large caliber, distinguished this siege from any previ-
ous one. He gave a graphic description of the quantity of
ammunition that had been expended: "One of the ravines
leading to the town, on the left of the English attack, was
known as 'The Valley of Death'; in the bottom of it, in
some places, our horses literally walked on a pavement of
cannon balls lying close together,"
.
Mordecai even joined Orestes Brownson and a small
group of Americans who praised some aspects of the Austrian
political system. Becoming friendly with many Austrian
officers, he was particularly impressed by their courteous
manner, for they treated the Americans with almost the same
comradely spirit as they observed amongst themselves:
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courtesy and amiable frankness of ^^^^^^^in no country which we visi?|| in nn^"-"'had we a more cordial recfotior, ?h?n ^"V™®^'or more ac:reeab:p s,o=„if " '^^'^ i" Austria,
trian officlr^ of ^f?°=^a,*=^°ns than with Aus-
'
the lowest s^ade- ?iom ?h f ^ ^""^ ""^Shest tolieutenant. 57 ' ^"^'^ marshal to the
While the American military commission traveled in
Europe, and the fall of Sevastopol was impending, a dispute
gradually developed between the United States and Great
Britain which, combined with their long-standing rivalries
in the Caribbean, almost produced a diplomatic break. It
grew out Of a British attempt to recruit a foreign legion
in the United States for service in the Crimea.
CHAPTER X
Heavy British losses early in the Crimean campaign re-
sulted in a serious manpower shortage toward the end of
1854. Unlike the Continental powers, Britain could not ex-
pand its army rapidly by conscription, and, although the
war had great popular support, there was no patriotic rush
to enlist. Parliament, however, would be unable to enact
a conscription law, even if it had desired to do so. The
Continental system of raising armies had long been regarded
as un-British, and liberals and conservatives alike detest-
ed it.
,
Since outright conscription was out of the question,
and most of the militia were too poorly trained to be in-
corporated into the regular army in the near future, the
government decided to resort to a variant of the old eight-
eenth century practice of hiring mercenaries. A Foreign
Enlistment Bill was introduced in Parliament in December
1854, which authorized recruitment of foreign legions for
service with the British army, ^
• The British government decided to concentrate its re-
cruiting activities in the smaller German states, Switzer-
land, and the United States. John P. Crampton, Britain's
minister in Washington, described by Secretary Marcy as "a
full-blooded John Bull," was charged with co-ordinating the
enlistment campaign in America with the Governor-Generals
of Canada and Nova Scotia. ^
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British Officials in the United States and Canada de-
cided to focus enlistment efforts on recent German immi-
'
grants. Few native Americans would be interested in going
to the Crimea, it was reasoned, while the Irish, who formed
the largest group of low-paid laborers in the Eastern
cities, were bitterly hostile to Britain. Some of the Ger-
mans had served in the armies of their native states before
migrating across the Atlantic and, therefore, would make
valuable recruits. That there was much unemployment in the
northern cities in the winter of 1855 added to the chances
of success. ^
Since the American neutrality law prohibited enlist-
ments in foreign armies on American soil, British agents
had to use the subterfuge that they were hiring laborers
for work in Canada. Once there, the recruits were formally
enrolled in the British army. The British consuls obtained
the services of numerous German agents to take charge of
the recruiting in their localities. Joseph Howe, a Cana-
dian who worked with Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General
of Canada, was charged with co-ordinating the campaign.
Contact was also established with a small number of former
Polish officers (veterans of the anti-Russian revolt of
1830), then living in the United States, who were quite ea-
ger to try another struggle against the Russians. ^
This enlistment campaign was ill-starred from the be-
ginning. Making little effort to conceal his purposes, Jo-
seph Howe travelled across the Northern states contacting
the various local recruiters. He repeatedly used the Amer-
ican telegraph system to inform Crampton and Head about his
progress. He even used Crampton 's name in the telegrams he
sent. Initially, Mr. Barclay, the British consul in New
York, had consulted Oscar Cromrey, one of the local agents,
as to whether it would be best to send the recruits to Can-
ada by ship or railroad. Cromrey advised the use of the
latter and Howe concurred in this. Barclay cautioned Crom-
rey that it was necessary to keep the matter secret, but
Howe's indiscretions had already made this impossible, ^
After Howe had been active for a few months, Sir Ed-
mund Head became alarmed over the potential consequences
for American-Canadian relations. When Head had visited
Washington in October 1854 he had warned Sir George C. Lew-
is, the Colonial Secretary, that the American government
might "commit some desperate act in the hope of receiving
popularity by an anti-British cry." The British attempt to
recruit a foreign legion in the United States would pro-
vide an excellent pretext for such an attack. Head's con-
cern was increased by the fact that Britain had reduced its
Canadian garrison from seven thousand to three thousand men
in order to strengthen the expeditionary force sent to the
Crimea. American filibustering expeditions might take ad-
vantage of this weakening of forces by staging raids.
Head's greatest fear was that the United States government
misht seize the opportunity to declare war on Britain and
thereby divert public attention from the slavery contro-
versy. In order to ease these potential dangers Head sug-
gested that the center of recruiting activity be trans-
ferred from Canada to Nova Scotia (then a separate prov-
ince). Nova Scotia, unlike Canada, did not have a long ex-
posed land frontier and the fleet units at Halifax could
ward off filibustering expeditions. Crampton and Sir Gas-
pard Le Marchant, Nova Scotia's Governor-General, agreed to
this change. The recruits were now sent by ship to Hali-
fax. ^
American authorities, meanwhile, alerted by Howe's ac-
tivities, began to take action. The British consulate in
New York, despite Barclay's advice about secrecy, had be-
gun to circulate recruiting handbills. Attorney General
Caleb Gushing ordered a halt to this practice on the ground
that it was a violation of the American neutrality law. On
M^rch 22, 1855 Secretary Marcy called Crampton into his of-
fice and protested the use of the handbills. Crampton dis-
avowed the action of the consulate and denied that Britain
had any intention of violating American neutrality. Marcy
stated his firm policy of enforcing the neutrality law, but
did concede that there was nothing wrong if a person vol-
untarily went to Canada to enlist. After receiving Cramp-
ton's report on the attitude of the American government.
Lord Clarendon instructed his minister to "have no conceal-
ance
ree
was in
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ment" from Marcy. ^
Crampton, xn early May, conferred with'sir Edmund Head
at Quebec and with Sir Gaspard Le Marchant at Halifax, It
was agreed that Howe's tours had been indiscreet. Reli
henceforth, would be placed mainly on local recruiters
New agents were now hired and Crampton arranged for 1
passage for the recruits to Halifax. While Crampton
Canada, his charge d'affaires, John S. Lumley, visited
Marcy and read Clarendon's recent instructions. However,
on Crampton 's advice, Lumley altered the despatch to con-
ceal the fact that Clarendon had ordered a halt to all re-
cruiting activity that conflicted with the British inter-
pretation of America's neutrality law. ^
While these events were taking place, American offi-
cials apprehended several of Crampton 's agents in Philadel-
phia. They were tried in the Federal District Court with
Judge John Kane presiding. Kane ruled on March 22 that the
government had not presented any clear-cut evidence of a
conspiracy to violate the 1818 Neutrality Act. Enlistment
contracts signed in the United States, he ruled, would be a
violation of this law, but conversations promoting enlist-
ment or paying passages to Halifax were not.
On May 28, 1855 Marcy informed Buchanan about the re-
cruiting campaign and instructed him to demand an end to it.
He accompanied this despatch with some very unfavorable com-
ments on the reasons for England's war with f?ussia:
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r.^ ^^I"^^ ^he character in the evesof others which she herself gives to In i?I
sia lS?ified b^;^?r^ '° ^^-^ asaiAst Rus''
?i?Ar.H f i ?^ suspicion that the Emperorintended to do what she has been in the practiceof doing for a century and one half - encroach-
nationr^ll territories of other
The Philadelphia trial and the prospect of similar lit.
isation in which the American authorities would have strong,
er evidence, convinced the British government that the re-
cruiting drive should be terminated; and, on June 22, in-
structions to this effect were sent out. Buchanan, how-
ever, was not immediately informed of the suspension and he
presented his government's protest to Clarendon. Referring
to British concern about the possibility of Russian priva-
teers being fitted out in American ports, he stated that
British recruitment of soldiers in the United States was
equQlly a violation of the neutrality law. Clarendon re-
plied by citing Judge Kane's opinion upholding the legality
of paying passages to Halifax for prospective recruits.
But Clarendon did concede that the activities of certain
"unauthorized agents" were contrary to American law. He
also informed Buchanan of the order of June 22 which had
terminated the enlistment campaign. Marcy, in the mean-
time, sent another note to Buchanan, instructing him to de-
mand the dismissal of all those who were enlisted on Amer-
ican soil, but Buchanan neglected to present it to Claren-
don for several months and Anglo-American correspondence
on the issue ceased for some time.
In August 1855 the United States government was able
to obtain evidence clearly linking Crampton with the re-
cruiting drive. At the Philadelphia trial, one of the al-
leged agents, Max Strobel, once a captain in the Bavarian
army, turned state's evidence, described his contacts with
Crampton, and claimed that Crampton had discussed the re-
cruiting drive with him in Washington in January, On July
11, 1855 Strobel had written to Crampton threatening to
inform the American government about his activities if
Crampton did not send him£lOO to finance a trip to Europe.
Crampton failed to do so, and Strobel told his story. The
chief defendant, Henry Hertz, formerly a Danish soldier and
then employed as a Philadelphia salesman, added his own con-
fession.
Marcy then informed Buchanan of the evidence gathered
against Crampton but Lord Palmerston had already announced
the end of recruiting. In replying to Marcy Clarendon
strongly criticized American methods of obtaining evidence
against the agents. According to him. Hertz and Strobel
were untrustworthy and their testimony should not have been
accepted against the word of a gentleman like Crampton. In
relying on such men the United States was following a prac-
tice "sometimes resorted to under despotic institutions"
but which "all free and enlightened governments" disdained.
sClarendon's note also critxcized American munitions sale
to Russia, thereby countering the charges that Britain had
violated American neutrality. ^5
Marcy, in reply, denied that any "irregular" means had
been used to obtain evidence. As for munitions sales, the
United States had sold far more weapons to the Allies than
to Russia. Moreover, the Allies had chartered many Ameri-
can ships to transport their troops and supplies to the
Crimea. The sale of weapons to both belligerents, he ar-
gued, was clearly justified under international law.
The British government soon found that some of its
other agents were equally troublesome once the enlistment
campaign was suspended. William Schumacher testified that
in April 1855, he and several others went from New York to
Halifax where they met Governor Le Marchant. Appointed a
lieutenant in the new foreign legion, he then returned to
New York to begin raising men for his unit. Schumacher de-
scribed his activities as follows:
We went in Liberty Street and put up at a
German boarding house, which was a good place for
enlisting. The next day Mr. Weiss arrived and
told us he had seen the man who furnished the
money (Mr. Turnbull) for the enlistment, and we
advertised in two German papers for "five to ten
young unmarried men who wanted to leave New
York." The next day we sent ten or eleven men,
and so on every day, for three or four days; on
the fourth day we were arrested. 17
Upon release, he continued to enlist men until August.
Mr. Stanley, an assistant to the British consul, actively
participated in the campaign, and Schumacher and his asso-
ciates called almost every day upon him. He gave Schu-
macher two hundred dollars in cash to take ten recruits to
Montreal. Mr. Barclay, the consul, was in the office at
the time. According to Schumacher, Barclay "always bowed
to me, or made some sign of recognition."
Further testimony by William Schumacher and Oscar
Cromrey revealed that a certain Max Thoman received large
sums of money from Stanley for his services in obtaining
recruits. Thoman and Stanley despatched the ship "Ade-
laide" to Nova Scotia with a large party of enlisted men.
Later, Thoman furnished affidavits to the British govern-
ment which challenged the veracity of Hertz and Strobel.
Thoman claimed that Hertz suddenly started to live in style
after- he turned state's evidence in Philadelphia. This was
supposedly because he had been paid by Russian officials in
that city for giving information to the American authori-
ties. 19
Louis Celagi, an agent who worked with Crampton in
Washington, asserted that he copied an agreement between a
Polish officer named Smolenski and Colonel Ansell of the
British 76th Infantry Regiment. The document they had
signed appointed Smolenski a colonel in the foreign legion:
Crampton was present at this meeting.
Another former Polish officer, Louis Kazinski, who was
commissioned in the British foreign legion, contributed an
unsigned article to the New York Tribune entitled
-The Mys-
teries of British Recruiting." when Kazinski was arrested
and tried in Boston for sending recruits from there to Hal-
ifax, Stanley paid his legal fee. The Polish officer
Claimed to be "on familiar and confidential terms- with
Stanley. Stanley, he asserted, was a hard-drinking man and
"very communicative when intoxicated"; and, according to
Kazinski, he revealed the details of his regular corre-
spondence with Crampton on the recruiting campaign. ^1
While the trials of the British agents proceeded, the
Canadian government began to take precautions against a
possible American invasion. Alarmed by the Walker expe-
dition to Nicaragua, they suspected that similar filibus-
tering raids might be made on their territory. Another
source of anxiety occurred early in the war - when rumor
had it that the Russians were planning to smuggle soldiers
into the United States under the guise of immigrants, and
then have them invade Canada. Then, too, Anglo-American
tension over the recruitment question heightened Canadian
22concern. ^'^
Since the number of British regulars in Canada had
been drastically reduced, the provincial legislature enact-
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ed a law in 1855 designed to strengthen the militia. The
provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick took similar ac-
tion. The legislative committee which drafted the Canadian
militia bill made the following comments on possible Ameri-
can designs:
The Committee are also impressed with theconviction that a large and lawless party existsm the United States unfriendly to Great Britainand desirous, if possible, of depriving her o?
^l^^^^'^^lK^^^rican Colonies. Should the War beprotracted, or the course of events render itnecessary to employ the whole Military force ofthe Empire m the East, the Committee have toomuch reason to believe that attempts similar tothose from time to time made on Cuba, and in theyear 1838-39 on Canada would be made by the par-ty alluded to. 25 ^
The British and Canadian governments were also con-
cerned about the possibility of an Irish-American invasion
of Canada, or even an attempt to stir up an insurrection
in Ireland itself. At the outset of the conflict John
Mitchel, a leading Irish nationalist living in the United
States, visited the Russian minister, Baron de Stoeckl, in
Washington. Mitchel suggested that the Russian government
send military supplies to Ireland. A major Irish revolt
would be a formidable diversion for Britain. Stoeckl,
while interested in Mitchel 's plan, did not give him much
encouragement. He said that since the Allies were blockad-
ing the Baltic, it would be impossible for Russia to send
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any weapons to Ireland.
Stoeckl's attitude was based on conservative princi-
ples as well as military practicality, m rejecting Mitch-
el's plans he reflected the opinions of Nicholas I. Prid-
ing himself on being the guardian of order in Europe, N.cho-
las could never have countenanced an Irish revolution, even
though it might have been militarily advantageous. Another
more practical factor influenced him. If Russia encouraged
the Irish to rebel, Britain and France could easily retal-
iate by fomenting insurrection in Poland. The consequences
were incalculable, and could be disastrous for Russia.
These considerations caused Stoeckl to reject Mitchel's
project.
But rumors of possible Irish raids into Canada persist-
ed throughout the war. The Philadelphia Ledger reported
that five thousand Irishmen were planning to invade Canada
in cooperation with a Russian demonstration on the North-
west coast (British Columbia). A Russian agent was supposed
to be the "chief engineer of the whole concern." The Brit-
ish government, in the light of these rumors, was apprehen-
sive about possible attacks from Russian America. A naval
base was established at Esquimalt, and one warship was per-
manently stationed there. But the Russians made no move
and the British for their part refrained from attacking
Alaska. The private agreement between the Hudson's Bay
Company and the Russian American Company, which prevented
hostilities from being extended to the North Pacific, was
maintained, and their profitable trade remained undis-
turbed.
Irish-Americans were vocal in expressing their pro-
Russian sentiments. In December 1854, a meeting was held
in New York to congratulate William Smith O'Brien, (one
of the leaders of the abortive "Young Ireland" revolt of
1848, upon his escape from imprisonment in Australia),
Three cheers were proposed for the Emperor of Russia, and,
according to the New York Citizen
, "the enthusiasm with
which the call was responded to was quite overwhelming.'^ ^7
The Massachusetts Irish Emigrant Aid Society, an or-
ganization designed to serve as a commissary for an expe-
ditionary force of Irish-Americans, made plans for a land-
ing in Ireland which would hopefully lead to revolution.
But factionalism split the Irish leaders and thwarted any
action. Even if their differences had been composed, Amer-
ican authorities would probably have prevented a filibus-
tering fleet from sailing,
American officials tended to dismiss the reports of a
projected filibustering expedition to Ireland as a practi-
cal joke. The British, however, took them much more seri-
ously. During the autumn of 1855 about three hundred Irish-
Americans returned to their native land in small groups.
On October 11 Crampton met Marcy and presented him with ev-
idence about the plans of Irish liberation societies. Re-
2^
eapding Crampton-s ™ove as an attempt to find an issue that
would counterbalance the recruiting case, Narcy did not re-
ply to his note.
A few weeks later, Lord Clarendon raised the Irish in-
vasion issue again in a conversation with Buchanan. The
Foreign Secretary claimed that the three hundred emigrants
who had recently re-appeared in Ireland were "returning to
their country piecemeal to create disturbances." Buchanan,
however, denied that there was anything serious behind the
talk about an invasion.
Another issue that re-appeared was that of Russian pri-
vateers. During the conference at which Crampton raised
the Irish filibustering matter with Marcy, he also claimed
that the Maury, a barque then being fitted out in New York,
was intended as a Russian privateer. Marcy thought that
this too was a means of diverting attention from the re-
cruiting controversy, but he suggested that Attorney Gen-
eral Gushing investigate. Gushing reported that the Maury
was designed for the Ghina trade and carried a few guns as
a protection against pirate junks. Glarendon too had men-
tioned the Maury in his talk with Buchanan about the return
of the Irish-Americans and was also informed of the ves-
sel's true purpose. ^"^
With the fall of Sevastopol the British government,
alarmed by Walker's Nicaraguan campaign, decided that the
time was ripe to make a show of force which would deter any
new filibustering expeditions. The British fleet in West
Indian and North American waters was greatly strengthened.
It was hoped that this action would demonstrate Britain's
ability to take a strong stand in the Western Hemisphere
while still engaged in war with Russia.
The appearance of a reinforced British fleet in the
Caribbean caused great excitement on both sides of the At-
lantic. Buchanan, in a letter to his niece Harriet Lane,
wrote that "the aspect of affairs between the two countries
has now become squally." He suggested, in an interview with
Clarendon, that the fleet be withdrawn since its presence
was causing great excitement in the United States. Buchan-
an also told Clarendon that a war between their nations
would be disastrous to the cause of liberty and civiliza-
tion. 5^
Clarendon denied that the despatch of the fleet signi-
fied an aggressive intent. There was no truth to the ru-
mors that British ships might enter American harbors to
destroy suspected Russian privateers. According to Claren-
don, the orders issued to the fleet forbade any close ap-
preach to the American coast. Buchanan was somewhat re-
assured by this statement, but he derived greater comfort
from the fact that English manufacturing and mercantile
classes were opposed to war with the United States. His
greatest fear was that Napoleon III might be the prime mov-
er behind the despatch of British ships across the Atlantic.
If Britain became involved in a war with the United States
Napoleon would have free rein to pursue his ambitions in
both hemispheres. Repeatedly expressing concern over the
growing power of France at this time, Buchanan noted the
relative decline of England as illustrated by Prance's rol
in the capture of Sevastopol: "Louis Napoleon at the pres
ent moment wields more real power than ever his great uncL
did. All the potentates of Europe dread him, and are pay-
ing court to him. He has England in leading strings, near-
ly as much as Sardinia. How have the mighty fallen!" ^5
A few days later Buchanan described the new European bal-
ance of power to Secretary Marcy:
^ } tt^ lighting for -the balance ofpower/ and the effect will most probably be toimpair the power of Russia to such a degree asno longer to leave her a counterpoise to that of
J®??^' ^^"^ ^o^is Napoleon the arbiter
Shortly thereafter, Buchanan saw indications that Napo
leon III was less belligerent than he had feared. On No-
vember 30 the American minister reported that Napoleon was
eager to end the war with Russia and might force Palmerston
to accept peace. England, on the other hand, was making
extensive preparations for the 1856 campaign, and Palmer-
ston hoped that the capture of Cronstadt would redeem the
reputation of British arms which, at Sevastopol, had been
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badly shaken in comparison with those of Prance. ^7
Buchanan now began to worry that England might make
peace with Russia before a new campaign could be fought.
Should that event occur, Palmerston could be tempted to use
his well-prepared forces to settle some scores with the
United States. Reinforcement of the British fleet in Amer-
ican waters might be the first step in this direction, he
conjectured; but he was pleased to observe that peace sen-
timent seemed to be gaining ground in Britain and that
Palmerston
-s despatch of the fleet was strongly opposed in
commercial circles. Should peace come to Europe, Buchanan
thought, it would be a "most happy consummation" if the
treaty brought down Palmerston.
Some of the staunchest opponents of the Crimean War
shared Palmerston 's belief that the United States was a
dangerous rival of Great
• Britain. John Bright, for ex-
ample, declared in a speech at Manchester, that the United
States "is the true rival of this country." Admiring Amer-
ica and hoping that this rivalry would be confined to the
commercial sphere, he nonetheless pointed out that the
United States was already the world's second trading nation.
Britain, he declared, would fall far behind her former col-
onies if she continued to engage in continental European
wars.
on November 16 Lord Clarendon replied to ^^arcy's note
demanding the dismissal of all persons recruited Tor the
roreign legion. He denied that there was any reliable evi-
dence of enlistment contracts having been made in the
United States, and once again criticized American reliance
on the confessions of Hertz and Strobel. He also rebuked
the administration for following a disguised pro-Russian
policy. According to Clarendon, the United States, with its
democratic professions, might have been expected to sympa-
thize with the Anglo-French war against Russian despotism;
but this had not been the case.
Buchanan, meanwhile, denied that American public opin-
ion was "universally favorable" to Russia, although he con-
ceded that "a considerable portion of the press took their
side." He again asserted that the anti-British sentiment
in the United States derived from English attempts to inter-
fere with American interests in the Western Hemisphere and,
more recently, English violations of American neutrality.
President Pierce sharply criticized British recruit-
ing policy in his annual message to Congress in December
1855. At the same time, the general tone of this message
was conciliatory despite the recent reinforcement of Brit-
ain's American squadron:
It is difficult to understand how it should
have been supposed that troops could be raised
here by Great Britain without violation of the
municipal law. The unmistakable obipct nf i-holaw was to prevent every such act which if let
±n stLT.f ""'"^"^ violation of the law ^r
t?vP tho ri^'-^^ either alterna-i e e act done would be alike injurious tothe sovereignty of the United States. !
cause of^oS^^^^'^f^^^^''''^' ^^^^ ^h^t the
with fun vL f^J^^''^^^ design, entered uponll knowledge of our laws and national pol-
arLs imSenS,'^^ responsible public function-
R^t^. Ih "^t present the case to theBritis Government, m order to secure not onlya cessation of the wrong, but its reparation. ^
of wh^^f ''^^^^ discussion, the result01 ich will be communicated to you in duetime. 42 ^
The recruiting campaign intensified Anglophobia in the
American press. A parallel was frequently drawn between
the new British foreign legion and the German troops which
they had purchased during the American Revolution. Some
papers even thought that the English might be planning to
use the mercenaries to repress a possible revolution at
home.- The New York Tribune, pointing to the events of 1855
as evidence of England's declining military power, spoke
scornfully of British attempts to enlist "the scum of
. . .
both hemispheres." Crampton had allegedly told Hertz that
he need not worry about American popular reaction against
his enterprise because the United States was so economi-
cally dependent on England that it trembled when a single
Liverpool business house failed. This led the Tribune to
denounce once again the British policy of free trade,
pointing out that America could be truly independent only
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by following a protectionist policy. The performance of
Russia in the Eastern war was evidence of the "masnificent
advantages of the Protective System to domestic industry,
wealth and strength." The Tribune thought that Crampton's
dismissal would be the only proper course for the admin-
istration.
While the protectionist Tribune sang the praises of
Russia, the newspapers of the free trade South continued to
denounce Britain for their cwn reasons. The British gov-
ernment, according to the Washinp:ton Union had engaged in
"kidnapping" men for their army under the false pretense
that they were needed as railroad workers in Nova Scotia.
These enlistments proved that England had sunk into "servil-
ity and decay." The Union also denounced the abolitionists
and philanthropists for remaining silent while "hundreds of
white men are kidnapped in midday, and taken off by
fraud." ^
Only one of the leading American newspapers, the New
York Courier and Enquirer
, the Union later noted with pleas-
ure, dared to defend British recruiting. Here was one issue
on which North and South spoke with a single voice. The
Union praised Attorney General Gushing for his vigorous ac-
tion in prosecuting the British agents. In his instruc-
tions to the district attorneys in New York, Philadelphia
and Cincinnati, Gushing had denounced the policy of the
British government for its violations of American sever-
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eignty. This use of outspoken language was regarded by the
Union as one of the best ways of dealing with John Bull. ^5
On November 23, 1855 the Union criticized the London
Times for its defense of the British foreign enlistment
policy. The Times had denied that any men were actually
enlisted in the United States; and, therefore, there was no
violation Of America's neutrality law. In reply, the Union
pointed to the Times,' denunciations of American filibus-
tering expeditions. The men who joined such enterprises
also frequently left the United States in the guise of "em-
igrants" or workers. Editorials against recruiting from
the London Telegraph and the Manchester Examiner were repro-
duced as evidence that many Englishmen agreed with the Amer-
ican stand on the question. The Union also reprinted a
whole column from the New York Tribune which claimed that
the Eastern war had humbled England before the world. When
it praised one of the Tribune's attacks on the London
Times, the Union added (remembering domestic political dif-
ferences) that the New York paper "has not often so good
an excuse for its strictures as the present occasion."
In the opinion of the Union
, the Times ' construction
of America's neutrality law was only one instance of a
wholesale disregard for truth which characterized the war
reports appearing in the British and French press. The
Allies, for example, never emphasized the fact that even
after the Russians evacuated Sevastopol, they still held
fortifications on the north side of the town
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teemed wn t-h fS l^^ Anglo-French alliance hasi the most gross and palpable attemptssystematically pursued, to impose on the credu-
'
lltl J?''''^^- content with falsifying
to llU ^h^-""^^" absolutely perverted languagesuit t eir purposes. They have given Sew
names to things. 47 ^ ^
The New Orleans Daily Picayune took essentially the
same stand on the recruiting question as the Union
. It in-
sisted that if filibustering expeditions against Cuba were
illegal, then the same standard must be applied to the Brit,
ish foreign legion. The Picayune doubted that the British
government would disavow the actions of its agents; and,
therefore, the President would have to expel them. The
episode was a great blow to "British honor and good
faith."
After the conviction of Hertz in Philadelphia, the
Picayune called for both the immediate expulsion of Cramp-
ton and reparation from Great Britain. The paper compared
the situation with President Washington's insistence upon
the recall of Citizen Edmond Genet, the French minister, in
1793« (Genet had issued letters of marque to American pri-
vateers at a time when the President had proclaimed the
neutrality of the United States with respect to the Anglo-
French war.) In addition to this, the Picayune cited emi-
nent legal authorities such as Emerich de Vattel and Chan-
cellor Ja.es Kent in support or the charge that Britain had
violated American neutrality. The editorial concluded by
expressing the hope that there would be "no backwardness"
on the part of the administration in handling the case. ^9
Secretary Marcy, however, spent several months trying
to obtain a complete disavowal of the recruiting policy
from Lord Clarendon. As the Picayune had predicted, the
British government supported its agents with the argument
that since the enlisted men were not actually enrolled in
the British army on American soil there was no violation of
the neutrality law. The New Orleans paper denounced the
idea that Clarendon and Crampton had the right to interpret
American law as they pleased.
When Britain reinforced its naval squadron in the West-
em Hemisphere, the Picayune considered war to be unlikely
(although some British schemes were of "deadly hostility"
to American interests), and placed its faith in England's
"great middle class" which always favored peace with the
United States. The Picayune also ridiculed the British
claim that the Maury was a Russian privateer and that a
filibustering expedition to Ireland was being planned in
America. These charges, and the war scare which grew out
of them, were a "political ruse" by the Palmerston ministry
to divert attention from the enlistment controversy.
The New York Times
, which was committed to opposing
the extension of slavery, shared the anger of papers in
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Washington and New Orleans. Pierce, it asserted, should
have dismissed Crampton at the end of the Philadelphia
trials. If it was legal for Great Britain to raise troops
in the United States, then it would be equally proper for
Russia to fit out privateers in American ports. The Brit-
ish minister, the Times believed, was "a broken man, and
must necessarily seek to win his diplomatic spurs in some
other field."
The National Intelligencer continued to stand out from
the majority of American newspapers by the moderate tone
with which it discussed the new dispute. While opposing
the British recruiting drive, it also opposed any action
against Crampton. It favored a negotiated settlement of
both the enlistment and Central American disputes, believed
that everything possible should be done to avoid a conflict
with the Allies, and (since it had criticized American au-
thorities in the past for winking at filibustering expe-
ditions) tended to take a more tolerant view of British
violations of the neutrality law. Such violations, after
all, were not all on one side.
A Paris correspondent of the National Intelli^^encer
reported the extreme talk of some English and French offi-
cers about supposedly planned actions against the United
States. If these comments had any official support, Bu-
chanan's worst fears might have been confirmed;
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thei/?alk^''w^ English are now loud in
that the squadron of four or five laree linPof-battle ships, which the Bri^IIh paoers an!nounced are fitting for the American s?a?ioSare intended to blockade these Russian ships \n
ente^^^e'^Sr^'^^'/"^ '^^^ ^^^^ ^^^l P^^^'^l^er th ports to destroy them. None of them
?hLf p''^'^-'"^ inquiry as to what port or portsthese Russian ships are building at, or wherethey are to be delivered to the Russians, whitherat Cronstadt or Sebastopol. 54 x ^ba
President Pierce, according to the IntelliG:encer
. was
not conciliatory enough towards Britain in his annual mes-
sage because, the paper went so far as to hint, he might
be attempting to foment a war with England over the enlist-
ment and Central American questions. It reminded its read-
ers of President Polk's activities before the Mexican War
and pointed to the present situation in the Caribbean area,
While the Intelligencer denied that it was drawing a clear
parallel between Polk and Pierce, it left no doubt that
this was the general tenor of its argument. Pierce's pol-
icy was characterized by "a disposition to make capital by
fomenting national jars into national hates."
Buchanan was correct in observing that Napoleon III
was more eager for peace than the British after the fall of
Sevastopol. Paced with increasing public hostility towards
the war, the French Emperor hoped to arrive at a peace set-
tlement before another campaign had to be fought. Lord
Palmerston, on the other hand, wished to inflict a more
serious defeat on the Russians before coming to terms with
them. In particular, he wanted an English victory at Cron-
stadt to offset the primary role played by the French at
Sevastopol. There was strong public support for this pol-
icy in Britain.
Meanwhile, Allied forces in the Black Sea made a suc-
cessful naval attack on the fortress of Kinburn at the
mouth of the Dneiper River, and there was extensive dis-
cussion of new campaign plans in London and Paris. But it
remained only in the talking stage. The French Emperor con-
tinued to concentrate on finding ways to end the war by ne-
gotiation. 57
In order to induce the British to accept his policy,
Napoleon hinted that if the war were to continue for another
year, it would be necessary to broaden it by encouraging a
Polish revolt against Russia. Since Poland was very pop-
ular in both Catholic and liberal circles, such an action
would revive French enthusiasm for the war. Napoleon's
proposal, as he had hoped, gave the British second thoughts.
They did not want to defeat Russia at the price of com-
pletely disrupting the Vienna settlement of 1815 and possi-
bly making France supreme in Europe.
Thus, as the year 1855 closed the question of peace or
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a wider war hung in the balance in Europe. Simultaneously,
the American dispute with Britain over the latter- s re-
cruiting practices reached its clin>ax, and the threat of an
Anslo-Amerxcan conflict was Joined to the Crimean War as
one of the great issues of 1856.
CHAPTER XI
Secretary Marcy regarded Lord Clarendon's defense of
Britain's recruiting policy as highly unsatisfactory. He
therefore instructed Buchanan on December 28 to demand the
recall of Crampton and Messrs. Rowcroft, Mathew, and Bar-
clay, the British consuls in Cincinnati, Philadelphia and
New York respectively. However, when Buchanan received
his instructions in mid-January, changes in the interna-
tional situation made it unpropitious for the United States
to press Great Britain.
In January 1855 Austria finally agreed to Join the Al-
lied spring campaign if Russia refused an ultimatum calling
on her to accept peace on Anglo-French terms. Since the
Russians had scuttled their Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol,
there was little point in maintaining their objection to
the demilitarization of that sea, particularly if this
meant, acquiring another powerful enemy. Faced with a seri-
ous shortage of money and munitions (one of the points
raised in the Council of Ministers in favor of peace was
the impossibility of obtaining large amounts of weapons
from the United States), Alexander II agreed to a peace
congress on the basis of the Austrian proposals. ^
The American demand for the recall of Crampton and the
three consuls reached London shortly after Russian accept-
ance of Austria's peace terms. Lord Palmerston, feeling
Britain's position strengthened by the approaching end of
the war, decided to ta.e a strong stand. Now sevent.-two
years of age, he had lost none of that renowned hellicosit,
whxch in word or deed, was familiar from Schleswig-Holstein
to Canton. Since "the strong arm of England" (which Palm-
erston praised in his Civis Romanus sum speech of 1850 for
the protection it extended to Britons all over the world)
was now stronger than ever, the Prime Minister was not go-
ing to recall passively his representative from Washington.
Palmerston advised Clarendon to tell Buchanan that Crampton
would not be summoned home, since his actions were fully
supported by the English government. Clarendon informed
the American minister of this decision on February 1, al-
though in a somewhat less peremptory tone than Palmerston
had suggested. ^
When the news of Marcy's demand became public, the
London Times and some other Journals again denounced the
United States. Buchanan expected that he would be given
his passports if Crampton were dismissed, although he did
not take the threats of war in the press too seriously:
You cannot fail to have observed the vainboastings and the threats contained in the Brit-ish public Journals. In the event of a war, ac-
cording to them, our cities on the seaboard are
to be bombarded, our ports blockaded, our com-
merce swept from the ocean, our Union divided,
and a servile war excited by the landing of
Black Regiments in the South. Their perfect
preparation - and it is true they have never
been so well prepared for war at any former pe-
riod of their history - is contrasted with our
eged want of preparation. ^
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Buchanan, while holding an unfavorable view of Palmerston,
did not believe he would deliberately go to war with the
United States to maintain his own power. Nevertheless,
some danger did exist because "human nature is too prone
honestly to believe that course of public policy which
chimes in with selfish interest." ^
Rumor of an American treaty with Persia, containing a
pledge of United States naval support in event of war, was
another issue which arose in early 1856 and which angered
Palmerston. Since Britain and Persia had been on bad terms
during the Crimean War, such a treaty seemed to be, accord-
ing to Palmerston, "impudent intermeddling." He was con-
vinced that Russian intrigue was behind the treaty. In
fact, the Persian government had requested such a clause,
promising American naval support, but Spence, the minis-
ter at Constantinople, who was supervising the negotiations,
rejected it out of hand. The Russians had encouraged
Persia to sign a treaty with the United States (in the hope
that American commercial activity would create a counter-
balance to British influence), and their consuls in that
country had interceded on several occasions to protect Amer-
ican missionaries. Understandably, the British government,
even without the naval clause, was strongly opposed to any
close Persian-American ties.
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Despite the attitude of Palmerston and of much of the
London press, mercantile and manufacturing interests once
again protested when talk of war with America began to
spread. The government was obliged to defer to their views.
While Clarendon remained firm on the Crampton case, Buchan-
an reported, he stressed the British willingness to arbi-
trate the longstanding Central American dispute. Palmerston
had advised concessions in this area, since he doubted the
practicability of a canal in Nicaragua: "If we wanted to
recede with dignity, a reference to arbitration, the ver-
dict of which would probably be given against us whatever
the merits of our case, might be the easiest way out."
Now that the European war seemed to be ending and Anglo-
French differences were appearing, Buchanan was more agree-
able to arbitration than in 1854. Clarendon's conciliatory
mood was also seen in his criticism of the anti-Ajiierican
tone of many articles in the London press.
When, Palmerston addressed Commons on the subject of
Anglo-.\merican relations, he emphasized Britain's willing-
ness to arbitrate the Central American difficulties and de-
nied any hostility to American interests. He also tried to
smooth over the recruiting controversy: when Buchanan had
complained to Clarendon the previous July about the enlist-
ment campaign, he declared, the Foreign Secretary had in-
formed him that on the mere report of American concern, or-
ders had been issued to end recruiting by June 22. Accord-
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ing to Palmerston, Buchanan expressed great satisfaction
with this decision. The Prime Minister would not discuss
later American complaints, stating that the charges were
being investigated. He also made no reference to the ques-
tion of Crampton's complicity or to the American demand for
his recall, ^
Palmerston was challenged in the House of Commons by
John A. Roebuck, who quoted documents recently published by
the American government, including some of Crampton's own
letters which confirmed his role in the recruiting campaign.
Palmerston angrily denounced Roebuck for "holding in his
hands the brief of the antagonist of his own country." How-
ever, these revelations had gone far to discredit the Prime
Minister's earlier speech, particularly for commercial in-
terests. ^
Palmerston, in both
. speeches, had spoken of Buchanan's
alleged "satisfaction" with Clarendon's order of June 22,
1855, but the American minister regarded this as a distor-
tion of his opinion:
Had Lord Palmerston
. . . been careful to
consult accuracy, he would have said: 'When the
communication to which I have referred was made
to the American Minister in London he expressed
the satisfaction he would have in communicating
it to his Government; but having subsequently
learned that the British Minister at Washington
was implicated in the transaction, he informed
Lord Clarendon more than once that he did not
knov/ the fact when he expressed this satisfac-
tion.' 10
While Parliament debated recruiting, the United States
Congress extensively discussed Anglo-American relations.
Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, long-time expansionist,
former minister to England, and leading Democratic spokes-
man on foreign policy, stressed the seriousness of the dis-
putes between the two powers. He praised the foreign pol-
icy section of President Pierce's annual message, and de-
plored the National Intelligencer 's charge that the admin-
istration was fomenting "national Jars into national
hates." -^-^
Cass denied that anyone in the administration favored
war, but warned that a conflict could not be avoided by re-
fusing to believe it was possible. According to the Intel-
ligencer, there was little danger of war when statesmen
kept their senses; but, Cass noted, recent evidence con-
cerning English public opinion indicated that a slight in-
cident might produce a clash with the United States. This
development was "anything but honorable to the boasted in-
telligence of this middle of the nineteenth century."
Approving Secretary Marcy's demand for Grarapton's re-
call, Cass asserted that the dismissal of a minister was
no cause for war. Prussia, he noted, had recently secured
the conviction of an English consular agent who had en-
gaged in recruiting in that nation. Spain had dismissed
Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister at Madrid in 18^8,
for giving unwanted advice on Spanish internal affairs.
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England herself would never per.it such a flagrant viola-
txon Of her laws. Thus, the Intelligencer
- s opposition to
the administration's handling of the Crampton case had no
solid basis. Cass concluded by calling on Congress to pass
a resolution reaffirming the Monroe Doctrine, as a warning
to Britain and Prance against any anti-American interven-
tion in the Caribbean or Central America. ^5
New lork-s William H. Seward, a staunch expansionist
and one of the Whig Party's experts on foreign affairs, was
also critical of Britain's Central American and recruiting
policies, but urged that every possible course be taken to
avoid war. He was convinced that within twenty-five years
Britain would peaceably withdraw from the Western Hemisphere
Conflict might hasten this development, but could also de-
14lay It. If hostilities did break out, Seward believed,
they would probably become part of the larger European con-
flict. He agreed with Napoleon Bonaparte's prediction
that someday Europe would be either all Republican or all
Cossack, blamed Great Britain for being "unfaithful to the
cause of free institutions in Europe," and described the
government of Napoleon III as "a hateful usurpation." De-
spite these sentiments, Seward clearly preferred the West-
ern powers to Russia and disliked the idea of an American-
Russian alliance, that probably would be a consequence of
Anglo-American conflict:
are te.'Syt'and 'prLtlcanf Ad.inxstrationsthe Russian Empire is an ^h. J- ^V^^^^"'^''^^' ^^^^^
reality t obstinate and portentous
cal masis'of the A!??f^^'?^.^'^"f monarchi-
tendinp- Lainst an .nf.^ ^ western nations con-
no dutf ^nrnl\r^^^^^^^
on their side, I sLuld^e ?ery u^wiUinf?o en'sage my country in a combination^gaiis?\hem! I5
Although Seward hoped to avoid an Anglo-American war,
he did not fear its outcome. The United States possessed
greater resources than Britain (although less realized
wealth), and a plentiful reserve of manpower, "as Great
Britain well knows, for she has tried to penetrate it clan-
destinely." The State Department should inform England
that it would take action if she did not cease to exercise
dominion in Central America within one year. England, he
thought, would accede, since a war would be disastrous to
her commerce and industry. He counted heavily on the in-
fluence of the British commercial interests, saying that
the English political system, "hardly less than our ovm, is
a popular one." The controversy over Central America grew
out of "a caprice of her
. . . administration." "^^
Senator Stephen Mallory, Democrat of Florida, in a
speech advocating an appropriation measure of three million
dollars for manufacturing small arms and equipping forti-
fications, also deplored the possibility of conflict with
Great Britain; but he condemned both her recruiting and
Central American policies. Mallory, too, believed Spain's
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dismissal Of Sir Henry Bulwer was sufficient precedent for
Pierce's demand for Crampton's removal. The siege of Sevas-
topol, according to Mallory, had demonstrated the value of
fortifications against ships. For many years Congress had
been parsimonious in voting money for the coast defenses;
and now that steam power had developed, it was time to im-
prove these defenses. The danger of a sudden attack was
more feasible, since England could now plan such an attack
"with oust as much certainty as to time and place as an
archer can send an arrow to its mark from his bow." ^'^
Senator William P. Fessenden, a Maine Republican, took
issue with Seward, especially Seward's suggestion of a one-
year ultimatum on Central America. If such a challenge
were issued, the United States would immediately have to
place its army and navy on a war footing, and make large
appropriations for coastal defenses. Britain meanwhile
might launch a preventive war since such action could fore-
stall some of the American preparations. Fessenden rhetor-
ically asked if any nation which planned war against another
nation ever gave a year's notice of its intention.
Although critical of British policy in Central ilmerica,
Fessenden could not see that the United States had any
right to demand Britain's withdrawal from the Mosquito
Coast protectorate. Since no American territory was in-
volved, Fessenden favored a limited interpretation of the
19Monroe Doctrine.
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Senator Albert G. Brown of Mississippi read tran-
scripts of the recruiting trxals to show that the Pierce
administration was acting on the firmest ground when it
called for the recall of Crampton and the three consuls.
Among the documents quoted was a proclamation publicly
posted in Philadelphia, whxch bore the signature of the Pro-
vincial Secretary of Nova Scotia, and which was stamped
with the Arms of Great Britain. The heading of this docu-
ment read "Men Wanted for Her Majesty's Service." It held
out a bounty of thirty dollars on enlistment and a stipend
of eight dollars per month. Brown pointed out that such
inducements clearly refuted English contentions that there
had been no violation of the American neutrality law. De-
nouncing Lord Clarendon for challenging the veracity of
Hertz and Strobel, Brown also cited a series of dinner in-
vitations to Strobel from Sir Gaspard and Lady Le Marchant,
and from several other high ranking British officers. These
documents provided certain evidence "that Strobel was on
terms of social intimacy with these gentlemen, and is, there-
fore, unimpeached, and, so far as we know, unimpeachable."
Judge Kane's acceptance of the legality of payment for
passage to Halifax, to those who desired to enlist, was one
of Lord Clarendon's main defenses of the recruiting policy.
Kane had also stated that "conversations" relating to the
possibility of enlistment were legale Clarendon's note of
July 16, 1855, Senator Brown pointed out, did not mention
Kane's limitation of this opinion to the case of a Mr.
Bucknell, who had engaged in such "conversations." In
Hertz's case the Judge revealed the existence of evidence
which indicated that the defendant had actually hired men
in Philadelphia for the British service. Kane dismissed
the charges against Bucknell, but Hertz was convicted after
the Federal District Attorney presented this material.
Strobel's confession was one of the main exhibits which led
to the conviction. The close relationship of Strobel and
British officials in Nova Scotia, and Clarendon's failure
to mention Judge Kane's action with respect to Hertz, in-
dicated the flimsiness of the British defense of the legal-
ity of recruiting practices.
Another item which Senator Brown introduced was a let-
ter of instructions from Crampton to Strobel, written in
Crampton's own handwriting. This letter emphasized the
need for secrecy and for avoidance of any actions "which
might bear the appearance of recruiting within the Juris-
diction of the United States." According to Crampton it
was essential that no gatherings meet in such places as
beer halls, for they would easily draw official attention
and lead to prosecutions. Crampton correctly predicted
that "the institution of legal proceedings against any of
the parties in question, even if they were to elude the pen-
alty, would be fatal to the success of the enlistment it-
self."
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After these extensive quotations from the records -
including Roebuck's challenge to Lord Palmerston in Com-
mons
-
Senator Brown criticized Clarendon's attempt to in-
troduce the issue Of American munitions sales to Russia in-
to the controversy. Like Secretary Marcy, the Mississip-
pian saw this as a subterfuge:
How many thousand barrels of pork, flourand beans have England and France bought in theUnited States for the use of their armies? - andyet Russia has not complained. These articles
^f^li-'^'lt
'"'"'"^ 2^ ammunition, but they are storesoust as essential
-co the success of an army aspowder and ball. How many of our ships have theAllies chartered to transport their armies andtheir warlike stores? - and yet Russia has never
charged us with bad faith or double-dealing.
. . .
Men are very apt to lose their temper whenin discussion they are driven to the wall: and
when Lord Clarendon could no longer answer the
statesman-like notes of Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Mar-
cy, he lost his temper and became childish - infact, almost womanish. 23
Brown concluded his speech by stating, as so many oth-
ers had before him, that commercial considerations would
probably deter the British government from risking war with
the United States. However, he expressed confidence that,
were Britain to make demands which America could not com-
ply with. North and South would put aside their domestic
differences in a common war effort.
Senator W. W. Boyce of South Carolina also denounced
Crampton for violating "every possible obligation resting
upon him as an ambassador.'. He suggested that the neutral-
ity law should be made more stringent and called for the
immediate dismissal of Crampton. But Boyce was more em-
phatic than some of his colleagues about the necessity of
avoiding war with England fearing as he did the great in-
crease of power that would accrue to the central govern-
ment during such a conflict.
Senator Boyce also took a higher ground. It was "mon-
strous," he declared, that war was still the most common
means of settling national grievances after eighteen hun-
dred years of Christianity. Of all wars, he thought, a con-
flict with England would be most deplorable:
The advanced position both countries occupy
as the exponents of civilization and free insti-
tutions, would make a war between them disas-
trous in the extreme. It would do more to re-
tard civilization than any event which could
occur; it would put back the clock of time half
a century. Our intimate commercial relations -
the general spirit of our institutions - our
common origin - the fraternity of literature,
all speak trumpet-tongued against calling on the
sword as the arbiter between us. 26
Denying the influence of "Anglo-mania," Boyce de-
scribed England as "our great rival - almost our enemy."
Britain was trying to retard national progress in manufac-
turing and commerce by checking American expansion and,
above all, she was encouraging the slavery controversy. He
regarded the main British objective to be disruption of the
Union. The real rival of England was the industrial and
commercial North; and, once the anti-slavery agitation pro
duced dissolution, England would support the South against
the North. ^'^
Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, a leading
anti-expansionist Southern Whig, opposed the dismissal of
Crampton. He contended that the British government had
given a sufficient apology to the United States by suspend-
ing recruitment after the initial American protest. In
Crittenden's opinion it was beneath the dignity of a great
nation to dismiss a subordinate official after his govern-
ment had acknowledged its error. The Kentucky senator
warned against "leaping
. . . into a war with England,"
which he feared might be a consequence of Crampton 's dis-
missal. Conflict with England over the enlistment ques-
tion would not be based on any genuine national interest,
but rather on a matter of irritated pride. His argument
was essentially the same as that of the National Intelli-
gencer
,
which had accused the Pierce administration of
being deliberately bellicose in its dealings with England.
Crittenden contrasted certain persons "disposed to be ap-
peased" (i.e. himself) with others not so inclined, among
them being the President and his congressional support-
ers. 2^
One pro-administration senator. Democrat Charles James
of Rhode Island, compared English recruiting to the im-
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pressment of American seamen during the years before the
War of 1812. In the tradition of Jefferson and Madison,
Pierce had "sternly rebuked" this new English violation of
American neutrality. Praising Attorney General Gushing,
for his energetic action which put an end to the "nefarious
proceedings" of British agents, James (like Senator Brown)
also quoted Judge Kane's opinion in the Hertz case to rebut
Lord Clarendon's contention that an American Judge had up-
held the British interpretation of the American neutrality
1 29law. ^
The general trend of this Senate debate followed the
pattern that had existed throughout the Crimean War. Mil-
itant anti-British sentiment was strongest in the Democrat-
ic party while the Whigs were much more conciliatory. All
speakers were agreed that war with England would be a great
evil, but they differed on how far the United States should
go to. avoid it. All spoke against war, but practically all
were careful to avoid the charge of being pro-British,
which could be damaging in an election year. Crittenden
was the only senator who did not seem concerned about pro-
British accusations.
At this time George M. Dallas succeeded James Buchanan
as American Minister. Buchanan had long desired to return
home, but Pierce and Marcy, owing to political considera-
was in-
tions were reluctant to name a successor. Buchanan
terested in obtaining the Democratic presidential nomina-
tion in 1856, while Pierce was hoping for renomination,
George Dallas was finally appointed and there was a momen-
tary improvement in the diplomatic atmosphere after he ar-
rived in London. Lord Palmerston seemed to prefer him to
Buchanan, and explained the delay in responding to the de-
mand for Crampton's recall by citing Clarendon's absence
from London (the Foreign Secretary was attending the peace
conference in Paris). The Prime Minister intended to take
a stronger line in dealing with the United States, but was
waiting upon the completion of the peace treaty in Paris.
Since the end of the European war would free large British
military and naval forces for action elsewhere, Palmerston
calculated, it could also "lower the political barometer at
Washington."
After the signing of the peace treaty, Palmerston and
Lord Panmure, the Secretary of State for War, decided to
reinforce the garrison in Canada, which had been depleted
at the beginning of the war. Five infantry regiments and
a reinforcement of artillery were sent from the Crimea. The
office of Commander of the Forces in British North America
was revived, and Sir William Eyre appointed. Panmure, like
the Prime Minister, was confident that these actions would
strengthen the British position in negotiations with the
United Stateso He said that "Jonathan" had recently been
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"bumptious," but Britain's hands were now free and the Amer-
leans would "come second-best-off" in a trial of strength.
Nonetheless, England was not anxious to provoke a conflict,
and orders were issued to avoid any suggestion of menace
when the troop movement occurred.
The transfer decision met with some opposition in
Parliament. Lord Elgin, the former Governor-General of Can-
ada, opposed the apparent policy reversal which the new dis-
patch of troops implied. He denied that there was any seri-
ous anti-British feeling in the United States and referred
to his earlier efforts to reduce the size of British forces
in Canada. A large military force was not compatible with
the recent concession of limited home rule to Canada. Pan-
mure, in reply, stated that the troop transfers were only
designed to replace forces withdrawn at the beginning of
the Russian war. Reports that they were being sent out for
the purpose of aggression were "entirely without founda-
tion." 5^
In Canada itself Sir Edmund Head was extremely appre-
hensive about the possibilities of an American invasion.
He thought that the outbreak of civil war in Kansas and the
increasing animosity between North and South had created a
situation where the Pierce administration would take any
risk to divert public attention to foreign affairs. His
chief fear was of a possible agreement between Southern and
Northern politicians to sink their differences in support
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of an expansionist program. Seward's militant tone made
Head suspect that the New Yorker might be trying to arrange
such an agreement:
... If we have a war I suppose we
shall have to stand the first blow," Head wrote. "There is
nothing as yet to hinder my being taken prisoner any day for
as things now stand the Yankees would have command of the
lakes." 5^
While Head worried about an American invasion and
British troops were crossing the Atlantic, George Dallas
was pleased to find that America's "well-wishers" in Eng-
land were becoming more numerous and outspoken. He ad-
dressed one dinner where his remarks were followed by as-
surances from Edward Cardwell, a member of Parliament, that
Commons would sustain United States rights "against any
ministry whatever." According to Dallas, all the House
members present (mainly liberal Whigs and Peelite Tories)
approved Cardwell 's declaration. Moreover, the American
position was constantly upheld by John A. Roebuck and Wil-
liam E. Gladstone, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer
who had resigned from Palraerston's ministry a year earlier.
Palmerston for a while took a strong line with Dallas,
reminding him that it was up to the United States to choose
between peace and war: If war came, America would be "the
greatest sufferer." But the opposition in Parliament and
the press soon forced him to temporize. He requested more
time to consider the merits of the Crampton case. General-
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ly confident that the manufacturing and mercantile inter-
ests of England would prevent Palmerston from taking any
drastic action, Dallas had moments of doubt. In late April
1856, shortly after the British reinforcements were ordered
to Canada, Dallas wondered whether England's need of Amer-
ican cotton could be relied on as a guarantee of peace in
all circumstances. But a few weeks later he was convinced
that Palmerston was bluffing. He thought that Napoleon
Ill's eagerness for a rapprochement with Russia would con-
tribute to greater British caution in dealing with the
United States. Above all, the pressure for peace in Great
Britain was too strong for Palmerston to resist:
All men of opinions worth anything agree in
saying (I should not be surprised to hear it from
his own lips) that a conflict with the United
States IS the only thing he could not stand for
six months, or even half that time. His power
is immense, but that is a rock on which, if he
touch, he founders. 36
Palmerston did persist in his original intention to re-
sist the demand for Crampton's recall. After Clarendon re-
turned from Paris the Foreign Secretary sent a despatch to
Washington which reiterated his earlier defense of the Brit-
ish minister's conduct. The British refusal to recall
Crampton did not come as a surprise to Pierce and Marcy.
Dallas, weeks before Clarendon's despatch, had already so
informed Narcy. In any cose. Pierce ordered that Crampton
and the three consuls be handed their passports after the
despatch arrived. ^'^
Pierce, during this period, received information that
Britain was willing to sell arms to Costa Kica for use a-
Sainst Walker's regime in Nicaragua. Moreover, a British
naval vessel had stopped an American steamer, the Orizaba,
in Nicaraguan waters and demanded her papers. Pierce now
decided to recognize the Walker government and expel Cramp-
ton simultaneously. Secretary Marcy opposed this combina-
tion of events. He supported the expulsion decision but
regarded Walker as a reckless adventurer who had broken the
American laws. But Pierce was determined to take a strong
stand on both issues. In his opinion Britain would soon
send troops in support of the Costa Ricans if the United
States did not recognize Walker. An American warship was
ordered to the Nicaraguan coast to prevent any repetition
of the Orizaba incident and the Nicaraguan envoy was re-
ceived a few days before Crampton was expelled.
Pierce and Secretary Marcy agreed that Dallas should
be authorized to resume negotiations with Britain over the
Central American question. But there was a possibility
that the British government, having officially sustained
Crampton 's actions, might retaliate by dismissing Dallas.
When the news of Crampton 's dismissal reached London in
early June, Lord Palmerston strongly favored sending the
American minister home. He said that any other course
would be "dirt eating" to the United States. In an angry
letter to Lord Cowley, the British ambassador in Paris
Clarendon said that the Americans were rapidly becoming a
"universal nuisance." The French government should take
notice Of this danger, since its interests were also im-
periled by American expansion. Dallas, meanwhile, wondered
Whether he would be the last American minister to Britaxn.
But English peace advocates now demonstrated their
strength.
Roebuck's use of the recruiting documents had already
partially undermined Palmerston's American policy. After
the dismissal of Crampton, the mercantile and manufacturing
classes made it very clear that they were opposed to any
retaliation against Dallas. Since Palmerston's government
consisted of a coalition of old Whigs and Liberals, and the
Liberals were closely connected with the manufacturing in-'
terests, the Prime Minister could not risk the collapse of
his ministry. Several cabinet members made it clear that
they would not support a strong anti-American policy. The
Conservative opposition in Commons also was very critical
of Palmerston's policy. Benjamin Disraeli, former Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, and Conservative leader,
, declared:
"It would be wise if Britain would at least recognize that
the United States, like all the great countries of Europe,
have a policy, and that they have a right to have a pol-
icy." ^0
Faced by such varied opposition, Palmerston decided
against Dallas' expulsion and the only retaliatory action
for the Crampton dismissal was failure to appoint a Brit-
ish minister to Washington while Pierce was in the White
House, The cabinet also decided to quietly abandon the
British claim to a protectorate over the Mosquito Indians.
Rationalizing his concessions, Palmerston played down the
Crampton case and stressed that he was "most anxious" to
maintain diplomatic relations with the United States. He
also emphasized a conciliatory policy for Central America.
This reversal of recent positions on the enlistment and
Central American questions proved very effective and the
ministry emerged from the controversy stronger than be-
fore.
In the United States the announcement of Crampton 's
dismissal caused a minor panic on Wall Street, and the pos-
sibility of war was taken quite seriously by some people.
George Templeton Strong confided to his diary that although
he. disliked the prospect of a conflict with England, he
could see it might have some positive results. It would
probably halt the activity of both pro and anti-slavery
fanatics, a prospect pleasing to Strong, since he regarded
both Southern expansionists and Northern abolitionists as
lawless. Although few prominent Americans seriously de-
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Sired a war with England, there was a widespread assumption
that such a conflict would again draw the North and South
together, (a few years later, after the states of the deep
South had seceded, William H. Seward would briefly toy with
this idea as a last-ditch means of reuniting the two sec-
tions.) On the other hand, some Englishmen in 1856 thought
that New England would either remain neutral or Join forces
with Britain in the event of an /mglo-American war. Gar-
rison's Liberator could even visualize Franklin Pierce as a
providential instrument for ending the slave system in the
South.
^ .
Rumors of war passed quickly when it became apparent
that the British government had no intention of sending
Dallas home. During the course of the enlistment affair
Pierce's administration was frequently accused of using it
as an electioneering device in the 1856 campaign. This
charge was made most commonly by the London Times and other
British newspapers, but it occasionally appeared in Amer-
ican papers like the National Intellip:encer
. Pierce, to be
sure, did hope that his action against the British minister
and the three consuls would improve his chances of renom-
ination; and Grampton was given his passports about a week
before the Democratic National Convention met. But domes-
tic issues dominated the convention, and James Buchanan who
had recently returned from England, received the nomina-
tion. Since Buchanan had been out of the United States
during the years of increased agitation over the expansion
Of slavery, he was considered
"safe" on the issue. The con
vention did endorse Pierce's foreign policy in strong lan-
guage, notably with respect to the Monroe Doctrine. ^5
Most American papers approved of the dismissal of
Crampton with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The New York
SEibune Claimed that the British were far more nervous over
the Crampton affair than the Americans, and approvingly
noted the role of British public opinion in forcing Lord
Palmerston to modify his policy. Anglo-American commercial
ties had become so close, according to the Tribune, that a
war between the two nations was very unlikely.
Although the New Orleans Picayune criticized Pierce
.
for delaying the dismissal of Crampton, it applauded the
action when it finally came and observed with satisfaction
the less belligerent tone of the London Times a few weeks
after news of the dismissal arrived. The Times had aban-
doned its original suggestion that Dallas should be sent
home. In the opinion of the Picayune Pierce's handling of
the Central American affair deserved more criticism than
his policy in the Crampton case: If he had recog-nized the
Walker regime earlier, the British would not have dared to
encourage Costa Rica to declare war on Nicaragua.
The New York Times
,
in approving the administration's
action in the enlistment dispute, contrasted Secretary
Haroy's letters favorably with the "offensive character" of
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some Of Lord Clarendon. s despatches. It also had high
praise for Hoebuck's defense of the American position; and,
though opposed to Walker's Nicaraguan adventure, asserted
that the English record in India did not entitle her to com-
plain about American expansionism.
^''^''^^
' ? ^^--^Fjazine also supported administration policy
on recruiting. It criticized England for trying to use the
alliance with Napoleon III to check American as well as
Russian expansion, denounced anti-American diatribes in the
British press, and asserted that almost all Americans were
in favor of peace, but that they would be ultimately vic-
torious in any war with England.
Drafting the peace treaty was comparatively easy,
since the Russians had agreed to the main Allied demands in
January 1856. The Treaty of Paris prohibited Russia from
maintaining any warships on the Black Sea (except small
coastal patrol vessels); so were the Turks, but they now
had an advantage over the Russians since their fleet in the
Sea of Narmora could easily move into the Black Sea in the
event of war. The Danubian Principalities were given au-
tonomy under Turkish suzerainty. Bessarabia, v;hich had
been annexed by the Russians in 1812, was rejoined with the
Principalities.
Turkey was further protected by being admitted into
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the Concert of Europe in return for a pledge to guarantee
the civil rights or her Christian subjects. In the Baltic,
Russia was forced to agree to the demilitarization of the
Aland Islands, which had been captured by Sir Charles
Napier's expedition in the summer of 1854.
The Declaration of Paris establishing new rules for
maritime warfare was the section of the Treaty of Paris
that most directly concerned the United States. At the be-
ginning of the war, the Pierce administration had tried un-
successfully to persuade Britain and France to sign a per-
manent "free ships, free goods" treaty with the United
States. Russia immediately agreed to such a treaty, but
the Western powers insisted that it be combined with an
American renunciation of privateering. Since it had never
been American policy to maintain a large permanent navy.
Pierce and Marcy rejected any prohibition upon privateer-
ing unless the British and French would agree to abandon
all warfare against private property at sea. The Allies
refused to accept such a limitation, and the matter rested
here until the end of the war.
Although the British were somewhat harsher in their
dealings with the small maritime neutrals (particularly the
North German cities) than with the United States, they
found on the whole that a successful blockade of the Russian
ports could be maintained without resorting to the rigorous
search-and-seizure practices of the Napoleonic V/ars. Con-
sequently, they were willing to renounce some of these pol-
•
• 51icies. ^
The United States government was presented with the
important question of whether or not to adhere to the mari-
time clauses of the Treaty of Paris which prohibited pri-
vateering, stated that a neutral flag protected non-contra-
band enemy goods ,and that non-contraband neutral goods on
enemy ships were not subject to capture. Moreover, block-
ades had to be effective if neutral powers were to respect
them. The last three clauses of the declaration were very
pleasing to the Pierce administration, since the United
States had advocated them for over half a century. Before
the War of 1812, for example, the Americans had frequently
protested against the "paper blockade" of many European
ports that Britain was maintaining. The other clauses con-
tained a clear affirmation of the "free ships, free goods"
doctrine.
However, the unmodified privateering clause was as
unacceptable to the administration as it had been two years
earlier. The French minister presented the treaty to the
State Department in late May 1856 and requested American
adherence to the maritime section. On July 28 Marcy for-
warded a counterproposal to American representatives of
France, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sardinia. He suggest-
ed that the provision against privateering be amended with
the following words: ".And that the private property of the
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suboects or citxzens of a belligerent on the high seas shall
be exempted from seizure by any public armed vessels of the
other belligerent, except it be contraband." ^3
England was firmly opposed, believing that she had al-
ready given up enough of her traditional blockading prac
tices. Some British statesmen were concerned over the pes-
sibility that, in a future war with France, England would
find these treaty restrictions too onerous. In event of
such a war, they argued, the old practices which were con-
sidered unnecessary in the conflict with Russia might again
be valuable. If the American proposal was accepted, Brit-
ish sea power would be restricted still further. The Con-
tinental powers were more favorably disposed towards the
Marcy amendment but none of them wished to challenge Brit-
ain openly at this time. Russia, however, did privately
assure the United States that its adherence to the new
maritime code did not indicate disrespect for America's
right to fit out privateers in wartime.
Marcy 's amendment was generally praised in the nation's
press, and received the endorsement of Elihu Burritt, Amer-
ica's leading pacifist. But since the European powers would
not accept the amendment, and the United States would not
accept the Declaration of Paris without it, the matter lay
dormant until the Civil War began. Then Secretary of State
William H. Sev/ard, fearing attacks by Confederate priva-
teers on Northern ships, offered to sign the declaration
without the Marcy amendment. But the signatories of the
treaty refused, declaring that the United States had been
given such an opportunity five years earlier and could not
suddenly reverse its position because of its present dif-
ficulties. ^5
American reaction to the end of the Crimean War varied.
The National Intelligencer editorially praised the moderate
peace treaty terms. The Allies had achieved their wartime
objective, namely security for Turkey and for Europe from
Russian predominance. At the same time, the Intellip:encer
asserted, the treaty was not so severe as to permanently
embitter the Russians and guarantee a renewal of the war.
Praising Austria and Prussia for remaining neutral, the
paper found this policy "masterly."
The New York Tribune found some evidence of human
progress in the new peace settlement. It was pleased by
the immediate publication of the treaty terras and com-
forted by the thought that, in contrast to the eighteenth
century (when a war "so finely begun as this was" would
have lasted another ten years), the Crimean conflict ended
after two and a half years of fighting. Europeans, it be-
lieved, would no longer permit such protracted wars. ^'^
Turkey, in the Tribune 's opinion, was the chief loser.
Its admission into the Concert of Europe would only make it
easier for the European powers to expand at Turkish expense.
Since the conservative alliance of the throe Eastern mon-
archies was "the greatest diplomatic ruin" of the war the
Tribune predicted that Russia would eventually combine with
Napoleon III. it also expected Russian support for Sardin-
ia against Austria in Italy. These predictions were a
fairly accurate forecast of the European alignment in the
Italian War of 1859.
According to the Tribune, the Black Sea clauses of the
treaty were humiliating to Russia, but would have little
effect ultimately on her expansion:
Navy yards will be built at Archangel on the
r^r^ ^t^U""^^ "^^^^^ the Amoor on the Pa-cific
;
both having better materials for the con-
i^r^.M-^p'^f/^S''^^'' ^^^"^ P^^ts of the Eux-ne, v/hile to the Amoor machinery may be easilvforwarded from the United States^^
. . Russia^like a steadily rising tide, may be momentarily
checked, but It will overthrow with renewed forceany artificial dam. 59
The Tribune also denounced the strong opposition to
the peace treaty that existed in England. It praised the
manufacturers, commercial men, and Peelite Conservatives
who favored peace, contrasting them with the conservative
agricultural classes and "the great masses of England" who
were "burning with a bully's desire to retrieve their fail-
ures in the ring." The British wartime record was deplor-
able and, only the work of Florence Nightingale stood out
amidst a "forest inaccessible of incapacity and disgrace,"
The Tribune did not share the disappointment of some Euro-
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pean radicals who regretted that the Crimean War had not
developed into a truly revolutionary conflict. It declared
that only peace could aid in the emancipation of Europe's
masses.
It was good that peace had returned to Europe, stated
the New Orleans Picayune, although the treaty appeared to
strengthen conservatism. The Picayune also saw signs of an
impending Franco-Russian alliance. Nevertheless, the Anglo-
French entente had achieved a psychological victory that was
greater than their actual military success. They had bro-
ken Europe's faith in the invincibility of Russia, which had
flourished ever since 1812, checked Russia's growing naval
power, and temporarily ended her ability to threaten Tur-
key. ^1
In spite of this, Turkish sovereignty was now impaired
by a general European protectorate. Austria and Russia were
alienated, and it was possible that the Anglo-French al-
liance might break down soon. The war had brought no gain
for popular liberties, but "the lovers of humanity" could
still hope that "the hour and the man for deliverance vv^ill
surely come."
The New York Times said that the peace treaty, like
the war itself, was a product of "selfishness and medioc-
rity." Nevertheless, the paper stressed the benefits that
peace would bring to world commerce. France had reaped the
greatest gains in prestige from the war, but England would
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have made a better showing if it had lasted another year.
The conflict had revealed Russia's need of "industrial and
commercial development/' and proved that "a purely military
policy is insufficient." Along with many Americans and
liberal Europeans the Times shared the conviction (or hope)
that war was an anachronism in the new age of commerce and
industry,
One man who did not believe that war was out-dated
suffered a decisive defeat a year after the signing of the
Treaty of Paris, William Walker's regime in Nicaragua was
overthrown in 1857 b;y forces from the Central American re-
publics which were well provided with British arms and ad-
visors. Although the United States had recognized V/alker,
President Buchanan had no desire to add further fuel to the
slavery question by taking any action on his behalf. More-
over, Walker had managed to alienate some of his chief fi-
nancial backers, notably Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt.
So the "Grey-eyed Man of Destiny" was left to his fate.
After experiencing a long siege, he was compelled to aban-
don Grenada, the Wicaraguan capital, and return to the
United States.
Although the British did withdraw from the Mosquito
protec Lorato, their influence in Central America remained
strong after Walker's defeat. When in 1860 Walker attempt-
ed another incursion, he was captured by a British naval
officer who handed him over to the Honduran authorities,
sentenced to death, he was executed by a firing squad. &5
Thus, the Pierce administration's apparent victory in
both the recruiting and Central Ainerican disputes in 1856
had been partly illusory. England yielded to public pres-
sure in accepting Crampton's dismissal without retaliation,
but her concessions in Central America were more apparent
than real. Once the Crimean War was over Britain could
take a stronger stand in the Western Hemisphere, which it
did by supporting the campaign against Walker. Faced with
the increasing sectional bitterness aroused by the civil
war in Kansas and the Dred Scott decision, the United
States government's ability to act in Central America was
weaker than it had been when Britain and France were en-
gaged in the Crimean War.
CONCLUSION
American reaction to the Crimean War was closely bound
up with the spirit of Manifest Destiny and the domestic
controversy over slavery. Some years earlier the Mexican
War convinced most Americans of United States hegemony in
the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine, when formu-
lated, seemed to some i^uropeans a rather ludicrous piece of
bombast by a weak nation with no power to back up its
words. By the 1850's, however, the situation had greatly
changed. The temporary lull in the debate over slavery af-
ter the 1850 Compromise seemed to presage a new expansion-
ist era. More than ever, owing to the California gold rush,
American attention was focused on Central America. Agita-
tion for Cuban annexation, while strongest in the South,
also had Northern supporters. Santo Domingo was another
likely goal of America's Caribbean expansion and, in the
Pacific theater, missionaries and businessmen were active
in Hawaii and China. In 1853 Commodore Matthew C. Perry
succeeded in opening up Japan to American trade. Manifest
Destiny clashed with British, French, or Spanish interests
in all of these places. Spain, being a second-rate power
by this time, was sustained indirectly in Cuba by Britain
and France, and these two nations were America's main ri-
vals.
United States interest in European affairs was growing
rapidly at this time. Many observers noted that in the
past twenty years, mounting affluence and the development
of steamship lines had greatly increased the number of
American tourists in Europe. The ms Revolutions aroused
considerable enthusiasm in the United States. Kossuth's
American tour in 1851-52 evoked much sympathy for the Hun-
garian cause, although some of the pro-Kossuth sentiment
can be attributed to anti-Catholic feelings. Senator
Stephen A. Douglas and other "Young America" spokesmen dur-
ing the early fifties called for an end to "Old Fogyism"
which, among other things, demanded perpetual American ab-
stention from European politics. President Pierce stated
in his inaugural address in March 1855 that Americans should
not be deterred from expansion by any fears of being great.
A few months after his term began Commander Ingraham res-
cued the Hungarian refugee Martin Koszta from the Austri-
ans at Smyrna. Since this incident took place during the
early phase of the Russo-Turkish dispute which led to the
Crimean War, many European and American observers saw it
as portending an active American role in Europe.
.
Ingraham 's action at Smyrna was approved by most of
the American press with the important exceptions of the
most conservative and the most radical journals. The Na-
tional Intelligencer
,
spokesman for the old V/higs, both
North and South, opposed the rescue of Koszta, just as it
opposed most other actions which were in lino with the pol-
icy of Manifest Destiny. On the other hand the Liberator,
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the voice of Garrisonian abolitionism, denounced American
hypocrisy in rescuing a Hungarian abroad while enforcing
the Fugitive Slave Act at home. Ingraham's supporters cov-
ered the broad press spectrum - from the Washington Union,
organ of the Pierce administration, to the New York Trib-
une, a strongly anti-slavery paper which also sympathized
with European revolutionaries.
The National Intellirpnf p-p ' q n•t-^-^ -t-,,^ ^ f> ^. .
_
xiut.j..L±;^encer s attitude foreshadowed the
conservative response to the Crimean War. The old-line
Whigs were opposed to further expansion mainly because they
hoped to avoid a resumption of the agitation over slavery
and also because they regarded war as a very dangerous game
with potentially disastrous consequences for American com-
merce. If new territories were acquired in the Caribbean
and in Central America, the United States, they reasoned,
would be faced with the problem of governing people who
could not be assimilated into the American political sys-
tem. Many Whigs distrusted European revolutionaries and
regarded America's liberal political institutions as appli-
cable (at least for the present) only to Anglo-Saxon peo-
ples. According to them the American Revolution had noth-
ing in common with the doctrines of French and German so-
cialists
.
Conservatives accordingly favored a policy of strict
neutrality for the United States. Their interest in pre-
serving tho benefits of peacetime commerce unimpaired led
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them to deplore anti-British sentiment and government pol-
icies which might lead to an Anglo- American clash. At the
same time, they tried to be fair to the Russians. They de-
nounced the vilifiers of Nicholas I and lamented the /uiglo-
phobic diatribes of some newspapers, things easy to do since
they had political and social reservations about European
revolutionaries. Even Daniel Webster, despite his welcome
to Kossuth, had conceded that there were progressive as-
pects to the Czar's regime.
Conservatives and abolitionists differed sharply in
tneir attitudes towards the Crimean War. Abolitionists were
divided between unconditional pacifists such as Garrison
and supporters of Great Britain like Thomas Wentworth Hig-
ginson. But even Garrison clearly preferred Britain to
Russia, although opposing war on principle. Higginson, on
the other hand, saw Russia's expansion at Turkish expense
as similar to the attempt of the South to establish slav-
ery in America's Western territories.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act caused many anti-slavery peo-
ple to regard a conflict such as the Crimean War in a dif-
ferent light than they might have a few years earlier.
Pacifist sentiment, which had appeared to be gaining ground
in both Europe and iVmerica for several years, suffered a
disastrous setback in both hemispheres simultaneously. The
combination of events made some of the New England reform-
ers - a small minority of the total population - the most
consistent American supporters of the Allied cause. Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Charles Sumner and
William Henry Channins all favored the Western powers while
advocating resistance to pro-slavery forces in Kansas.
Southern politicians and newspaper editors were more
outspokenly pro-Russian than any other group of Americans.
Southern Democrats, unlike their Whig colleagues, engaged
t
in frequent denunciations of Great Britain and sometimes
coupled these with enthusiastic praise of Russia. Although
Southern defenders of slavery had some sympathy for the
European revolutionaries, there was a tendency to view Rus-
sian society favorably, as comparable to their own. Both
societies, after all, had a class of servile agricultural
laborers at their base.
Moreover, many Southerners saw Britain's attempts to
thwart Russia's expansion as identical with her policies in
the Caribbean. They also regarded British abolitionism as
a deadly threat. One of the favorite Southern methods of
rebutting the British was to dwell at length on the miser-
ies of the people of Ireland and India under British rule.
Some Southerners compared the supposed happiness of Amer-
ican slaves and Russian serfs with the suffering endured by
the Irish, the Indians and English factory workers. Simi-
larly, the Austrian government would occasionally remind
London about Ireland when Britain rebuked Austria for its
repressive practices in Italy and Hungary. Thus there was
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a considerable similarity of outlook between Southern de-
fenders of slavery and European conservatives.
Strangely enough, Southern admiration for Russia and
dislike of Britain was partially echoed by American advo-
cates of a high protective tariff, notably the strongly
anti-slavery New York Tribune. But the British enemy that
the New York paper was fighting was free trade rather than
abolitionism. It believed that England was cooperating
with Southern slave-owners in a campaign to impose free
trade on America, At times the Tribune came close to say-
ing that the new British economic doctrine was a plot de-
signed to reduce the United States and Continental Europe
to the economic level of Ireland or India.
Although anti-Catholicism was widespread in the United
States during the early 1850' s, the role of France in the
Crimean War was not immediately a prime factor in shaping
the attitudes of Americans towards the conflict. At the
beginning of the war, when it was purely a Russo-Turkish
conflict, American opinion (both North and South) was over-
whelmingly pro-Turkish. After Britain and France allied
themselves with Turkey, the dominant American tendency was
to regard the war as primarily an Anglo-Russian conflict.
This attitude was changing by the time Sevastopol fell.
French troops, far outnumbering the British, played the
leading role in its capture. Moreover, superior French
supply and medical services had been clearly demonstrated
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during the winter of 1854-55, and it alarmed some American
Protestants (particularly clergymen) who favored the Allied
cause. In England the war had received more ardent support
from Dissenters than from Anglicans; so too from American
evangelical denominations (at least in the Northern states).
But when it appeared likely that Napoleon III, the protec-
tor of the Pope, would be the chief beneficiary of the war,
evangelical enthusiasm faded. Russia might be Gog and Ma-
gog, but the Pope was still the Antichrist.
American Catholic opinion, on the other hand, was not
strongly pro-Allied. Orestes Brownson, a leading Catholic
intellectual, disliked Napoleon III (whose protection of
the Pope he considered mere opportunism) and leaned towards
the Czar. As editor, he devoted much space to refuting the
contention of some European Catholics that Russia was se-
cretly a revolutionary power. Brownson also disliked the
British commercial system, regarding it as being largely a
Reformation product. Austria, in Brownson's opinion, was
the keystone in the European balance of power. She blocked
any one power - be it Prance, Russia, or "the Revolution" -
who might otherv/ise dominate the Continent.
Since many American Catholics were recent Irish immi-
grants, they naturally formed an important source of anti-
British sentiment. The Irish vote was vital for the Demo-
cratic Party and, along with Southern dislike of Britain,
contributed to the pro-Russian leanings of bhe Pierce ad-
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ministration. British fear of possible Irish filibustering
expeditions from America heightened the tense situation
during the autumn of 1855, when the British reinforced their
Caribbean squadron.
The Crimean War increased the importance of commercial
ties between the United States and the Western Allies while
at the same time it contributed to a deterioration of, po-
litical relations. Many American merchant ships were char-
tered by England and France to transport troops and sup-
plies to the Crimea. The Allies also purchased large a-
mounts or American foodstuffs. Some munitions were sold to
Russia during the war, but on the whole there was a drastic
decline in American-Russian trade due to the Allied block-
ade. At the outset of the conflict Russia hoped that the
United States would challenge this blockade in the Baltic.
But the American government respected it despite hints from
the Russians that the United States could obtain the Baltic
carrying trade which had long been dominated by the Brit-
ish,
The Crimean War would have stood out as a milestone in
the history of American foreign policy if the mediation
plan which President Pierce considered in the spring of
185^ had come to fruition. This plan did mark the first
time that the United States government seriously considered
offering its services to end a major European war. British
and French concern over the possible consequences of Amer-
ican intervention in Europe, plus the disputes between the
Western Allies and the United States over Cuba and Central
America, soon made it clear that American mediation was
not acceptable.
British and French anxiety about rapid American expan-
sion and their fear of a Rus so-American alliance indicated
their increasing realization of the potentialities of
United States power. The London Times and certain French
writers stressed Russian-American similarities despite the
differences in their political institutions. In France
there was a particularly strong sense of the relentless ad-
vance of the giants of the East and West which one day, it
was feared, would squeeze Western Europe between them.
While Britain and France worried over the growth of the
United States, many Americans feared that the anti-Russian
alliance would be turned against the United States at some
future date. Lord Clarendon's statement, at the beginning
of the war, that England and France were in agreement on
all important questions in both hemispheres was interpreted
by Senator Lewis Cass as an indication that the Allies
might be planning Caribbean actions. Although Clarendon,
in response to an inquiry from Buchanan, stated that he on-
ly meant Argentina v;hen he referred to the Western Hemi-
sphere, American suspicions persisted. Buchanan generally
thought that the old Anglo-French rivalry would soon re-
assert itself and block any Joint anti-American action.
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However, there were times when he was less sanguine. Un-
like many Americans, including Secretary of State Marcy,
Buchanan believed that Napoleon III would be the prime mov-
er behind any maneuvers in the Caribbean.
The possibility of a Russian-American alliance was not
seriously considered by the United States, despite the many
American differences with the Allied powers. Both Demo-
crats and Whigs preferred to adhere to the traditional Amer-
ican neutrality policy, although the Democrats were clearly
more anti-British than their opponents. Pierce was fortu-
nate in not being directly confronted with a situation in-
volving Russian privateers similar to that of the Genet
case of 1793. If the Russian government had followed the
advice of its minister in Washington it would have attempt-
ed to fit out privateers in American ports. But Count Nes-
selrode regarded American neutrality as the most that Rus-
sia could hope for and preferred not to risk the danger of
completely alienating American opinion. His decision was
probably wise, in the light of later American reaction to
the Crampton case.
Towards the end of the Crimean War the revelation of
a British attempt to enlist a foreign legion on American
soil helped crystallize anti-Allied opinion. What was most
notable was the way in which newspapers violently opposed
on most other issues joined in condemning the practice.
These denunciations of British violations of American neu-
trality raised the question of whether the North and South
would have put aside their differences if war with Britain
had broken out in 1855 or 1856. Despite some rhetoric
about war restoring national unity, it seems likely that
sectionalism was already too great to make such an event
possible. The New York Tribune mightaoin many Southern
newspapers and politicians in denouncing England, but there
was a world of difference between Greeley's protectionist
antipathy to Great Britain and Southern hatred of British
abolitionism. Probably an Anglo-American war would have
found the United States as seriously divided in sentiment
as it had been during the War of 1812. Britain would have
faced a similar situation, since an American war would have
been almost unanimously opposed by her commercial and in-
dustrial interests.
Another indication that war with England would not
have healed the North-South breach is that Pierce's dis-
missal of Crampton did not help him win renomination.
There was no outburst of patriotic enthusiasm for the Pres-
ident at the Democratic convention, James Buchanan v/as
nominated chiefly because he had been outside the country
during the Kansas-Nebraska controversy. Pierce's defiance
of Great Britain could not counterbalance his involvement
in that dispute.
V/hen one looks at America's reaction to the Crimean
War in the long perspective, it appears as one of the great
might-have-beens of history. The United States in 1855
seemed on the verge of a new era of expansion in Central
America and the Caribbean, while the Koszta affair was a
portent of intervention in Europe.' If the slavery contro-
versy had not been re-intensified in 18^4, we might specu-
late that Texas events would serve as a model in Central
America with William Walker, a new Sam Houston, paving the
way for the annexation of Nicaragua. The European war was
the opportunity for a more aggressive Caribbean policy
which the Pierce administration recognized but could not
exploit because of internal division over the "peculiar in
stitution." If Pierce had not been forced to focus on do-
mestic affairs, Cuban annexation might have been accom-
plished rather than the fiasco of the Ostend Manifesto.
Even in the midst of the heightened slavery controver-
sy, his successor attempted to continue a strong foreign
policy, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America.
James Buchanan, on several occasions, unsuccessfully re-
quested authority from Congress to use American armed for-
ces to maintain order there. The vigor of his policy sug-
gests what American activity in the world might have been
like without an impending civil war at home. Buchanan a-
chieved one great success; he persuaded the British govern-
ment to formally renounce its old assertion of the right to
search American ships for deserters, finally laying to rest
one of the causes of the War of 1812.
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If an aggressive American foreign policy unhampered by
domestic discontent had come into collision with an old-
fashioned British blockading policy during the Crimean War,
the United States might have become Russia's ally. Neither
of these factors existed, however, so the war was of sec-
ondary importance in American politics. But the alignment
of opinion on the war revealed that domestic differences
were reflected in attitudes towards foreign policy.
Perhaps the most significant aspects of the American
reaction to the war were the strong anti-British and pro-
Russian sentiment in the South and the generally pro-Brit-
ish stand by a majority of New England intellectuals.
Southern animosity during the Crimean War was not forgotten
in London when the South looked to Britain for raajor assist-
ance during the Civil War. The reaction of the intellec-
tuals (and of the missionaries) is important for two rea-
sons: First, there is the sense of Anglo-American solidar-
ity in spreading political liberty around the world which
they exhibited; and, secondly, their tendency to accept and
even to glorify war was stimulated by the Kansas conflict.
The Crimean War seemed to fit the same pattern of despotism
versus liberty. In both the North and South, then, Ameri-
cans were reading their nation's destiny by the light of .
European events.
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